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The Takeover by a Literary Culture 
Richard Rorty’s Philosophy of Literature 
 




The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive account of the role literature, the ‘literary’, 
and the notion of a ‘literary culture’ plays in the work of the American pragmatist philosopher 
Richard Rorty (1931-2007). While these notions are systematically significant in Rorty’s work, no 
thoroughgoing study of the literary aspect of his oeuvre exists. I undertake this study to understand 
why Rorty hoped ‘culture as a whole’ would be ‘poeticized’ (CIS p. 53) rather than simply 
pragmatised, and why he, at the end of his career, stated that his key contribution had been his 
narrative about the ‘takeover’ by a ‘literary culture’ (PTG p. 4). I ask what work literature and a 
particular literary vocabulary does for Rorty as he articulates his own brand of pragmatism.  
Examining Rorty’s narrative as narrative, and foregrounding his constant alignment with 
the literary attitude, allows me to understand the Rortian project as a break with traditional forms, 
and, importantly, with the governing forms we impose on history and moral progress. Tracing the 
roots of the idea of a ‘literary culture’ in Rorty’s work permits me to see CIS as a literary and 
poeticist response to a question Rorty’s adoption of a literary vocabulary helps him articulate: how 
we might cultivate a humanist pragmatism – a mode of thought and work that emulates the attitude 
and writerly practices of the literary artist or critic. And, lastly, looking closely at why Rorty, 
despite advancing a thoroughly contextualist and functional conception of literature, recommends 
that we centre liberal-intellectual practice around plays, poems, and especially novels, lets me 
delineate the morally significant function Rorty takes literature in the narrow sense to be more 
efficient at performing – the performance of which depends on the cultivation of literary skill. I 
close by offering some thoughts on Rorty’s readings of Lolita and 1984, on how my findings 
enables us to become better readers of Rorty, especially of Rorty as a reader of literature, and on 
what I take Rorty’s attention to literature to imply about the role and importance of the literary 
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Pragmatism, Literature, Attitude 
 
Introduction 
That Richard Rorty was a literary philosopher in some sense is immediately clear from his work. 
Literature and an idea of a postmetaphysical ‘literary culture’ is a recurring refrain in his writing 
from the mid-seventies onwards. With the publication of Contingency, irony, and solidarity (1989, 
hereafter CIS), this theme became a prominent and distinctive facet of Rortian thought. Rorty 
deployed a range of concepts that sit at the heart of literary studies, urged philosophers to turn to 
literature and criticism, and turn away from philosophical representationalism. Moreover, he used 
novels, writers, and critics to make his case: Harold Bloom, Milan Kundera, Charles Dickens, 
Marcel Proust, George Orwell’s 1984, Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, to name a few.  
CIS is hard to categorise. It might be called a work of political or moral philosophy but is 
more appropriately described as a call to intellectual action to make a better world. It contains 
Rorty’s rationale for a version of liberal democracy he calls a ‘literary’ or ‘poeticized’ culture.1 He 
envisages this as a possible future where people turn to literature and literary critics for moral 
guidance. It is a place where intellectuals adopt a stance of self-conscious awareness of their own 
and everyone’s writing as writing: as literature or poetry, rather than as a transparent layer between 
thought and world. They see their ideas – including their idea of who they are – as human-made 
imaginative creations. In this culture, perceptions of what constitutes a better world – or society, or 
person, or the good, or the just – would not be construed as metaphysical ideas but as temporary, 
renegotiable outcomes of a continual, imaginative, creative, and conversational process of human 
making. As this thesis will show, CIS can also be considered a literary work in a particular Rortian 
sense of ‘literary’.  
It is a major task of this thesis to investigate what Rorty means by the designation 
‘literary’, as well as by a ‘literary’ culture, and his invocations and uses of ‘literary’ works. These 
notions and their uses are not only central to CIS but systematically significant to his thought. In a 
late essay, ‘Philosophy as a Transitional Genre’ from 2004 (hereafter PTG), Rorty submitted that 
the most significant contribution he had made in his philosophical career was to further our efforts 
to bring about a ‘literary culture’. The urgency and sense of drama conveyed as he makes this 
suggestion indicates the importance of its central construct: 
 






A way of getting Nietzsche, James, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Heidegger, and Dewey under the 
same antirepresentationalist tent, and a focus on the overlap between their views rather than on 
their disagreements, is pretty much all I have to offer. I want us to see all six of them as heralds 
of a new dawn – not just a new stage in the history of philosophy, but a new self-image for 
humanity. I think of them all as assisting in the takeover by what I call a ‘literary culture,’ a 
culture unlike anything that has existed in the past.2  
  
While Rorty’s is not a Hegelian end-of-history vision, the rise of ’a new dawn’, the ‘takeover’, the 
emergence of a radically new ‘self-image for mankind’, do not denote an insignificant event. There 
is clearly a before and an after.  
The narrative about Western culture’s intellectual and moral progress towards a ‘literary’ 
culture that Rorty points to as his central contribution was a story he told repeatedly – as he 
emphasises in PTG – throughout his career.3 Its roots are already discernible in his 1967 
‘Introduction’ to The Linguistic Turn when he worries that philosophy might never be able to 
move beyond a cycle of philosophers attempting to be presuppositionless but constantly being 
shown to fail by their successors.4 It was articulated as a progress-narrative in the 1970s and was 
further elaborated in the 80s and 90s. Rorty’s story runs from Platonic idealism, via the dualist, 
essentialising, systematic philosophising of Descartes and Kant, through Hegel’s historicism to 
romantic expressivism, via Nietzsche, Darwin, classical pragmatism, and analytic philosophy, to a 
point where this vision of an expressly literary culture ‘unlike anything that has existed in the past’ 
becomes a conceivable future.5  
This novel narration of intellectual history thus culminates in a utopian vision that cannot 
be set out without recourse to literature and poetry. In CIS, Rorty introduced the idea of ‘final 
vocabularies’: the set of words that we employ to justify ourselves, to formulate our ‘long-term 
projects’ and our ‘highest hopes’.6 ‘Literary culture’ was undeniably a part of Rorty’s final 
philosophical vocabulary, and, by extension, so was the word ‘literary’ and a notion of literature. 
 
 
2 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Transitional Genre’, in Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for 
Richard J. Bernstein, ed. by Richard J. Bernstein, Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (MIT Press, 2004), pp. 
3–28 (p. 4). 
3 Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 5. 
4 Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy’, in The Linguistic 
Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method, ed. by Richard Rorty (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992 (1967)), pp. 1–39 (pp. 1–2). 
5 Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 4. 





There is, then, good reason to hold that literature and the literary is a vital topic in Rortian 
philosophy. However, despite this being a key term to Rorty, ‘literary’ is not regularly used to 
characterise him and his work. While it is frequently noted in the commentary that he used literary 
examples to illustrate his philosophical case, and that he considered literature of vital importance 
to moral and political deliberation and advancement, it is not unusual to come across explications 
of his thought that proceed as if there was a core Rortian philosophy and that literature and ‘the 
literary’ was an auxiliary matter. 
 Two sources might serve as examples: the entries on Rorty in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (hereafter SEP) and Oxford Bibliographies. The author of the former, Bjørn Torgrim 
Ramberg, is a thoughtful, nuanced, and sympathetic Rorty-interpreter, known for having made 
Rorty concede ground on the question of whether we need some conception of ‘getting it right’ to 
be successful users of language.7 Additionally, while he mainly writes in an analytical vein, 
Ramberg has written on Rorty and hermeneutics, irony, and CIS, and appreciates Rorty’s 
engagement with the continental tradition.8 Yet, his authoritative account of Rortian philosophy 
does not provide any clues to the importance of literature in Rorty’s work. The entry begins: 
 
Richard Rorty developed a distinctive and controversial brand of pragmatism that expressed 
itself along two main axes. One is negative – a critical diagnosis of what Rorty takes to be 
defining projects of modern philosophy. The other is positive – an attempt to show what 
intellectual culture might look like, once we free ourselves from the governing metaphors of 
mind and knowledge in which the traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics… are 
rooted.9 
 
The critical diagnosis was chiefly set out in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979, hereafter 
PMN) and in the essays published shortly before and after PMN collected in Consequences of 
Pragmatism (1982, hereafter CP).10 Ramberg continues: ‘Rorty’s principal target is the 
 
7 See Bjørn T. Ramberg, ‘Post-ontological philosophy of mind: Rorty versus Davidson’, in Rorty and His 
Critics, ed. by Robert Brandom, Philosophers and Their Critics, 9 (Malden, Massachusetts, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), pp. 351–70. Rorty’s response follows. For a recent evaluation of what is at stake here, see 
Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi, ‘Two Forms of Realism’, ejpap, XII.1 (2020). 
8 See for instance Bjørn T. Ramberg, ‘For the sake of his own generation: Rorty on destruction and 
edification’, in Richard Rorty: From Pragmatist Philosophy to Cultural Politics, ed. by Alexander 
Gröschner, Colin Koopman and Mike Sandbothe (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 49–72; Bjørn T. 
Ramberg, ‘Irony's Commitment: Rorty's Contingency, Irony and Solidarity’, in Richard Rorty's Multiple 
Legacies, ed. by Samuel C. Wheeler III (= The European Legacy, 19 (2014)), pp. 144–62. 
9 Bjørn T. Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta 
[accessed 20 January 2020]. 





philosophical idea of knowledge as representation, as a mental mirroring of a mind-external world. 
Providing a contrasting image of philosophy, Rorty has sought to integrate and apply the milestone 
achievements of Dewey, Hegel and Darwin in a pragmatist synthesis of historicism and 
naturalism’.11  
Ramberg does add that:  
 
Characterizations and illustrations of a post-epistemological intellectual culture, ...are more 
richly developed in later works, such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), [and other 
works]. In these writings, ranging over an unusually wide intellectual territory, Rorty offers a 
highly integrated, multifaceted view of thought, culture, and politics, a view that has made him 
one of the most widely discussed philosophers in our time.12 
 
While this emphasises the importance of CIS, the observation that literature and a specifically 
literary, ‘poeticized’ culture is important to Rorty’s work is not made.13 Ramberg only mentions 
‘literature’ once, as he notes that Rorty ended his career as a Professor of Comparative Literature 
at Stanford University.14 The significance of this is not considered.  
A similar observation can be made by looking at Neil Gascoigne’s entry in Oxford 
Bibliographies. Gascoigne has worked extensively on Rorty and is also a sympathetic 
commentator.15 CIS is summarised in the following way:  
 
Describes the trajectory of Western thought as an attempt to make commensurable two 
‘constellations’ of values: those relating to our individual need to fulfil, create, or perfect 
ourselves (to exercise private autonomy), and those relating to our desire for solidarity with 
others, expressed in our public obligations. Rorty’s alternative image for the intellectual is that 
of the ‘liberal ironist,’ combining an awareness of the contingency of one’s own self-
conception with a commitment to liberal values.16  
 
There is nothing inherently wrong with this formulation. What appears incongruous is that this is a 
description of CIS as a work, yet its defining focus on literature is not deemed worthy of note. 
 
11 Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’. 
12 Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’. 
13 Poeticized: Rorty, CIS, p. 53. 
14 Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’. My italics. 
15 See for instance Neil Gascoigne, Richard Rorty: Liberalism, irony and the ends of philosophy, Key 
Contemporary Thinkers (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), and Neil Gascoigne, Rorty, Liberal Democracy, and 
Religious Certainty (Cham: Palgrave Pivot, 2019). 
16 Neil Gascoigne, ‘Richard Rorty’, in Oxford Bibliographies Online Datasets: Philosophy, ed. by Duncan 





Moreover, while Gascoigne mentions ‘literary criticism’ and the ‘poet’ very briefly when 
introducing Rorty as a philosopher, Rorty’s literariness does not make it into the list of themes in 
his work Gascoigne provides. Nor is this aspect mentioned as part of the discussions of these 
themes.17  
Anyone turning to either of these sources to find representative distillations of prevailing 
views on Rorty and Rortian pragmatism would be forgiven for remaining unaware of the fact that 
Rorty placed great importance on literature. 
One might object that caring about literature is not what philosophers do – that would make 
them literary critics. However, as I contend in this thesis, Rorty’s persistent literariness cannot be 
separated from his philosophical, ethical, or political concerns. Moreover, he explicitly argued that 
philosophers ought to become ‘literary critics’ (I return to this in chapter 6). Hence, one might 
expect any expert interpreter of his work to consider this matter with care. Even if becoming a 
literary critic might seem a step too far, a lack of attention to the literary aspect of Rorty’s work at 
moments when the explicit aim is to do it justice as a whole begins to look not just like a 
shortcoming, but one that leaves out something vital. What I want to suggest is the possibility of 
foregrounding Rorty’s literariness – of taking it as seriously as Rorty did. That is what this thesis 
aims to do.  
 
Rorty, Language, and Literature  
What do I mean when I talk about Rorty’s literariness? PMN has a literary dimension not widely 
remarked upon: its most apparent and structuring imagery is Shakespearean. It seems likely that 
Rorty adopted the mirror-metaphor most directly from Wittgenstein, but when the ‘Mirror of 
Nature’-image is juxtaposed with the title of Part One ‘Our Glassy Essence’, the imagery points 
directly to Shakespeare, Hamlet, and Measure for Measure.18 The phrase ‘mirror of nature’ occurs 
when Hamlet explains to the players how to perform the famous ‘play within the play’, urging 
 
17 The central themes in Rorty according to Gascoigne are: Philosophy of Mind and Transcendental 
Arguments; Epistemology; Reference, Truth, and Objectivity; Democracy; Liberalism; Religion; Varieties of 
Pragmatism; Pragmatism and the Future of Philosophy. I take no objection to this as a way of organising 
Rorty’s work per se but observe that any discussion of the role of literature in Rorty’s work is omitted from 
this account.  
18 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 9. 
Rorty says: as he states: ‘[i]f we have a Wittgensteinian notion of language as tool rather than mirror, we will 
not look for necessary conditions of the possibility of linguistic representation’. The mirror-metaphor was 
central to Wittgenstein, and I have not been able to find any other sources that would let me ascertain who 





them to deliver their lines carefully so as to not turn the performance into comedy. Their task is: 
‘…to hold, as ’twere, the mirror up to nature: to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, 
and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure’. As George Hibbard observes, 
Shakespeare is referencing a long and much-quoted definition of comedy, attributed to Cicero: 
comedy is ‘an imitation of life, a mirror of custom, and an image of truth’.19 Rorty credits Peirce 
for first having used the phrase ‘man’s glassy essence’, from Measure for Measure, in philosophy, 
but also quotes Shakespeare directly: ‘But man, proud man / Dressed in a little brief authority / 
Most ignorant of what he’s most assured— / His glassy essence—like an angry ape, / Plays such 
fantastic tricks before high Heaven / As make the angels weep—who, with our spleens, / Would all 
laugh themselves mortal.’20 
Thus, PMN will, to anyone familiar with Shakespeare, have a literary undercurrent, and 
one that runs together leitmotifs like the comedic, play and playfulness, truth, representation and 
the real, fiction and drama, scepticism and knowledge, the problem of action in the face of 
imperfect knowledge, powerlessness, voice, and moral justice – themes vital to Rorty’s oeuvre as 
well. This pivotal work plays itself out against a Shakespearian backdrop, and it hardly seems an 
accident, given how substantial Rorty’s writing on literature would become. However – I draw 
attention to this to say that when I claim that the literary has been central to Rorty since the 1970, I 
do not mean it in the sense of discussing Shakespeare, Hamlet; plays, novels, or poetry. ‘Literary’ 
here needs to be understood differently. 
 
 
19 The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark (1600), ed. by George R. Hibbard (Online, 2012), The Oxford 
Shakespeare, 3.2. 
20 Rorty, PMN, p. 42. Rorty’s use of solidi and m-dashes rather than line-breaks. See also Measure for 
Measure (1604), ed. by N. W. Bawcutt (Online, 2012), The Oxford Shakespeare, 2.2. 
Rorty provides some interesting comments in n19 p. 42: ‘See J. V. Cunningham, “ 'Essence' and The 
Phoenix and the Turtle,” English Literary History 19 (1952), p. 266 for the claim that the “glassy essence” 
here is the “intellectual soul,” which is “glassy, for it mirrors God.” The O.E.D. does not give this sense of 
“glassy,” but Cunningham is persuasive and is followed by the editors of the Arden Shakespeare (to which l 
owe the reference to Cunningham). Shakespeare here seems to be simply original, rather than using a stock 
trope. There is apparently no allusion to the “speculum obscurum” passage in St. Paul or any other standard 
notion. For the history of analogies between the soul and a mirror, see Herbert Grabes, Speculum, Mirror 
und Looking-Glass (Tiibingen, 1973)’. This footnote is also where Rorty credits Peirce: ‘The phrase man's 
glassy essence was first invoked in philosophy by C. S. Peirce in an 1892 essay of that title on the 
“molecular theory of proto-plasm,” which Peirce strangely thought important in confirming the view that “a 
person is nothing but a symbol involving a general idea” and in establishing the existence of “group minds” 
(cf. Collected Works, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss [Cambridge, Mass., 1935], 6.270 '271)’. It is 
beyond the scope of this Introduction to discuss this in detail, but I hope to do so in the future within a larger 






From the beginning of his career, Rorty persistently grappled with the consequences of adopting a 
particular stance towards minds, selfhood, language, vocabularies, texts and textuality, and with 
philosophy’s role within the broader intellectual culture. In his essays from the 1970s, collected in 
CP, Rorty provides variations on pragmatist objections to representationalism that emerge from a 
shifting focus on Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Freud, Derrida, Cavell, and others, combined 
with sketches of alternatives to foundationalist intellectual culture. He builds the case against 
analytic philosophy that will culminate in PMN, but rather than detailing a point-by-point 
argument against representationalism, describes the narrative, human-made, and contingent 
character of philosophical problems.  
It is striking how early and consistently Rorty describes his stance in terms that explicitly 
align his philosophical attitude with perspectives usually attributed to literary artists and critics. In 
‘The World Well Lost’ (1972), he emphasises that what counts as morality, or poetry, or science, 
is a matter of what kinds of stories we think it possible to tell.21 In ‘Dewey’s Metaphysics’ (1975) 
and ‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’ (1976), Rorty emphasises that Dewey’s 
work helps us reject the idea that we are on a ‘quest’ for truth as certainty and to see types of 
inquiry and experiences as non-competing activities. (Rorty is referencing Dewey’s The Quest for 
Certainty (1929). The quest-idea is a significant theme in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis).22 Dewey, 
moreover ‘helps us put aside that spirit of seriousness which artists traditionally lack, and 
philosophers are traditionally supposed to maintain.’.23 
These observations play directly into Rorty’s writings on Wittgenstein. In essays like 
‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’ (1976) and ‘A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor’ (1980), Rorty explicates 
Wittgenstein as a thinker that helps us resolve a residual quasi-essentialism in Dewey with regards 
to the idea of ‘experience’,24 and to adopt hermeneutics as ‘an attitude’: an ‘intellectual position’ of 
 
21 Richard Rorty, ‘The World Well Lost’, The Journal of Philosophy, 69.19 (1972), 649–65 (p. 654) The 
world best lost is ‘the world’ understood as ‘...the realistic true believer’s... obsession...’ (p. 661). Rorty’s 
title invokes John Dryden’s 1677 drama All for Love; Or, The World Well Lost: A Tragedy, but Rorty only 
mentions Dryden once – as a poet that does not look like a poet to an imagined Patagonian unfamiliar with 
our ‘world’ (p. 658). 
22 Richard Rorty, ‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, The Review of Metaphysics, 30.2 
(1976), 280–305. Reprinted in CP 1982. 
Richard Rorty, ‘Dewey's Metaphysics’, in Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 72–89 Lecture given in 1975, 
reprinted in CP. 
23 Rorty, ‘Dewey's Metaphysics’, pp. 87–88. 
24 Richard Rorty, ‘Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein’, in Consequences of Pragmatism, 





being open to ‘the course of conversation’.25 Wittgenstein aids us in thinking of philosophy as, in 
Wilfrid Sellars’ terms, narratives that articulate how ‘things’ ‘hang together’ (I discuss this in 
chapter 2).26 Rorty insists that making such a narrative turn would not mark the end of an essential 
human pursuit, but rather the end of a cultural tradition: the end of an argumentative form (I pick 
up ‘form’ as a cue in chapters 2 and 3, and traditions, form, and style in chapter 6). Wittgenstein 
helps us see this old form as ‘hopeless’ through responding to it with ‘satire’ and ‘examples’.27 In 
‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’ Rorty adds that Wittgenstein teaches us that all 
we can do is to ‘assemble reminders for a particular purpose’ – Rorty would later use Mathew 
Arnold’s term ‘touchstones’ to describe a similar practice (as I explain in Chapter 4).28 
Derrida becomes increasingly important to Rorty in the 1970s and helps Rorty 
complement his pragmatist-Wittgensteinian critique of representationalism, the ‘picture picture’ of 
language, and the correspondence theory of truth.29 In ‘Derrida on Language, Being, and 
Abnormal Philosophy’ (1977), Rorty adds an emphasis on writing: ‘Derrida thinks that the ability 
to see writing as writing is what we need to break the grip of the notion of representation, of 
getting things accurately pictured’.30 He develops this in ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing’ (1978), 
where Rorty suggests that ‘writing about writing will help to “deconstruct” the Kantian way of 
looking at things’.31 Becoming more fully aware of ourselves as language users engaged in a 
process of playing with and deploying signs and sounds for effect, will aid the 
antirepresentationalist cause. (This is a topic in Chapter 5). 
 Similar examples could be drawn from nearly every essay he publishes throughout the 
1970s, and it is against this rich and repeatedly ‘literary’ background that Rorty first deployed the 
term a ‘literary culture’ in ‘Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture’ (1976, 
hereafter PPTC).32 He further develops this idea in ‘Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-
 
25 Richard Rorty, ‘A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor’, Review of Metaphysics, 34.1 (1980), 39–47 
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1290792513/fulltextPDF/13829870DA854697PQ> [accessed 
19.03.19] (p. 39). 
26 Rorty, ‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, pp. 29–30. 
27 Rorty, ‘Keeping Philosophy Pure’, pp. 32–34. 
28 Rorty, ‘Heidegger and Dewey’, p. 295. 
29 Richard Rorty, ‘Derrida on Language, Being, and Abnormal Philosophy’, The Journal of Philosophy, 
74.11 (1977), 673 (675-676). 
30 Rorty, ‘Derrida on Language, Being, and Abnormal Philosophy’, p. 678, Rorty's emphasis. 
31 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An essay on Derrida’, New Literary History, 10.1 
(1978), 141–60 (p. 146). Hereafter PKW. 






Century Textualism’ (1981, hereafter NITT).33 I return to these texts and the development of this 
term in Rorty’s work in substantial detail in subsequent chapters. 
And Rorty continued to associate his variant of pragmatism with the literary (critical) 
institution throughout the 1980s. The majority of his essays from this period are collected in 
Objectivity, relativism, and truth (1991, hereafter ORT) and Essays on Heidegger and others 
(1991, hereafter EHO).34 His engagement with language, texts, poetry, metaphor, and how this 
relates to our form of (moral) life continues and expands. Donald Davidson’s philosophy of 
language plays an increasingly important role in Rorty’s thinking through the 70s and 80s, and 
Davidsonian perspectives add to his analysis of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Freud, and Derrida. 
Community, and how we shape our lives in relation to and as part of a community, is a vital matter 
in many of the texts from this period, for instance, ‘Postmodernist bourgeois liberalism’ (1983), 
‘Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity’ (1984) and ‘The priority of democracy to philosophy’ 
(1988).35 Here, too, Rorty aligns his pragmatist attitude with that of the artist when he recommends 
a ‘light-minded’ attitude towards problems we deliberate on in public (moral, political, 
philosophical) – he wants us to ‘view matters aesthetically’.36 ‘I  should argue’, he tells us, ‘that in 
the recent history of liberal societies, the willingness to view matters aesthetically – to be content 
to indulge in what Schiller called “play” and to discard what Nietzsche called “the spirit of 
seriousness” – has been an important vehicle of moral progress’.37 (This topic – holding our 
concepts lightly, viewing matters aesthetically – is a vital issue in Chapter 5 of this thesis.) 
One of Rorty’s more startling advances at this time is that he redefines objectivity as 
solidarity, as intersubjective agreement. In several articles Rorty relates science to rule-governed 
behaviour and the solidity of its facts to the firmness of its solidarity. He also makes a case for a 
pragmatic humanism, for human solidarity (a defining topic in Chapter 6), and already here 
suggests that literature plays a vital part as a resource for expanding our sense of self. Literature 
helps us become able to have conversations that lead to broader agreement and understanding, to 
 
33 Richard Rorty, ‘Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism’, The Monist, 64.2 
(1981), 155–74. 
34 Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Online: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (1991)), Philosophical 
Papers, 1 < https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/objectivity-relativism-and-
truth/04DFAEAC5991EC3C403C50B83C6F4086>,  
 Essays on Heidegger and Others (Online: Cambridge University Press, 2010 (1991)), Philosophical Papers, 
2 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/essays-on-heidegger-and-
others/AEDEB66001493274C87B57D66585A59A>. 
35 Richard Rorty, ‘Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity’, Praxis International, 4.1 (1984), 32–44 
Richard Rorty, ‘The priority of democracy to philosophy’, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 175–96. 
36 Rorty, ‘The priority of democracy’, pp. 193–94. 





greater solidarity, by equipping us to have conversations with participants in ever more varied 
kinds of interpretive communities.38  
The essays I have enumerated to this point are integral to the development of Rorty’s 
conception of a literary culture, without, however, extensively engaging with either literary theory 
or literary texts. But Rorty does address literary themes and problems directly in essays such as 
‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’ (1984), ‘Texts and Lumps’ (1985), ‘Freud and Moral 
Reflection’ (1986), and ‘Philosophy without Principles’ (1985).39 In ‘Deconstruction and 
Circumvention’, Rorty levels all principled distinctions between philosophy and literature, or 
literature and science. Literature is, he suggests, what we have come to call texts that use words in 
more unfamiliar ways.40 Or it is the ‘conversational situation’ where ‘everything is up for grabs at 
once, where the motives and terms of discussion are a central subject of argument’.41 This kind of 
situation is, he says, a ‘literary’ conversation. Moreover, in these essays, Rorty begins to think of a 
‘literary culture’ as a term with a broader scope: we can ‘...think of a ‘literary or “poetic” moment 
as occurring periodically in many different areas of culture – science, philosophy, painting, and 
politics, as well as the lyric and the drama.’42  
 
38 See for instance Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism Without Method’, in Sidney Hook: Philosopher of 
Democracy and Humanism, ed. by Paul Kurtz (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1983), pp. 259–73.  
Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism without method’, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 63–77. Richard 
Rorty, ‘Solidarity or Objectivity?’, Nanzan Review of American Studies, 6 (1984), 1–18 <https://nanzan-
u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=645
&item_no=1&page_id=13&block_id=21> [accessed 7 September 2020].  
Richard Rorty, ‘Science as solidarity’, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 35–45. 
Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner, ‘Introduction’, in Philosophy in History: Essays in 
the Historiography of Philosophy, ed. by Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1–14. 
Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others, pp. 
9–26. 
39 Richard Rorty, ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, Critical Inquiry, 11.1 (1984), 1–23 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343288>. 
Richard Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, New Literary History, 17.1 (1985), 1–16.  
Richard Rorty, ‘Freud and Moral Reflection’, in Pragmtism's Freud: The moral disposition of 
psychoanalysis, ed. by Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan, Psychiatry and the humanities, v. 9 
(Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 1–27. 
Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy without Principles’, Critical Inquiry, 11.3 (1985), 459–65. 
40 Rorty, ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, p. 3. 
41 Rorty, ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, p. 4. 





A similar drift is detectable in Rorty’s reply to Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’s 
‘Against Theory’ (1982): ‘Philosophy without Principles’ (1985).43 Rorty suggests that philosophy 
must become a practice of playing vocabularies against vocabularies to see what works. And this, 
Rorty offers, is what ‘literary theory’ already does: ‘It names the practice of splicing together your 
favorite critics, novelists, poets and such, and your favorite philosophers.’44 (What Rorty means by 
‘literary criticism’ is a topic in chapters 4 and 6 of this thesis.) In ‘Texts and Lumps’, Rorty 
continues to commend this kind of literary attitude and practice and equate its adoption with 
progress. There is no difference, Rorty here insists, between texts and lumps: both types of objects 
can cause us to hold beliefs, but no objects can suggest beliefs for us to hold.45 What occurs is that 
we tell stories about them; we make it hang together, recontextualise, have conversations about 
them, experiment, make heuristics, put to use. Culture can thus be reclassified in terms of genre, a 
sequence of texts, as a way of getting by by using a particular language (I discuss this in chapter 
6).46 
These essays that deal explicitly with the literary attitude and the uses of literature should 
be read alongside Rorty’s writings on language and metaphor, like ‘Pragmatism, Davidson, and 
truth’ (1986) and ‘Unfamiliar noises’ (1987) or ‘Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as 
politics’ (1989).47 Rorty sees metaphors as contributing to moral and intellectual progress through 
functioning as stimuli that cause effects and, over time, perhaps pragmatic change (I address this in 
my discussion of CIS in Chapter 5 of this thesis). This takes us up to the publication of CIS in 1989 
and the point where Rorty’s literariness became recognised as a prominent feature of his thought. 
Later, these themes are further developed in essays such as ‘Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens’ 
(1991), Rorty’s ‘Introduction’ to Pale Fire by Vladimir Nabokov (1992), ‘Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, and the reification of language’ (1993), ‘Tales of Two Disciplines’ (1994), ‘The 
Necessity of Inspired Reading’ (1996, later expanded into ‘The Inspirational Value of Great Works 
of Literature’ in 1998), and his 2004 Page-Barbour lectures, published in 2016 as Philosophy as 
 
43 Steven Knapp and Walter B. Michaels, ‘Against Theory’, Critical Inquiry, 8.4 (1982), 723–42, and Rorty, 
‘Philosophy without Principles’. Both of these and responses to Knapp and Michaels by Stanley Fish and 
E.D. Hirsch, amongst others, are collected in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), Against theory: literary studies and the 
new pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
44 Rorty, ‘Philosophy without Principles’, p. 463. 
45 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, p. 7. 
46 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, p. 15. 
47 Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism, Davidson, and truth’, in ORT, pp. 126–50; Richard Rorty, ‘Unfamiliar 







It is then this literariness I have sought to identify and understand – the why and how of 
Rorty’s constant alignment of his pragmatist attitude with that of the literary artist and critic: his 
literary stance.  
 
The above summary indicates that Rortian pragmatism might indeed be understood as an attitude. 
The whole of this thesis attempts to undergird this suggestion by explicating Rorty as advocating a 
literary attitude that correlates, for pragmatic reasons, with the adoption of a literary intellectual 
(critical) – readerly and writerly – practice. I emphasise this not just because the attitude-practice 
division is central to this thesis but also because others in contemporary literary studies talk in 
similar terms, for similar anti-theoretical, anti-representationalist reasons. In her recent Revolution 
of the Ordinary, Toril Moi emphasises how a Wittgensteinian view of language (which Rorty also 
subscribes to) sets aside the ‘Augustinian picture of language’ where every word has a meaning 
determined by its correlation to the world.49 And Moi sees Wittgensteinian philosophy and her 
Cavellian brand of ordinary language philosophy as an attitude: ‘[a]ll Wittgenstein leaves us with 
is a certain spirit or attitude in which to go about our investigations. Here the word “spirit” stands 
in opposition to “approach,” or “method,” or “theory,” for ordinary language philosophy proposes 
no such thing.’ Moi takes this word up from Cora Diamond and Richard Fleming, and notes that 
Rita Felski similarly speaks of ‘the “thought style” or the “mood” uniting otherwise different kinds 
of critique’.50 Similarly, I want to talk about Rorty’s attitude – albeit more in terms of an 
 
48 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophers, Novelists, and Intercultural Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera, and 
Dickens’, in Culture and modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives, ed. by Eliot Deutsch (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 3–20.  
Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction’ in Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire, Everyman's library, 67 (London: David 
Campbell, 1992 (1962)), pp. vii-xix.  
Richard Rorty, ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, in The Cambridge companion to 
Heidegger, ed. by Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge companions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 337–57. Richard Rorty, ‘Tales of Two Disciplines’, Callaloo, 17.2 (1994), 575–85. 
Richard Rorty, ‘The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature’, in Richard Rorty, Achieving Our 
Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1998), pp. 125–40.  
Philosophy as Poetry, ed. by Michael Bérubé, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2016), 
Page-Barbour Lectures. 
49 Toril Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary studies after Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 26. A Rortian might talk about literary studies after 
Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson, as these are the figures Rorty takes to have dismantled the idea that 
language is a clearly defined structure: see Rorty, ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, 
pp. 337–38. 





intellectual disposition than a mood or a feeling. Although that certainly also follows. Explicating 
the Rortian attitude is a key objective of chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
 
The Literature on Rorty and Literature 
Given the above, Rorty’s conception of a poetic or literary attitude seems to be at least as 
significant in his work as his specific uses of literary works. I want to argue that it is, and 
moreover, that a full appreciation of Rorty’s uses of literature can only be articulated in the context 
of the close alignment of the Rortian pragmatist attitude with the aesthetic attitude. This 
framework seems necessary for wholly understanding Rorty on literature. Thus, the lack of a 
coherent account of Rorty and the question of literature that situates it within his philosophical 
work has been the fundamental motivational drive for writing this thesis.  
 The fact that, as late as 2015, Ulf Schulenberg, with his Romanticism and Pragmatism, 
could provide the first sustained discussion of the idea of a literary culture in Rortian thought, 
speaks to my claim that this is indeed an underappreciated topic in the extensive secondary 
literature on Rorty.51 However, while Schulenberg’s book does focus on Rorty’s ‘literary culture’, 
the comparisons and contextualisation he offers take up the greater part of his analysis: 
Schulenberg relates Rorty’s notion to  the thought of F.C.S. Schiller, Roland Barthes, Marcel 
Proust, Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, John Dewey, Martha 
Nussbaum, Michel Foucault, and Richard Wright. Because the scope of Schulenberg’s study is this 
broad, it cannot be as deep as it is wide, and it does not provide a detailed and comprehensive 
study of the literary within Rortian thought. 
 What Schulenberg sees, which William Curtis also notes, is that Rorty’s romanticism ‘is 
too often neglected or summarily dismissed by his philosopher critics’.52 Schulenberg importantly 
 
51 Ulf Schulenberg, Romanticism and Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Idea of a Poeticized Cultur 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). The commentary on Rorty can be difficult to approach. Christopher Voparil 
noted fifteen years ago that ‘Achieving a mastery of the vast secondary literature on Rorty has long ceased to 
be humanly possible.’ Christopher Voparil, ‘On the Idea of Philosophy as Bildungsroman: Rorty and his 
Critics’, Contemporary Pragmatism, 2.1 (2005), 115–33 (p. 118). Voparil also observes that ‘the greatest as 
yet unsolved puzzle surrounding the Rorty phenomenon may very well be the question of why so much of 
the secondary literature is... hyper-critical in nature’ and that this leads to a situation where ‘[it] is often 
difficult to discuss Rorty without reference to a mountain of philosophical and historical baggage that 
demands as much attention as Rorty’s thought itself.’ (p. 116,119). Ten years later, William Curtis affirmed 
that this still was the case, and matters have not gotten any less complicated since. See William M. Curtis, 
Defending Rorty: Pragmatism and liberal virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
'Introduction' and p. 55. 





sketches the lines from Rorty’s romanticism to his anti-authoritarianism but only once 
acknowledges Tim Milnes’s crucial book on this topic. In The Truth about Romanticism (2010) 
Milnes discerns a (proto)pragmatist mode of thought in John Keats, Percy Bysshe Shelley, and 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge in particular and shows its resemblance to the theories of modern 
pragmatist thinkers such as Rorty, Davidson and Jürgen Habermas.53 While Milnes is sympathetic 
to the Rortian position, he argues that Rorty, in his attempt to isolate ‘the romantic celebration of 
creation from what he perceives to be its nostalgia for absolute grounds […] underplays the 
“pursuit of intersubjective, unforced agreement” within romanticism itself.’54  While I am broadly 
in agreement with Milnes’s assessments of Rorty and Curtis’s of the lack of writing on Rorty’s 
romanticism, my topic is a different one, and my task is another than both Schulenberg’s and 
Milnes’s, who both contextualise Rorty within a broad set of figures from Kant until today. I want 
to present careful readings of primary texts where Rorty elaborates his notions of the ‘literary’ and 
a ‘literary’ culture. 
 While Schulenberg insists on the philosophical potential in Rorty’s ideas, others are less 
enthusiastic. I touched on Moi above, who quickly dismisses the entire pragmatist tradition as yet 
another ‘formalism’ resulting from unselfconscious essentialist thinking.55 As Áine Mahon shows 
in The Ironist and the Romantic (2014), there is substantial overlap between the pragmatist 
tradition Rorty inscribes himself in and the strand of thought from Emerson to Cavell, which 
Milnes tellingly names the ‘romantic pragmatic tradition’.56 Moi’s expedient dismissal of 
pragmatism might in part be motivated by a worry about the ethical implications of its stance: she 
holds Rorty to be a ‘radical relativist’.57 While Rita Felski is more favourably inclined towards 
pragmatist thought, she expresses similar concerns when she insists that we cannot afford to be as 
‘cavalier about the difference between finding things out and making them up’ as Rorty is; reading, 
 
53 Tim Milnes, The Truth about Romanticism: Pragmatism and Idealism in Keats, Shelley, Coleridge 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
Tim Milnes, ‘Rorty, Romanticism, and the Literary Absolute’, in Pragmatism and Literature, ed. by 
Wojciech Małecki (= Pragmatism Today The Journal of the Central-European Pragmatist Forum, 2 
(2011)), pp. 24–33. 
54 Milnes, The Truth about Romanticism, p. 11. 
55 See Moi, Revolution of the Ordinary, pp. 64–65. 
56 Milnes, The Truth about Romanticism, pp. 61–65. Áine Mahon, The Ironist and the Romantic: Reading 
Richard Rorty and Stanley Cavell (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
57 Toril Moi, ‘Kortversjonen. Stanley Cavell: The Claim of Reason’, Prosa, 10 (2001). My translation from 





Felski stresses, has an ethical dimension.58 Moi, Felski, Catherine Toal whom I discuss in my 
conclusion and, to an extent, Mahon perceive Rortian pragmatism to lack a constructive moral project. 
The word ‘spirit’ might be invoked again: these critics conjure Rorty as a troubling spirit – Felski holds 
him to be ‘cavalier’, Moi indicates that Rorty is not interested in human experience, Mahon sees Rorty 
as ‘blasé’, less hopeful than Cavell, less honest, courageous, and sincere.59  
Rorty was and is a disturbing presence in philosophy too. His dismissal of concerns and 
purposes philosophers took to define their discipline and self-image provoked many to respond 
with a refusal to see Rorty as anything but trouble. Alan Malachowski persuasively argues that a 
great deal of Rorty-criticism is curiously aimed at Rorty as a person and misses its target owing to 
demonstrable misapprehensions of his aims.60 But this matter of taking Rorty seriously, of the 
spirit he writes in, and in what spirit to take his work, prevails. In a recent article, Gascoigne and 
Michael Bacon take this matter up and shows how closely it is linked both with philosophers’ self-
conception and with the question of whether Rortian pragmatism fails to present us with effective 
strategies – which the authors maintain it does.61 Cheryl Misak serves as one of their prominent 
examples. In a later essay, she sharply reaffirms a view where Rorty’s presumed lack of 
seriousness and commitment is taken to render his position not just philosophically problematic 
but ethically and politically inert.62 In the same publication, Christopher Voparil reads Rorty’s 
rhetorical playfulness as integral to his philosophical case and achievements. Voparil observes that 
Rorty, in a newly published paper from the 1980s, suggests he was, in fact, ‘trying to moralize’ 
truth.63  
This thesis attempts to contribute to these contemporary debates by articulating Rortian 
pragmatism as both an attitude and a playful, poetic practice – where the latter is indeed construed 
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as emblematic of Rorty’s constructive, ethical project. I suspect the relative neglect of his literary 
attitude and emphasis on poiesis contributes to the persistent difficulties concerning how to 
formulate Rorty’s moral contribution. And my understanding of why Rorty insists on naming his 
culture ‘literary’ (rather than merely ‘pragmatic’) emerges from connecting his earlier suggestion 
that adopting an aestheticising stance (as Voparil touches on) ‘remoralizes’ the ‘mechanical self’, 
with his later claim that his central contribution was his narrative about the ‘takeover’ of a ‘literary 
culture’. (See Chapter 5. I take up Felski’s objection at the end of chapter 4, and Rorty’s ethical 
concerns come to the fore in chapters 5, 6, and 7.) 
Gascoigne and Bacon take the recent surge in explications and applications of Rortian 
thought as a sign that the intellectual community is ready to take Rorty’s work ‘seriously’.64 In 
fact, in the years since his death several books have endeavoured to do so, but only one of these 
pertains directly to literary studies: Bryan Vescio’s Reconstruction in Literary Studies: An 
Informalist Approach.65 Vescio considers how we might perceive ourselves as a discipline – and 
think about reading, teaching, and theory – if we adopt a thoroughgoingly pragmatist, anti-
essentialist position. His aims are comparable to Moi’s in Revolution of the Ordinary, but where 
she follows Cavell, Vescio follows Rorty.66 Vescio goes further in attempting to reconceptualise 
‘literature’ through articulating what it is ‘good for’, and in defining literary studies by the social 
purpose it ‘actually serves’.67 This is, ultimately, to be ‘a “Ministry of Disturbance,” a cultural 
institution devoted to the disruption of received wisdom and settled methodological routine.’68 
Vescio moreover describes literary theory as having a rhetorical and pedagogical role in explaining 
‘a set of institutional practices’ and in connecting these to ‘Deweyan ideals of experiment and 
growth’.69 I arrive at similar inferences in Chapter 6, and my Conclusion. 
 Nicolas Gaskill has also approached the matter of how we might conceive literary theory 
from a pragmatist perspective. Like Vescio, Gaskill begins from the premise that ‘[pragmatism] 
 
64 Gascoigne and Bacon, p. 1. 
65 Bryan Vescio, Reconstruction in Literary Studies: An Informalist Approach (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
66 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a comparison between Vescio and Moi. I have, however, 
began work on an article outlining the salient differences and points of agreements. Their approaches, in my 
view, complement each other.  
See also, for instance, Michael Bacon, Richard Rorty: Pragmatism and political liberalism (Lanham, 
Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007); Marianne Janack, Feminist interpretations of Richard Rorty, Re-reading 
the canon (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Gascoigne, Rorty, Liberal 
Democracy, and Religious Certainty; Rosa M. Calcaterra, Contingency and Normativity: The Challenges of 
Richard Rorty, Value inquiry book series, Volume 329 (Leiden, Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2019); or Tracy 
Llanera, Richard Rorty: Outgrowing modern nihilism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). 
67 Vescio, p. 8 and 12. 
68 Vescio, p. 15. 





asks “What does a text do?” rather than “What does a text mean?” and then traces the difference 
that this difference makes.’70 But Gaskill’s pragmatism is ‘one of transactive experience and 
semiotic production rooted in Dewey and Peirce’.71 He sees Rorty in a less favourable light: Rorty 
‘banished’ ‘an interest in “experience” outside of language’ alongside ‘attention to “scientific 
method”’, and dismissed a mode of being in the world that allows us to ‘make sense of our ethical 
connections to the lives of others.’72 While my assessment of Rorty does not fully align with 
Gaskill’s, I see extensive overlap between Gaskill’s desire to advance a pragmatist literary-critical 
mode of thought and what Rorty wants to articulate.73 Part of my argument is that Rorty does not 
articulate his literariness clearly enough, and doing so might open up new avenues for 
investigating how we might link neopragmatism to Gaskill’s suggestions, and to the question of 
how we might envision and work within a fully-fledged pragmatist literary-critical paradigm. 
 
The Aims and Approach of This Thesis 
As I have been outlining, this thesis aims to provide a specific and comprehensive account of the 
conceptual role that literature, the literary, and the notion of a literary culture plays in the work of 
Richard Rorty. It aims to defend and substantiate the claim that Rorty was a literary philosopher 
and to reinforce the importance of his literariness to his philosophical project. At the same time, 
my goal is not to get Rorty right – an aim Rorty would reject for reasons that will become clear. 
My goal is to perform a reading of his oeuvre that proceeds from taking Rorty’s own claim that his 
pivotal contribution was his narrative about the progress of Western culture towards a literary 
culture at face value and to present this reading persuasively. Using Rorty’s literary vocabulary is 
not, and should not be, the only way to talk about his work. It is, however, an instructive way to 
conceptualise it – for reasons Rorty seems to have sensed more than explicitly set out, which 
leaves room for this study to attempt to do so.  
I want to note that I am aware that these aims sketch a monumental task. Undertaking this 
project has required familiarity with the greater part of everything Rorty wrote over his last four 
decades, as well as the contexts to which it belongs. I have nevertheless held on to the conviction 
that the most significant contribution I could produce would emerge from working to fully 
 
70 Nicholas Gaskill, ‘Experience and Signs: Towards a Pragmatist Literary Criticism’, in Remembering 
Richard Rorty, ed. by Ralph Cohen (= New Literary History, 39 (2008)), pp. 165–83 (p. 165). 
71 Gaskill, ‘Experience and Signs’, p. 183n39. 
72 Nicholas Gaskill, ‘What Difference Can Pragmatism Make for Literary Study?’, American Literary 
History, 24.2 (2012), 374–89 (p. 381) , and Gaskill, ‘Experience and Signs’, p. 180n7. 
73 Gaskill’s description of pragmatism as process is particularly on point here. See Gaskill, ‘Experience and 





comprehend Rorty’s broader reasons for talking about ‘the literary’ and using literature the way he 
does. This has meant that, much like Schulenberg, I could not also provide in-depth discussions of 
each subtopic of interest that arose. Several leads and observations have had to be left where they 
were found, at least for now. And whereas I could have written at length on Rorty’s readings of, 
for instance, Lolita and 1984, I have chosen to pay greater attention to the meta-level where the 
question is how and why Rorty uses these novels for his purposes (I address this in my 
conclusion). I could have paid extensive attention to Rorty’s relationship to Harold Bloom or how 
he overlaps with, for instance, Wayne C. Booth, or Lionel Trilling – all of whom figure in Rorty’s 
work. I have not. Where Schulenberg’s aim was to unwrap and contextualise Rorty’s idea of a 
literary culture, mine has been to keep it in focus throughout, but without losing sight of its place 
in Rorty’s overarching narrative. Where I have seen a particularly strong potential for separate 
pieces of work to emerge from individual observations, I have indicated this, and in the conclusion 
of this thesis I relate some thoughts on further work I see emerging from this thesis.  
The fact that the literary aspect of Rortian thought is inseparable from Rorty on 
representationalism, or ethics, or politics, or any other topic, presented a challenge as I attempted 
to work out how to approach this project. However, as I grappled with how to construct an 
instructive narrative on Rorty, I found myself increasingly mindful of Rorty’s narrative as a 
narrative. As mentioned above, he saw himself as having told one story: his anti-representationalist 
story of the development of Western liberal culture.74 This led me to contemplate what kind of 
story this was, which led to the realisation that Rorty’s narrative had a different form than the 
governing narrative of traditional philosophy. When I also found that Rorty’s semi-
autobiographical narratives about his own intellectual and moral development traced the same arc, 
I realised that I could use the matter of form to talk about the attitude these form-choices 
expressed. This exploration resulted in an original and demonstrably useful redescription of 
Rortian pragmatism as the rejection of the quest-narrative form as a governing narrative form. As 
it provides an overarching conception of the Rortian attitude that has proven helpful to subsequent 
explications, this is where I begin my account in chapters 2 and 3.  
 It was also paramount to undertake a specific study of the origins of Rorty’s idea of a 
literary culture. To this end, I carefully read and interpreted the essays in which he introduced this 
term in the 1970s, and considered how he conceived this literary, or ‘poeticized’ culture in CIS. I 
found that the scope of this term observably expanded from denoting a ‘highbrow’ sub-culture to 
envelop Rorty’s vision of a utopian secular, liberal, democratic culture more broadly. I also 
observed that ‘the literary’, as used by Rorty, meant something in and of itself. It indicated an 
 





attitude – and this attitude was carried into Rorty’s use of the terms literary critic, literary work, 
and literary culture – they came to denote critics, works, and cultures that embodied a literary 
attitude. This is not a point Rorty sets out coherently, but which emerges when Rorty’s writings on 
literature and the literary over several decades are taken together and studied for thematic 
coherence. Chapters 4 and 5 thus present readings of key essays and the first part of CIS and bring 
out these observations regarding the Rortian attitude from the material. 
Rorty’s view of the private and the public, as well as the making of selfhood and collective 
identity, became more prominent elements in these readings than I had expected. As did the matter 
of the ethical implications of his position – or more precisely the ethical problem I see CIS as an 
attempt at resolving through showing, in writing, the possibility of a character (the liberal ironist).  
By allowing this to emerge and take up room I developed a clearer understanding of why Rorty 
takes living an aesthetic life to be a moral act. This, in turn, helped me get to grips with what I 
describe as Rorty’s recommendations for writerly and readerly practices for liberal ironists, as well 
as with how and why he classifies books and writers the way he does, how he thinks about the 
usefulness of theory versus the uses of literature. I found that while Rorty advances a 
thoroughgoingly anti-essentialist view of literature, he nevertheless suggests that there are texts 
that more effectively accomplish the task he associates with literature, an insight I use to 
reconstruct a Rortian notion of literature in a narrower sense. These are the topics of chapters 6 and 
7. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is then structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 are closely related and present a novel 
redescription of Rortian pragmatism as the rejection of the quest-narrative form as the governing, 
unifying form for history, moral or intellectual progress. Rorty’s ‘semi-autobiographical’ essays 
‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’ (1992) and ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids’ (also 1992), which detail 
his private intellectual development, are related to his story about the ‘takeover’ of a literary 
culture, and to central passages from Rorty’s ‘Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism’ (1979) 
where he defines his pragmatist attitude. The focus is on the transformative moment when the 
quest-hero becomes the pragmatist, and on this as a moment of overcoming through amending 
one’s self-image, rather than as a moment of conversion to a new doctrine. 
Chapter 3 applies the insights of Chapter 2 and continues to investigate what kind of story 





philosophy is best seen as a Bildungsroman, as both Voparil and Curtis have suggested.75 I show 
that while Rorty says that the narrative he constructs is ‘at the start’ a quest-romance, the story he 
actually tells does not fit this form. It is instead a story about rejecting the quest. This leads me to 
suggest that Rorty’s work is not most adequately captured by the idea of Bildung, and to question 
whether Curtis’ suggestion that Rorty is a virtue ethicist holds up. Taking from Alasdair Macintyre 
the idea that narrative unity is a premise for the articulation of virtues, and from my analysis the 
claim that Rorty rejects framing life and history within a unified governing narrative, I suggest it 
does not. Instead, I offer that the analogy of the protean, conversational, and constantly reinvented 
genre of the novel, or, more broadly, the literary institution, can better help us get to grips with 
Rortian philosophy, including his moral thought. 
 Having thus established an overarching view of Rortian pragmatism as literary, Chapter 4 
begins a detailed study of Rorty’s adoption and use of the term ‘literary culture’. I read and discuss 
PPTC and NITT to examine how Rorty used this term around the time of the publication of PMN. 
I show that Rorty closely aligns his attitude and practices with that of the literary artist and critic. I 
also observe that this helps him formulate what he takes to be a relevant concern about 
pragmatism: a worry about our ability to constrain poetic practices. 
 Continuing to pay careful attention to the notions of a literary culture and a literary 
attitude, chapter 5 takes up this worry and sees it as the central concern of CIS. I read CIS as a 
literary work in the Rortian sense and the ‘liberal ironist’ as Rorty’s attempt at showing us the 
possibility of a character that, at first glance, appears paradoxical. For the ironist to make not just a 
self but an ‘aesthetic’, open and expansive self, is explained as being as close to a moral obligation 
as it is possible to come on the Rortian paradigm. To facilitate an aesthetic (in a particular Rortian 
sense of that word) culture is seen as the collective equivalent of this moral obligation. This allows 
Rorty’s insistence on the need for facilitating a ‘poeticized culture’ to emerge as his response to 
the ethical challenge left unresolved by PMN, underscoring the importance the aesthetic and 
literary dimension has in Rorty’s broader project.   
 Chapter 6 turns to Rortian critical practices: to the style, the rhetorical mode of conduct, 
which the adoption of such an attitude would cause us to think useful. I examine Rorty’s 
recommendation in CIS that liberal ironists use literature in the service of the liberal project 
(lessening cruelty) and private pursuits, but remain cautious about the use of theory for anything 
but their private efforts to become more sensitive ironists, more aware of the power of 
redescription. This helps me explain Rorty’s distinctions between writers who are ‘exemplars’ and 
 





‘fellow citizens’, and books that are ‘stimulating’ and ‘relaxing’, which helps me explicate what 
Rorty means when he talks about literature in ‘the narrow sense’. 
 Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by looking at Rorty’s readings of Lolita and 1984, and 
showing why the analysis of Rorty’s views on literature I have offered – one that fully situates this 
topic within his wider philosophical discourse – is needed to make Rortian pragmatism more 
accessible and useful to us as literary scholars. I also suggest that Rorty might have made more of 
the analogies between his stance and the literary attitude, because doing so brings his emphasis on 
making, poiesis, into clearer view than the idea of an ‘ironist’ stance, and this brings the 
constructive, ethical nature of the aesthetic project inherent in Rortian pragmatism into sharper 
focus. I close by indicating what I take Rorty’s emphasis on the literary to suggest about the role of 
literary studies in a broader institutional and social context and offer some thoughts on what 













The Pragmatist’s Progress from This World to That Which Is To Come 
 
Wilfrid Sellars’s description of the aim of philosophy reads almost like a poem, or, perhaps, like a 
list of writing prompts: 
 
THE aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest 
possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 
‘things in the broadest possible sense’ I include such radically different items as not only 
‘cabbages and kings’, but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic 
experience and death.1  
 
Rorty adopted and adapted this description: philosophers, he thought, should tell stories about how 
things ‘hang together’.2 However, the task was not ‘to understand’, in some deep sense, as much as 
it was to construct narratives that made ‘things’ ‘hang together’ in such a way that they help 
human beings ‘cope’.3 Rorty turned to ‘narratives’ and ‘stories’ as rhetorical means for 
conceptualising his approach well before CIS. In ‘Texts and Lumps’ (1985), he says: ‘For 
pragmatists, telling stories about how one’s favorite literary texts hang together is not to be 
distinguished from – is simply a species of – the “philosophical” enterprise of telling stories about 
the nature of the universe which highlight all the things one likes best and least.’4 And: ‘There is 
no synoptic view of culture which is more than a narrative account of how our culture managed to 
get to where it now is.’5 In CIS, he talks about history and moral philosophy in the same manner: 
‘A historicist and nominalist culture of the sort I envisage would settle instead for narratives which 
connect the present with the past, on the one hand, and with Utopian futures, on the other.’6  
 
1 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Philospohy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Wilfrid Sellars, Science, perception and 
reality (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991 (1963)). Part I, which this sentence 
opens, is entitled ‘I. The Philosophical Quest’. Sellars does not comment on the venture he outlines as a 
quest. 
2 See Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction’, in Consequences of Pragmatism, xiii–xlvii, particularly p. xiv. See also 
Richard Rorty, ‘Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein’, Yale Review, 65.3 (1976), 336–56, 
and Rorty, PMN, pp. 182–92 (in particular. Also cf. p. 365 and the description of how we might construct 
edifying, hermeneutic responses). 
3 Occurs frequently. See for instance Rorty, ‘Introduction’ to CP, p. xliii. 
4 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, p. 2. 
5 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, pp. 15–16.  





 Rorty came to see his oeuvre as defined by one such narrative: a story about the 
intellectual history of Western culture from Platonism to the burgeoning literary culture of his day, 
to a utopian future where culture ‘as a whole’ has been ‘poeticized’.7 Furthermore, as noted in the 
introduction, he came to see this specific narrative as defining his unique contribution to 
philosophy.8 Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis examine the philosophical content of Rorty’s account 
of history and progress. In this chapter and the next, I want to ask a question about this narrative 
that he did not ask: what kind of story is it? Others have considered this question: Voparil has 
suggested we might view Rortian philosophy as a Bildungsroman, a suggestion that merits further 
scrutiny, especially as this conception underpins Curtis’ recent and original vision of Rorty as a 
virtue ethicist.9 But before homing in on the form of Rorty’s narrative in chapter 3, this chapter 
will examine Rorty’s narrative as a story.  
I first present a reading of two essays where Rorty recounts his Bildung-story: ‘The 
Pragmatist’s Progress’ (hereafter TPP) and ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids’ (hereafter TWO, both 
1992). Rorty called TPP a ‘semi-autobiographical narrative’, which I take as representative for 
both texts. Rorty recounts his philosophical maturation within a specific culture and process of 
education, and in both essays, he contextualises this autobiographical tale by relating it to his 
philosophical aims.10 Rorty’s first-person-singular stories are not separable from his first-person-
plural narrative about the ‘we’ of Western culture of which he is part. Juxtaposing these tales with 
Rorty’s ‘grand narrative’ about the development of Western culture towards a ‘literary culture’ 
reveal them to trace a plot that moves from a state of naiveté towards a peripety where an old self-
image is overcome. I clarify the transformative moment of pragmatist becoming by looking at a 
similar moment sketched in Rorty’s important 1979 Presidential Address.11 I close by taking up the 
suggestion I made in the Introduction that Rortian pragmatism is best conceived as an attitude of 




7 Rorty, CIS, p. 53. 
8 Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 4. 
9See Voparil, ‘Philosophy as Bildungsroman’. Curtis, p. 9. 
10 Richard Rorty, ‘The Pragmatist's Progress’, in Interpretation and overinterpretation, ed. by Stefan Collini 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 89–108 (p. 91). The same applies to the third, which is 
found in Richard Rorty, ‘Intellectual Autobiography of Richard Rorty’, in The Philosophy of Richard Rorty, 
pp. 3–24. 
11 Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American 





Becoming the Pragmatist 
When Umberto Eco, in his 1990 Tanner Lectures, wanted to set limits for how we might interpret 
a text, Rorty constructed his response around a personal narrative of intellectual development 
entitled ‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’.12 This, he said, was a ‘quest romance’.13 Quest romances call 
for a chivalric hero who will overcome obstacles to win glory, love, and loot. ‘[A]t the start’ of this 
particular story, Rorty says, the hero is a ‘Seeker after Enlightenment’ – a detail that sets up a 
metaphysical version of this plot, a search for ultimate Truth.14 In the religious allegory which 
Rorty’s title invokes, John Bunyan’s The Pilgrims Progress from This World to That Which Is to 
Come (1678), we follow a faithful pilgrim as he overcomes numerous temptations on his journey 
to Heaven. Implicitly, then, the naïve start-of-the-journey Rorty-as-a-young-man-character 
believed that there would be steps to be taken, a journey to complete, deeds to do, virtues to 
acquire, and eventual victory in the form of seeing the light. That is not, however, how this plot 
plays out. Our hero does not have to fight dragons or extricate himself from the Slough of 
Despond. The challenges he meets are books, different perspectives, alternative vocabularies. He 
faces intellectual trials – that ultimately challenge his sense of self.  
His first test of faith and virtue comes as he ‘reads a bit of Nietzsche’ and begins to see 
established dualisms as ‘just so many metaphors for the contrast between an imagined state of total 
power, mastery and control and one’s own present impotence.’ With this in mind, the Seeker 
rereads Thus Spake Zarathustra, and ‘comes down with the giggles’ – for with ‘a bit of help from 
Freud’ he is now able to reconceive of Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power ‘as just a high-faluting 
(sic) euphemism for the male’s hope of bullying the females into submission, or the child’s hope 
of getting back at Mummy and Daddy’.15 There are also inner demons to be fought: distracting 
daydreams that cast one in a ‘Walter Mitty-like role in the immanent teleology of world history’. 16 
Nevertheless, the traveller overcomes these desires to be personally powerful, to be a hero, and 
arrives – not at his imagined destination but at a transformational moment. 
 
12 Eco’s lectures, as well as responses by Rorty, Jonathan Culler, and Christine Brooke-Rose, were collected 
in Stefan Collini (ed.), Interpretation and overinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
13 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 91. 
14 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 91. 
15 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 92. This is not the laughter of the monomaniac losing his grip on reality, but that of the 
ironist: the one, as Rorty explains in CIS published three years before this essay, who sees that we cannot 
hold on to foundationalism and yet faces this realisation cheerfully. See the analysis of TWO below, and 
Chapter 4.  
16 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 92. In his later work Rorty also associated his pragmatism with anti-authoritarianism. See 
for instance Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: 





This moment unfolds when he pauses to look back on his journey so far and sees his 
‘previous peripeties not as stages in the ascent toward Enlightenment, but simply as the contingent 
results of encounters with various books which happened to fall into one’s hands’.17 It is a moment 
of both liberation and reckoning. The protagonist rejects the narrative that led him to this point – 
the story he thought himself part of and that thus had defined his self-image. But rather than 
feeling lost, he reframes the situation. He changes his attitude towards the specific intellectual 
challenges he encountered on his way to this new vantage point. They never constituted a 
necessary progression of ideas he must understand to arrive at Truth. In the absence of the 
narrative scheme that had structured these ideas and governed his actions by the power of his 
belief in its immanent teleology, they now appear as descriptions to be appraised ‘according to 
their efficacy as instruments for purposes, rather than by their fidelity to the object described’. And 
without the governing narrative, in which the protagonist had thought his role was to be a powerful 
questing hero in search of Truth, he now appears to himself as one human amongst many. Still 
‘capable’, but more modestly, of ‘as many descriptions as there are purposes to be served’.18 The 
‘Seeker after Enlightenment’ thus becomes ‘the Pragmatist’ at the moment when his self-image is 
altered in this decisive way. 
The formative change thus lies in going from seeing oneself as a hero, someone inherently 
better than the rest, on a singular quest for the right description (for truth; absolute knowledge), to 
seeing oneself as one human agent amongst many on a journey into the unknown – and 
simultaneously as someone capable of coping, of creating tools in response to shifting needs along 
the way. I am concerned to emphasise the dual movement at play here. On the one hand, here is 
the voluntary lessening of one’s own importance and authority: one is not a hero, nor a chosen 
being in communion with God or Nature or the Moral Law. On the other, this insight also brings a 
heightened sense of one’s capabilities qua ‘mere’ human being, derived from an increased 
awareness of all ideas and concepts’ human-made nature. Hence this insight reinforces a sense of 
accountability and responsibility as well, as the discussion of TWO and PRI below will make 
clearer. 
 
Rorty told the story of the Pragmatist’s Progress to make a hermeneutical point. This narrative 
was, he said, an interpretive ‘grid’ he imposed on all books he came across.19 A look at how Rorty 
 
17 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 92. This is not meant to be taken literally. Rorty fully accepts that one’s program of 
reading, whether in an educational or private setting, will be shaped by established and reasonably 
predictable institutional criteria, by traditions and canons, by one’s language and culture, and so on. 
18 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 92. 





applied this ‘grid’ as he approached Eco’s work can deepen our understanding of what is at stake 
in the moment of transformation. 
Rorty’s ‘grid’ – one possible way ‘things’ might ‘hang together’ to borrow Sellars’s terms 
again – has a function much akin to Gadamerian pre-judgements or the scientist’s hypothesis as 
she approaches raw data. Rorty recounts that upon reading Eco’s 1988 novel Foucault’s 
Pendulum, he thought he detected a parallel progression to his own. Eco’s novel is a multi-layered 
tale of secret societies, conspiracy plots, and the search for absolute Truth, laced with 
philosophical ideas about semiotics, interpretive theories, and the art of reading. The novel can be 
read as a satire of the postmodern search for meaning, and Rorty did indeed read it along these 
lines:  
 
I decided that Eco must be satirizing the way in which scientists, scholars, critics and 
philosophers think of themselves as cracking codes, peeling away accidents to reveal essence, 
stripping away veils of appearance to reveal reality. I read the novel as anti-essentialist 
polemic, as a spoof of the metaphor of depth – of the notion that there are deep meanings 
hidden from the vulgar, meanings which only those lucky enough to have cracked a very 
difficult code can know.20   
 
Rorty took Eco’s novel to be a ‘send-up’ of structuralism: ‘of the very idea of structures which 
stand to texts or cultures as skeletons to bodies, programs to computers, or keys to locks’. But Eco 
was not a pragmatist – Rorty concluded that the details of Eco’s later work were too difficult to 
place within the Pragmatist’s Progress-grid he was trying, by his own admission, to ‘impose’.21 As 
the world pushed back against the hypothesis, Rorty adjusted his interpretation accordingly. His 
grid was a temporary, open-ended, heuristic device for starting to think about how things might 
hang together.  
 Within this self-reflective analysis of his interpretation of Eco, Rorty provides some 
helpful analogies for understanding what is at stake in that decisive moment when the ‘Seeker after 
Enlightenment’ becomes ‘the Pragmatist’. Rorty first read Foucault’s Pendulum as the negation of 
Eco’s ‘A Theory of Semiotics – a book which sometimes reads like an attempt to crack the code of 
codes, to reveal the universal structure of structures’, and concluded ‘that it stood to that earlier 
book as Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations to his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’.22 That 
is, he first took the novel as confirmation that Eco had undergone the same intellectual self-
 
20 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 89. 
21 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 89. 





transformation he had. Referencing a dramatic moment in the story, where its main character 
seems to walk away from the others’ increasingly frenzied search for the code of codes, in favour 
of quietly relishing the experiences and sensations of life itself (the image of his infant child and 
the juiciness of peaches), Rorty says: 
 
I read this passage as describing a moment like that when Prospero breaks his staff, or when 
Faust listens to Ariel and abandons the quest of Part I for the ironies of Part II. It reminded me 
of the moment when Wittgenstein realized that the important thing is to be able to stop doing 
philosophy when one wants to, and of the moment when Heidegger concluded that he must 
overcome all overcoming and leave metaphysics to itself.23 
 
This way, Rorty was ‘able to call up a vision of the great magus of Bologna renouncing 
structuralism and abjuring taxonomy’.24 
It is this list of transformative moments that is telling. Shakespeare and Goethe did not 
read Nietzsche or Freud, so this has nothing to do with Rorty’s specific experience of giggling at 
the particular idea of Will to Power. Note also that it makes no difference to Rorty whether the 
writers in question expressed themselves through poetry or prose: he levels all distinctions 
between life and work, text and context. It is all simply taken to be juxtaposable material – ‘things’ 
that can be made to ‘hang together’ by ‘imposing’ a narrative (whether that narrative is usable or 
not, is persuasive or not, is another matter, as we have just seen). What matters here is that these 
narratives (unlike Eco’s) and their peripeties do align with the grid and climax of the Pragmatist’s 
Progress. Prospero breaks his staff so the spellbound can see reality – he dispenses with illusions. 
The Tempest ends with him asking forgiveness for his previous hubris and the realisation that he 
only has himself and the mercy of others to rely on – and that this will set him free. There is, of 
course, a long tradition of identifying Prospero the dramatic character with Shakespeare the 
playwright, as well as for seeing this moment in The Tempest as symbolising Shakespeare leaving 
his art behind, and hence Rorty’s reference invokes this as well. Part II of Faust not only leaves the 
romantic quest of Part I behind for the ironies of its more complex narrative, but moves from 
individuality to collective society, from higher aspirations to earthly strivings as a source of 
vitality; it drops idealist illusions in favour of appreciation of physical and aesthetic value. Goethe 
 
23 Rorty, ‘TPP’, pp. 90–91. 
24 Rorty, ‘TPP’, pp. 90–91. Notice here one of Rorty’s own small but effective literary moments when he, 
through casting Eco as ‘the great magus’ equates him, with dramatic flair, with Prospero, and conjures up 
some of the most powerful and theatrical scenes from Faust. Rorty’s prose is littered with such moments, 





wrote part II not as a text to be scrutinised for its hidden meaning but as an appeal to the senses 
and to ‘satisfy the eye’.25  
What these moments share is that they are moments of transformation constituted by 
giving up the quests that until then had consumed and defined these protagonists. At all these 
junctures, illusions are dropped, and the central characters fall back on – or must reckon with – 
their humanity. These are not moments of conversion, Kehres, as there is no re-orientation towards 
another fixed goal, no taking up of a different quest; no (re)turning, no getting on the right path to 
Enlightenment. The Pragmatist does not adopt a new doctrine. All these moments represent a 
decision to surrender. They are moments of letting go of ideas or ideals that, until that moment, did 
govern, and thus freeing moments where letting go expands one’s realm of possibilities. They 
represent a giving up of higher metaphysical art- and life-defining causes and giving oneself over 
to how things then, in their mere worldly humanity, are. They moreover represent overcoming as 
they are moments of acceptance of limitations, earthly pragmaticism, and recognition of a new 
sense of autonomy. 
   
A Cheerful Commitment to Irreducible Temporality 
‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids’ follows the same pattern of the protagonist first being captivated 
by a vision which a later transformative moment reveals to be an illusion, followed by a new sense 
of freedom and autonomy, optimism, and expansion of the realm of possibilities. 
As a son of left-wing political activists, Rorty knew ‘at 12’ that ‘the point of being human 
was to spend one’s life fighting social injustice’.26 This made him worry about his joyous ‘private, 
weird, snobbish, incommunicable’ and not socially useful interests – one of them in American wild 
orchids – which seemed incompatible with this higher goal. He was sincerely worried that Trotsky 
might disapprove.27 When, at fifteen, he left home for the University of Chicago, he had a vague 
idea of wanting to solve the problem of how to reconcile Trotsky and orchids; socially useful 
activities with private, idiosyncratic pleasures:  
 
 
25 Johann P. Eckermann, Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret, Cambridge library collection. 
Philosophy, 1 (Online: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 344. 
26 Richard Rorty, ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids’, in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 3–20 (p. 6). For an account of Rorty’s family history and his parents’ 
political activism, see Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher (Chicago, Ill.: 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 





I wanted to find some intellectual or aesthetic framework which would let me - in a thrilling 
phrase which I came across in Yeats – ‘hold reality and justice in a single vision’. By reality I 
meant more or less, the Wordsworthian moments in which, in the woods around Flatbrookville 
(and especially in the presence of certain coralroot orchids, and of the smaller yellow lady 
slipper), I had felt touched by something numinous, something of ineffable importance. By 
justice I meant what Norman Thomas and Trotsky both stood for, the liberation of the weak 
from the strong.28  
 
The young-Rorty-character is here once more ‘at the start’ of his progress, once again a 
‘Seeker after Enlightenment’.29 
The phrase that thrilled Rorty is from Yeats’s The Vision, where the poet set out a 
supernaturally inspired cosmological system, supposedly dictated by the spirits to his wife. Rorty 
misquotes Yeats slightly: the exact phrase from The Vision, is ‘They have helped me to hold in a 
single thought reality and justice’ – they being the ‘circuits of sun and moon’.30 One might surmise 
that the substitution of ‘single thought’ by ‘one vision’ might have been done to emphasise the 
ocular metaphor implicit in Yeats’s title and its connotation of mirroring, reflecting, which was so 
important to the mature Rorty. In any case, what so excited the young Rorty, was the idea of a 
system that could encompass everything. 
To the poets of high modernism, the notions of reality and justice in Yeats’s line 
constituted an opposition between our everyday world as it appears and the effort to do it justice, 
in all its dimensions, power and potential, through poetry. Yeats had been told by the ‘spirit’ his 
wife, Georgie Hyde-Lees, was channelling, that it was bringing ‘metaphors for poetry’31 – and in 
the end, Yeats did come to think of his cosmology as ‘stylistic arrangements of experience’.32 But 
this was no lesser thing: modernists like Yeats or Ezra Pound believed that poetry could do greater 
 
28 Rorty, ‘TWO’, pp. 7–8. 
29 Rorty, ‘TPP’, p. 91. 
30 A Critical Edition of Yeats's A Vision (1925), ed. by George M. Harper and Walter K. Hood (London: The 
Macmillan Press, 1978), p. 25. 
31 A Critical Edition of Yeats's A Vision (1925), p. 8. Critics have speculated that Hyde-Lees used this device 
to influence Yeats to become a better husband and engage with her intellect. Yeats himself remarks that 
others thought his writing remarkably improved after these sessions with Hyde-Lees began. Yeats writes: 
‘THE other day Lady Gregory said to me: “You are a much better educated man than you were ten years ago 
and much more powerful in argument”. And I put The Tower and The Winding Stair into evidence to show 
that my poetry has gained in self-possession and power. I owe this change to an incredible experience.’ The 
experience being his wife beginning to channel an ‘unknown writer’, ‘so exciting, sometimes so profound’. 
(Loc. cit.) 
For more on ‘ghostwriting’ in this sense and the above influence of Hyde-Lees, see Helen Sword, 
Ghostwriting Modernism, Cornell Paperbacks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), Chapter 5, in 
particular.  





justice to the reality of experience than ordinary language, and thus let us, through its 
transformation of the ordinary, hold the duality of the world, nature and art; how things are and 
how the world should be if it were just or how we would describe it if we could do it justice, in the 
same thought. To the young Rorty, ‘reality’ meant something ‘numinous’, hence revealing, awe-
inspiring, and spiritual, that was of ‘ineffable importance’, and that we could sense in 
‘Wordsworthian moments’ – in communion with nature.33 ‘Reality’ was thus accessible through 
aesthetic experiences in the original sense of the word. ‘Justice’, on the other hand, was something 
different from what the modernists meant: a worldly, ideological, socialist programme of 
liberation. Trotskyism tempered by the pacifism of Thomas.34 What the young Rorty wanted was 
thus more expansive in some ways than the modernist vision; more concerned with the social and 
institutional mechanisms of injustice. And he wanted an answer to how these equally vital 
concerns could be theoretically commensurated – held in one philosophical vision. 
His search for answers led the young Rorty to briefly consider Christianity as the path that 
would let him leave his ‘private obsessions’ behind and serve his fellow human beings with 
‘proper humility’, but he ‘fell back on absolutist philosophy’ – that is, he became an even more 
devoted ‘Seeker after Enlightenment’, to use the vocabulary of TPP, a seeker of Truth.35 (Notice, 
again, Rorty’s invocation of the notion of falling  here, echoing how ‘books’, above, ‘fell’ into his 
hands – a rhetorical move which underscores the contingency of the particularities of Rorty’s 
personal story of intellectual development.) The young Rorty thought that ‘moral and 
philosophical absolutes sounded a bit like my beloved orchids - numinous, hard to find, known 
only to a chosen few’, and he figured that 
if I became a philosopher I might get to the top of Plato’s ‘divided line’ - the place ‘beyond 
hypotheses’ where the full sunshine of Truth irradiates the purified soul of the wise and good: 
 
33 Milnes comments on Rorty’s use of the term ‘Wordsworthian moments’ as ‘suggestive, particularly in 
light of the poet’s own association of flowers with epiphanic and renovating “spots of time” recovered 
through the “inward eye” of memory and imagination.’ Upon closer inspection Milnes finds that 
‘Wordsworth’s relationship with evocative flora bears little resemblance to Rorty’s.’ Milnes makes the point 
that Wordsworth ‘foregrounds the constitutive role of the aesthetic imagination in mediating one’s 
interaction with the world and with other people’ – and Rorty does not. While Milnes might be partially right 
about Rorty’s offhand use of the orchid relative to Wordsworth’s painstakingly considered use of floral 
images and metaphors, chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis argue that foregrounding the aesthetic imagination is 
exactly what Rorty does. See Milnes, ‘Rorty, Romanticism’, pp. 31–32. 
34 Rorty was not a communist and advocated democratic socialist reform, rather than revolution. While his 
parents were leftist activists, they strongly opposed Stalin and renounced communism in the 1950s. See 
Chapters 1 and 2 in Gross, on Rorty’s parents, James Rorty and Winifred Raushenbush, and p. 337. 





an Elysian field dotted with immaterial orchids. It seemed obvious to me that getting to such a 
place was what everybody with any brains really wanted.36 
 
This is our hero – wanting to be one of the chosen few – still at the early stages of his 
development, still understanding himself to be on a quest, where this image represents the 
envisaged destination, the moment of victory and reward. 
Rorty was, however, quickly disillusioned by absolutist philosophy, for it seemed dubious 
that one could ever find universal principles. He started seeing epistemology as a language game 
and to see ‘philosophical talent’ as ‘largely a matter of proliferating as many distinctions as were 
needed to wriggle out of a dialectical corner’. But such moves could not, in the end, make him 
‘either wise or virtuous’.37 And if not, what was philosophy for? Rorty began to discern some 
answers as he turned to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit: 
 
I read [it] as saying: granted that philosophy is just a matter of out-redescribing the last 
philosopher, the cunning of reason can make use even of this sort of competition. It can use it 
to weave the conceptual fabric of a freer, better, more just society. If philosophy can be, at 
best, only what Hegel called ‘its time held in thought’, still, that might be enough. For by thus 
holding one’s time, one might do what Marx wanted done – change the world.38  
 
Reading Hegel taught Rorty that redescriptions could be seen and used as a means for change, for 
ushering in new eras. 
For a long time thereafter, Rorty tells us, he thought Phenomenology of Spirit was one of 
the greatest achievements of humanity, only equally matched by Remembrance of Things Past, 
‘the book which took the place of the wild orchids once I left Flatbrookville for Chicago’: 
 
Proust’s ability to weave intellectual and social snobbery together with the hawthorns around 
Combray, his grandmother’s selfless love, Odette’s orchidaceous embraces of Swann and 
Jupien’s of Charlus, and with everything else he encountered – to give each of these its due 
without feeling the need to bundle them together with the help of a religious faith or a 
philosophical theory – seemed to me as astonishing as Hegel’s ability to throw himself 
successively into empiricism, Greek tragedy, Stoicism, Christianity and Newtonian physics, 
and to emerge from each, ready and eager for something completely different.39 
 
 
36 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 9.  
37 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 10. 
38 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 11. 





Although Rorty’s reading of Hegel perhaps seems more plausible than his reading of Proust, the 
objection that Rorty misreads Proust and particularly misconstrues Proust’s reasons for writing 
literature is perhaps correct, but also misses the point.40 What is relevant to Rorty’s progress-
narrative here is the shift Hegel and Proust’s writing triggers in his thought: a shift in attention 
from the eternal and universal to the time-bound and concrete of human experience. 
Heeding the lesson Rorty saw Hegel and Proust as imparting, he gave up the ambition to 
bring their thought together on a theoretical level, in ‘a vision’, a unifying representation that truly 
mirrored them both. Instead, he saw them as connected through their shared attention to the 
temporal and the particular and their display of a common spirit and skill: 
 
It was the cheerful commitment to irreducible temporality which Hegel and Proust shared – the 
specifically anti-Platonic element in their work - that seemed so wonderful. They both seemed 
able to weave everything they encountered into a narrative without asking that that narrative 
have a moral, and without asking how that narrative would appear under the aspect of 
eternity.41 
 
The crucial lesson was that ‘Hegel’s willingness to stop trying for eternity, and just be the child of 
his time, was the appropriate response to disillusionment with Plato’.42 The attitude of Hegel and 
Proust was the one Rorty must adopt. 
 
This was, then, the moment when Rorty dropped the illusions of his Part I, so to speak, for the 
ironies of Part II, and as in Faust this moment of overcoming a naïve idealism required not only 
leaving it behind, but a turn towards the human world and earthly striving, a change that 







Dewey now seemed to me a philosopher who had learned all that Hegel had to teach about how 
to eschew certainty and eternity, while immunizing himself against pantheism by taking 
 
40 For an in-depth analysis of Remembrance of Things Past which emphasises the thought and deliberation 
behind Proust’s writing, see Malcolm Bowie, Proust among the stars (New York, N.Y.: Columbia 
University Press, 2000). 
41 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 11. 





Darwin seriously. This rediscovery of Dewey coincided with my first encounter with Derrida 
[which] led me back to Heidegger, and I was struck by the resemblances between Dewey’s, 
Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s criticisms of Cartesianism. Suddenly things began to come 
together. ...The result of this small epiphany was a book called Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature.43  
 
As Rorty referenced ‘Wordsworthian moments’ at the start of this essay and draws on Proust to 
concretise his narrative, it hardly seems accidental that he here picks up the Wordsworthian idea of 
epiphany: ‘spots of time’ that we retain with great clarity (which is of course also a notion central 
to Remembrance of Things Past).44 What had become so clear to Rorty was how Dewey, 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger could be made to ‘hang together’ – he saw the anti-representationalist, 
anti-essentialist, historicist, nominalist argument he would articulate in PMN. This is the moment 
he became the Rortian pragmatist.  
 The autobiographical narrative embedded in TWO takes us one step further than that 
interleaved in TPP. For in TWO Rorty comments on what he did next:  
 
So I decided to write a book [CIS] about what intellectual life might be like if one could 
manage to give up the Platonic attempt to hold reality and justice in a single vision.  
 
[It] argues that there is no need to weave one’s personal equivalent of Trotsky and one’s 
personal equivalent of my wild orchids together. Rather, one should try to abjure the 
temptation to tie in one’s moral responsibilities to other people with one’s relation to whatever 
idiosyncratic things or persons one loves with all one’s heart and soul and mind... The two will, 
for some people, coincide... But they need not coincide, and one should not try too hard to 
make them do so. So, for example, Jean-Paul Sartre seemed to me right when he denounced 
Kant’s self-deceptive quest for certainty, but wrong when he denounced Proust as a useless 
bourgeois wimp, a man whose life and writings were equally irrelevant to the only thing that 
really mattered, the struggle to overthrow capitalism.45  
 
This passage restates the Pragmatist’s realisation in TPP that there will be as many descriptions as 
there are purposes. And Rorty here, also, ties this to a moment of accepting finitude and giving up 
the ‘self-deceptive quest for certainty’: doing so means ‘accepting that what matters most to you 
may well be something that may never matter much to most people. Your equivalent of my orchids 
may always seem merely weird, merely idiosyncratic, to practically everybody else.’ However, 
 
43 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 12. 
44 See for instance Nicola Trott, ‘Wordsworth: the shape of the poetic career’, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Wordsworth, ed. by Stephen Gill (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 5–21 (pp. 16–20). 





Rorty adds, ‘that is no reason to be ashamed of, or downgrade, or try to slough off, your 
Wordsworthian moments, your lover, your family, your pet, your favourite lines of verse, or your 
quaint religious faith.’46 
 Rorty’s larger point is that we do have specific, material, immediate obligations to other 
people: ‘not to bully them, to join them in overthrowing tyrants, to feed them when they are 
hungry’. But while our ability to see and sympathise with pain can cause us to formulate solidaric 
obligations and take political or compassionate action, this should not lead us to surmise that our 
peculiar ‘sensitivity to that pain [and] idiosyncratic loves, are going to fit within one big overall 
account of how everything hangs together’.47 Searching for such a theoretical explanation for why 
we should care, or what we should care about, is not only folly, but gets in the way of caring. The 
quest for a ‘single vision’ that accounts for suffering, obscures it.48 
 
A New Self-Image for Humanity 
TWO bridges the personal tale of TPP and the broader cultural story Rorty tells through its 
emphasis on justice and our responsibility to other people. In chapters 4 and 5 I go into this 
cultural progress-narrative in detail, but I want to outline it here to show that it follows the same 
narrative arc as Rorty’s individual progress-narrative.  
 Briefly re-told, Rorty’s story goes like this: Western intellectual culture was first under the 
spell of Platonism, of Ideas. Captivated by this picture, we simply kept on adding new 
metaphysical metaphors to fit within its frame – Descartian dualism for instance. We kept working 
at replacing faulty universalising frameworks (Theories) with new ones we thought – now, finally 
– got it right. A shift in our collective mindset occurred in the wake of Kant formulating criteria 
for knowledge based on human reasoning, as it opened our minds to the idea that human thinking 
could replace theology – that we could become the adjudicators of knowledge (even while Kant 
might not have thought so). Hegel’s historicism helped us see human ideas as manifestations of 
history rather than Reason. While the romantics retained a metaphysical outlook in their 
interpretation of Kant and Hegel – in their belief that human imagination and powers of expression 
would reveal profound truths – their insistence on the human perspective brought us one step 
closer to breaking free from the hold of teleological narratives altogether.  
 
46 Rorty, ‘TWO’, pp. 13–14. 
47 Rorty, ‘TWO’, p. 14. 
48 Cf. Toal’s argument in Catherine Toal, The entrapments of form: Cruelty and modern literature (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2016). I problematise Toal’s reading of Rorty in the concluding chapter of 





 In this larger we-narrative, our cultural moment of transformation began to unfold when 
proto-pragmatists like Nietzsche self-consciously connected human thought to humanity’s self-
image by discussing what philosophy, human knowledge, is or is not. Darwinian evolutionary 
theory later led us a further step towards accepting our mere material humanity and the brute, 
material contingency of history. Following this insight, the classical pragmatists helped us see 
ideas as tools for human purposes. Still, remnants of idealism and essentialism remain discernible 
in contemporary thought, for instance, in post-structuralist ‘textualism’ (I discuss this in Chapter 
4).49 Only the combined efforts of writers like James and Dewey, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Freud, but 
also Wittgenstein, Quine, Derrida, Sellars and Davidson can enable us to overcome it. Metaphysics 
has taken shelter in the idea of language. Their shared antirepresentationalism and common focus 
on language helps us see that what we are doing when we use language is merely to write 
descriptions for varying purposes, narratives that make ‘things’, in that wide-ranging Sellarsian 
sense, ‘hang together’. 
The story Rorty tells about the progress of Western culture towards a ‘literary culture’ thus 
traces the same development as his individual tale. Both stories move from a naive self-perception 
of being on a heroic quest in search of absolutes, of Platonic ideas, Enlightenment, Rationality, or 
Truth. Both end at a point where the very idea of a quest, a final destination, the end of inquiry, the 
one right vision is left behind. In both, this occurs not because these ideas were filled with new 
meaning or because the right conceptual scheme was finally found. But because our attitude 
towards these descriptions changed as a result of, and in conjunction with, a changed self-
perception, brought about by the telling of a new story about who we are. 
After examining Rorty’s semi-autobiographical narratives, the ‘takeover of a literary 
culture’ passage from PTG (quoted in the Introduction) makes greater sense.50 The ‘new dawn’, 
the ‘new self-image for humanity’ points to the moment when we collectively stop thinking of 
ourselves as being on a quest for Truth, and collectively (or at least predominantly) start thinking 
like the Pragmatist did the moment he became ‘the Pragmatist’. It is a cultural version of that 
transformational moment of overcoming and empowerment coupled with greater self-awareness 
and sense of responsibility. Rorty is not articulating a Hegelian end-of-history vision. He is 
describing a stage where the insights of the thinkers he catalogues are becoming internalised as 
part of our cultural identity, as their ways of speaking become increasingly integral to our shared 
(final) vocabulary.51  
 
49 Rorty, ‘NITT’. 
50 Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 4. 






Accepting the Contingency of Starting-Points 
This ‘new self-image for humanity’ moment can be illuminated further by examining Rorty’s 
preferred characterisation of pragmatism in his 1979 Presidential Address to the American 
Philosophical Association.52 But first, because I describe this moment as one of adopting an 
attitude, I briefly want to draw some lines to classical pragmatism.  
The pragmatist tradition has used the vocabulary of attitudes, consequences, and practices 
since its inception. William James suggested that pragmatism should be thought of simply as an 
‘attitude of orientation’.53 It stood, he thought, for ‘[n]o particular result’, and was hence not a 
doctrine but a stance. It was: ‘The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 
“categories,” supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
facts’.54 James aligned it with what he, with a nod to the British tradition, called the ‘empiricist 
attitude’. But adopting what we might colloquially call the scientist’s mindset and mode of inquiry 
was not sufficient: the pragmatist attitude also required us to ‘sincerely’ give up ‘the rationalist 
temper’ – by which he meant ‘abstraction and insufficiency... verbal solutions... bad a priori 
reasons... fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins’.55 James urged us 
to approach the world as the anti-sceptical scientist would and take the world at face value, but he 
also asked us to leave our aspirations for final answers behind. Hilary Putnam has suggested that 
this combination of anti-scepticism and fallibilism was ‘the’ insight of American pragmatism.56 
While James (unlike Rorty) did think pragmatism had a core ‘method’ – to evaluate ideas 
by the practical consequences of adopting them – he also emphasised that ‘the general triumph of 
that method would mean an enormous change in what I called... the “temperament” of 
philosophy’.57 A similar concern with attitude and self-conception is present in Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s and John Dewey’s work.58 In his study of the circle that gave rise to American 
 
52 ‘Sloganistic’, Rorty, ‘PRI’, p. 721.‘Prefer’ p. 726. 
53 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Cambridge Library Collection 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), p. 54. 
54 James, Pragmatism, pp. 54–55. James’s emphasis.  
55 James, Pragmatism, p. 51. 
56  Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism An Open Question (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 21. 
57 James, Pragmatism, p. 51. 
58 For further details on this and a useful analysis of the conception of pragmatism as attitude in classical 
pragmatism, see Stéphane Madelrieux, ‘Can We Secularize the Will to Believe?’, RIVISTA DI STORIA 





pragmatism, Louis Menand observes that what united the early pragmatists was indeed their 
attitude towards ideas: 
 
They all believed that ideas are not “out there” waiting to be discovered, but are tools... that 
people devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves. They believed that ideas 
are produced not by individuals, but by groups of individuals – that ideas are social. They 
believed that ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of their own, but are entirely 
dependent, like germs, on their human carriers and environment. And they believed that since 
ideas are provisional responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances, their survival 
depends not on their immutability but on their adaptability.59  
 
To the early pragmatists, the desirable and ‘enormous change’ in the ‘temperament’ of philosophy 
sprang from a shift, not from one doctrine to another, but in how we thought about human 
thinking. 
As the narratives above indicate, Rorty’s pragmatism can be usefully understood not just 
as a linguistically orientated pragmatism but as pushing the pragmatist shift one further step 
regarding the implications its view of ideas and language has for our self-conception. Rorty not 
only asks us to change our ‘temperament’, but to do so with great self-consciousness, mindful of 
what it entails for human beings’ conception of what it means to be a human being.60 I can 
motivate this further by looking at Rorty’s articulations of pragmatism in PRI. For Rorty here 
makes it clear that his sense of ‘what pragmatism means’, as James famously put it, hinges on 
whether one makes, and self-consciously so, a choice to view ‘all starting points’ as contingent – 
or not. This is precisely what was at stake at the peripeties of the narratives examined above.  
 In PRI, Rorty offered three ‘brief sloganistic characterizations’ of pragmatism.61 ‘My first 
characterization of pragmatism’, he said, ‘is that it is simply anti-essentialism applied to notions 
like “truth,” “knowledge”, “language,” “morality,” and similar objects of philosophical 
theorizing’.62 He here articulates pragmatism as a stance that declines to see ideas in metaphysical-
ontological terms and a practice (it is ‘applied’) of interrogating concepts from that point of view. 
I am stressing this latter point as I later want to relate the notion of a literary attitude to a specific 
kind of literary critical practice. Rorty’s second characterisation of pragmatism underscores that 
when the pragmatist delineates, distinctions are made in terms of practice and consequences, not 
 
59 Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club - A Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
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60 Rorty’s rejection of the idea of ‘human nature’ is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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in terms of metaphysically determined (ontological) kinds.63 (This comes to be important when I 
explicate Rorty’s public/private divide in Chapter 5). ‘James’ dictum about truth’, Rorty adds, 
‘says that the vocabulary of practise (sic) is uneliminable, that no distinction of kind separates the 
sciences from the crafts, from moral reflection, or from art’.64 In other words: what separates them 
is their function, as the Pragmatist realised in TPP. It is important to this thesis that the Rortian 
pragmatist paradigm lets us treat, as Rorty says elsewhere, physics and poetry evenhandedly.65 
That is, the texts of physics and of poetry alike, all texts, are seen as metaphysically deflated, 
human-made artefacts, distinguishable by the role they play in human lives and societies. 
Rorty’s preferred way of characterising pragmatism is that ‘it is the doctrine that there are 
no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones – no wholesale constraints derived from the 
nature of the objects, or of mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the 
remarks of our fellow-inquirers’.66 That this is the better way to think about pragmatism, he 
suggests, is because it homes in on the need to make a ‘fundamental choice’ between ‘accepting 
the contingent character of starting points, and attempting to evade this contingency’. 67 To accept 
it, Rorty continued, ‘is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow-
humans as our only source of guidance’.68 This encapsulates the close relation he sees between the 
conception of language he offers and his view of what it means to be human: adopting a pragmatist 
attitude towards language and concepts is simultaneously to orientate ourselves towards other 
human beings. If their remarks are our only source of guidance, we must pay careful attention to 
what they say.  
In a much later essay, Rorty redescribed the opposite attitude, which we must distance 
ourselves from, as ‘egotism’, meaning ‘self-satisfaction’. He also says: ‘[e]gotists who are inclined 
to philosophize hope to short-circuit the need to find out what is on the mind of other people. They 
would like to go straight to the way things are (to the will of God, or the moral law, or the nature 
of human beings) without passing through other peoples’ self-descriptions.’ He calls the 
preferable, non-egotistical view of truth ‘humanistic’, which here implies a concern for, and a 
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paying of attention to, other human beings.69 Note, however, that this lateral, conversational turn – 
or solidaristic turn, to deploy another term central to Rorty – is brought about by first taking that 
fundamental step of accepting that contingency goes all the way down. This is what is in play at 
those transformative moments in TPP and TWO, and in his narrative about the intellectual 
progress of Western culture. In Chapter 5, I will also suggest that the same moment plays out when 
the liberal ironist understands that her ironism permits her to stand ‘unflinchingly’ for her beliefs.70 
It is not that the pragmatist thinks we cannot or should not work systematically towards a 
goal, but ‘that the pragmatist knows no better way to explain his convictions than to remind his 
interlocutor of the position they both are in, the contingent starting points they both share, the 
floating, ungrounded, conversations of which they are both members’.71 Through this 
‘fundamental choice’ to accept the contingency of all starting points, Rorty levels all hierarchies. 
Not one ontological category is left standing – every description appears as just one more 
conversationally constituted contingent starting point for further conversation.72 Descriptions, 
texts, poems all appear as material ‘things’ we might make ‘hang together’ by imposing grids that 
help us interpret and make sense of our experience, in narratives that help us cope. 
In his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ (hereafter IA), Rorty rather beautifully articulates the 
need for us to embrace open-ended proliferation of a multitude of kinds of descriptions and 
purposes: 
  
The point of these new suggestions... is to twist the kaleidoscope in such a way that what 
looked to past thinkers like “hard, first-order, philosophical problems” simply vanish from 
view. There is no right way in which the bits of glass in the kaleidoscope should be arranged, 
because there is no right language for human beings to speak. There are only languages that 
serve some human purpose better than others. Human purposes and human languages change 
in tandem with each other. 
...A consistently historicist view would envisage intellectual and moral progress not as 
getting closer to anything but as the process by which the kaleidoscope keeps getting bigger 
and more colorful. To hope that such progress will continue is to hope that the human 
imagination will keep inserting new bits of glass, of previously undreamt-of hues. Goethe was 
 
69 Richard Rorty, ‘Redemption from Egotism: James and Proust as Spiritual Exercises’, in The Rorty Reader, 
ed. by Christopher Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 389–406 
(pp. 394–95). I discuss this further in chapters 5 and 6. 
70 Voparil also stresses the importance of this moment in PRI. See Christopher Voparil, ‘The Politics of the 
Novel: Rorty on Democracy, Irony, and Moral Education’, in Christopher Voparil, Richard Rorty: Politics 
and Vision (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), pp. 61–88 (p. 64). 
71 Rorty, ‘PRI’, p. 736. 
72 For an insightful discussion of Rorty and ontology, see Alan Malachowski, ‘Rorty against the 
Ontologists’, in Richard Rorty's Multiple Legacies, ed. by Samuel C. Wheeler III (= The European Legacy, 





right when he said that we live our life in colored reflections. That is not, as Plato thought, our 
misfortune. It is our glory.73  
 
I want to close by putting the same point less lyrically but equally literarily by suggesting we 
might see Rorty as urging us to evade the lure of the quest, the call of the crusade.  
 
Refusing the Quest 
Considering Rorty’s stories as stories shows that his narratives about his individual intellectual 
development have a broader philosophical function and supplement his narrative about Western 
culture’s progress towards a literary culture in meaningful ways. These narratives all begin as 
quest-narratives, where the protagonist(s) ‘at the start’ see themselves as on a quest, on a search for 
Truth. Then the unfolding of events breaks, in a subtle yet radical way, the form of this quest-
narrative that until that moment shaped their efforts and self-conception. These stories all trace the 
same trajectory and move towards the same moment of self-overcoming, acceptance of 
contingency, and recognition of capability and humanity.  
As I read Rorty’s stories, then, his protagonist reaches clarity, rather than Truth, when he 
refuses the quest: when he rejects the idea that history and intellectual or moral progress can be 
captured by the quest-narrative form. And from that point onwards, there is no straight and narrow 
path to follow towards a final destination, only a journey to go on. It is not that the journeyer veers 
off the straight and narrow, but that he recognises that there is no preordained path – he is the 
maker of it. It is a highly romantic idea, of course: the pragmatist is not a searching and beseeching 
pilgrim, but an autonomous, exploring Wanderer.  
While Rorty asks us to give ourselves over to a continual process of expansion and 
exploration, he is not saying we cannot look back, as the Pragmatist did, and impose a ‘narrative 
grid’ on our journey thus far. Nor that we cannot construct a narrative that might guide us as we go 
on. However, inevitability is no longer presumed: any such story is seen as narrative, as a useful 
fiction. Rorty does not say we cannot measure improvements pragmatically and comparatively. 
Rather, I take him to reject the teleological quest-narrative as the unifying, governing form that 
allows talk about ‘human progress’ or ‘historical progress’ or ‘moral progress’ in the abstract. In 
CIS Rorty says that ‘[t]he drama of an individual human life, or of the history of humanity as a 
whole, is not one in which a preexistent goal is triumphantly reached or tragically not reached.’74 
 
73 Rorty, ‘IA’, pp. 22–23. 





He would have, I want to suggest, benefitted from stating this rejection of the quest-narrative form 
more plainly than he did and from noting that his own narrative turn would be inescapably coupled 






The Playful Virtues of the Novel 
 
 
As mentioned at the start of the preceding chapter, Voparil and Curtis have proposed that Rorty’s 
work might be best captured by thinking of it as a Bildungsroman. In ‘On the Idea of Philosophy 
as Bildungsroman: Rorty and his Critics’ (2005), Voparil submits that Rorty suggest we treat 
philosophy as Bildungsroman and that we might, in turn, apply this notion in order to interpret 
Rorty more usefully.1 Voparil’s interest in Rorty’s uses of literature is linked to his concern for 
whether and how Rortian pragmatism provides effective strategies for liberal democratic thought, 
and thus to the motif of cultivating ‘ethical character through literature’ in Rorty’s work more 
broadly.2 In Defending Rorty: Pragmatism and Liberal Virtue (2015), Curtis commends Voparil 
for being ‘especially perceptive’ when he ‘identifies’ Rorty’s work as a Bildungsroman. This 
insight helps Curtis establish his understanding of Rorty as advocating ‘a particular model of 
ethical self-development and individuality’.3 
The model, the interpretive ‘grid’ Curtis ‘imposes’, to use Rorty’s vocabulary, is virtue 
liberalism. Curtis’s inscription of Rorty into this tradition prompted insights: Wojciech Małecki, 
for instance, considered whether ‘virtue’ might be the notion that would connect all Rortian 
strands of thought.4 But what if Bildungsroman is the wrong analogy here? What if the idea of 
Bildung is not the one that best captures the trajectory of moral and intellectual progress in Rortian 
pragmatism? As indicated in Chapter 2, I think Rorty is telling a different kind of story. 
Furthermore, I worry that using the Bildung-framework to contain the Rortian project – and this 
framework to model Rorty as a virtue ethicist, virtue liberal, and, as Małecki suggests, virtue 
aesthetician – risks setting aside those aspects of Rortian philosophy that are most original and 
uniquely useful – elements I take Rorty to closely associate with the idea of literature and with the 
genre of the novel in particular. 
My aim in this chapter is to apply the insights of the previous one to the issue of whether it 
is helpful to talk about Rortian philosophy as a Bildungsroman and, more broadly, to the question 
 
1 Voparil, ‘Philosophy as Bildungsroman’, pp. 115–16. 
2 Christopher Voparil, ‘Jonquils and Wild Orchids: James and Rorty on Politics and Aesthetic Experience’, 
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 23.2 (2009), 100–10 (p. 106). 
3 Curtis, p. 9. 
4 Wojciech Małecki, ‘Review: William M. Curtis, Defending Rorty: Pragmatism and Liberal Virtue’, 
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII.1 (2016) 





of what kind of vocabulary we can use to get to grips with Rorty’s overarching narrative. That is: I 
want to ask what kind of story it is, what form it takes, and to consider what this says about the 
Rortian stance. In the following, I develop an answer to these questions by first comparing the 
trajectory of Rorty’s tale of transformation to familiar narrative forms, such as the quest-romance, 
the allegory, and, indeed, the Bildungsroman. I suggest that while his story might contain elements 
of these, his narrative transgresses their bounds. Moreover, the underlying philosophical attitude 
manifested in these forms is not compatible with the Rortian attitude of orientation. Comparing 
Rortian philosophy to Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game (1943), a novel Rorty invoked in 
TLT, I offer an explanation for why the Rortian attitude is more usefully compared with the 
mindset of the modernist literary author and his work with the modernist novel – as Rorty also 
affirmed at various junctures, in particular when he associated his stance with Milan Kundera’s. 
However, extracting a virtue ethics from modernist novels seems an impossible task. I 
problematise Curtis’s Bildung-and-virtue-take on Rortian philosophy by agreeing with Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s observation in After Virtue (1981) that virtues can only be articulated within a unified 
narrative form – the kind of form the modernist novel frequently mobilises to contravene. This 
final analysis thus helps me contextualise the study contained in Chapters 2 and 3 and show the 
broader relevance of the view of Rortian pragmatism I am offering.  
 
The Form and Attitude of the Quest-Romance and the Allegory  
Despite how Rorty described his protagonist as he stood at the start of his journey, his narrative is, 
as I have shown in Chapter 2, not a quest romance. Rorty’s ‘Seeker after Enlightenment’ becomes 
‘the Pragmatist’ when he leaves the very idea of being a hero on a quest behind. However, Rorty’s 
Bunyan-reference does invoke this genre – The Pilgrim’s Progress from This world to That Which 
Is To Come is a quest-romance transposed into allegorical form. And the idea of a ‘quest’ is 
significant in this context: Rorty notes that James talked about the search for Truth as a ‘hopeless 
quest’.5 James imagines ‘metaphysics’ as having ‘followed a very primitive kind of quest’ and 
‘philosophy’ as having been defined as ‘the quest for the vision of the world’s unity’.6 The most 
significant example in the context of the pragmatist tradition is, of course, John Dewey’s The 
Quest for Certainty, where he takes this quest for finality to lead us to separate theory from 
 
5 Rorty, ‘Pragmatism, Davidson, and truth’, p. 126. 





practice, knowing from doing.7 The vision of a quest is a crucial metaphorical tool for pragmatist 
thought – as the image of the kind of journey pragmatists are not on. 
However, in TPP, Rorty did not merely say his character set out on a quest. He invoked the 
literary form of the ‘quest-romance’ to characterise his narrative as narrative.8 While there are 
moments in Rorty where he comes close to discussing the ‘quest’ metaphor’s relation to form, I 
have not come across any explicit discussions of this connection in classical pragmatism. Rorty 
might have made the connection when reading Harold Bloom – their mutual admiration is well-
established. Rorty began to use the term ‘quest’ in the latter half of the seventies (thus coinciding 
with his turn to pragmatism where this term then regularly occurs): Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ‘can 
be read as a heroic attempt to save philosophy from naturalism’,9 Heidegger is on a ‘quest’ for ‘the 
holy’,10 Heidegger and Nietzsche on a ‘quest for the historical sublime’,11 Derrida’s target is the 
notion of philosophy of language as a ‘quest’ for foundations, and so on.12 At this time, he also 
begins to deploy literary terms and tropes, and it seems likely that Rorty in this period would have 
read Bloom’s influential Romanticism and Consciousness: Essays in Criticism (1970), which 
contains his ‘The Internalization of Quest-Romance’.13 Rorty also read Northrop Frye and his 
Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (1957), in which the quest romance is a central topic.14 
Additionally, there is the possibility that this particular vocabulary was adopted from MacIntyre’s 
After Virtue (1981), where living one’s life as a virtuous human being is explicitly related to the 
idea of being on a quest and the matter of narrative form.15 
We might turn to Frye for a specific explication of the quest-romance as a form.16 He 
likens it to the wish-fulfilment dream; it has a sequential form (186), it posits a quest to complete, 
and its completion rounds off the story: this gives the romance its form (187, my emphasis). It tells 
of a hero’s struggles, sometimes conflict with an enemy (loc. cit.), and its central form is ‘the 
dragon-killing theme’ (189, i.e., power and victory). It can be ritualistic, mythical, or mundane: the 
 
7 John Dewey, The quest for certainty a study of the relations of knowledge and action: Gifford 
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10 Rorty, ‘Heidegger and Dewey’, p. 302. 
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hero can be Messianic, a ‘redeemer of society’, or be after worldly treasures – in any case, there is 
a reward at the end (192-93). It is dialectical and antagonistic; it moves from innocence to 
understanding, from action to contemplation (200). Frye’s description of the quest-romance fits 
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress as a quest-romance transposed into a religious-allegorical 
landscape: people, events, and places here represent a topography of ideas. The protagonist, 
Christian, journeys from his home in search of the Celestial City and someone who can help ease a 
‘terrible burden’ he carries on his back (his sin). He must overcome many obstacles and 
adversaries on his way. The struggles serve to cultivate and strengthen his virtues of character and 
teach him to walk away from vanities – although, in the end, Christian reaches the contemplative 
stage and discovers he is entirely reliant on the mercy of God to be admitted into the Celestial City 
and find peace.17  
‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’ similarly unfolds in a philosophical landscape where books 
and names represent positions toward which our hero must adopt an attitude; a progression of 
intellectual and moral agons. However, as we have seen, Rorty’s plot does not unfold in the 
manner of a quest-romance. Our protagonist is tested, but unlike the chivalric hero on his constant 
march to victory, and unlike Christian on the narrow path to salvation, Rorty lets himself be led 
astray – and not only that: he comes to approve of straying (it is not a sin to stray, in Rorty). He 
gives up not just the search for ultimate Enlightenment but the very idea of it. He does not simply 
cease fighting to overcome his antagonists and hurdles but begins to see all his obstacles as 
illusions – at least qua obstacles. And with this, his very identity as a questing hero dissolves. In 
the end, the tale’s pretended form can no longer contain its plot or its protagonist. As we also saw, 
this trajectory was mirrored in Rorty’s account about the progress of the West: he rejects the quest-
romance as the interpretive grid to be imposed on history and human development because these 
will invariably burst the bounds of any preordained, pre-graspable arrangement of events, 
experiences, and actions. 
 
Nevertheless, as Rorty points to Bunyan’s religious allegory, we might instead be tempted to think 
that Rorty’s tales are, at least in some ways, allegorical. This comparison, however, sits even more 
uneasily within the larger context of his work. An allegory is a form of art where ‘outward 
appearance is contrived to suggest a hidden or second order of meaning that is in some sense the 
 
17 See The Pilgrim's Progress: An Authoritative Text, Contexts, Criticism, ed. by Cynthia Wall, Norton 
Critical Editions (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009). 
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“true” meaning’.18 While Bunyan constructed a recognisable quest narrative layered on top of what 
he took to be an existing, deeper Truth, we know that Rorty wanted to do the opposite of 
constructing an appearance-reality distinction (Rorty could not make the move of saying, for 
instance, ‘this is what Nietzsche is truly about’). We are not meant to read behind Rorty’s text or to 
burrow down – his are not texts that say one thing but mean another, and where the ‘real’ meaning 
is to be excavated by hermeneutic efforts. Rorty is very much in accordance with Felski when she 
insists that we must leave ‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’ behind.19  
But there is a difference. In Chapter 2, I briefly indicated that in TPP, Rorty advocated what 
we might call a horizontal hermeneutical praxis rather than a vertical one: we start with our pre-
judgements, our ‘interpretive grids’ that seem to us, as human agents, useful for our purposes. We 
also adapt or abandon these if our attempts to make ‘things’ ‘hang together’ burst our grid or 
leaves it unwieldy. It seems more representative to say Rorty advocates a narrative, or poetic view 
of interpretation – sees the interpretive result as a new artefact made of the material under scrutiny 
or in play. As he says elsewhere, pragmatists see the question ‘“What is the meaning of a text” [as] 
as useless as the question “What is the nature of the good?”, treat ‘everything as a matter of a 
choice of context and nothing as a matter of intrinsic properties’, and ‘dissolve objects into 
functions, essences into momentary foci of attention’. But they also treat ‘knowing’ as ‘reweaving 
a web of beliefs and desires into more supple and elegant folds.’20 Seen in this way, the practical 
and experimental stance Rorty wants us to adopt towards texts, interpretation, and truth emerges as 
the inverse of Bunyan’s metaphysical outlook. 
This last point is critical. Neither the disposition and aims of the quest-romance nor of the 
allegory align with Rorty’s philosophical attitude of orientation. The writer of an allegory writes 
from a philosophical or religious perspective that takes a deeper level of truth as existent. As Frye 
stated, the shape of the quest-romance is defined by the presumed existence of a holy grail (prize, 
salvation, Enlightenment, Truth). Worldviews are mirrored in the choice of textual form; plotlines 
reveal what the writer thinks is ‘possible and important’, to borrow another phrase that recurs in 
Rorty. The problem is, then, not only that the allegory-grid is too constrictive a form, or the plot 
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University Press, 2018). 
19 See in particular Felski, Limits of Critique. Cf. for instance Rorty, ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, p. 
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too predictable and closed off. It is also that the philosophical attitudes the quest-romance and the 
allegory are manifestations of are at odds with Rorty’s.  
 
The Shape and Aspiration of the Bildungsroman  
If we dispense with quest romance and allegory as ‘interpretive grids’ that helps us understand 
Rortian thought, the natural next step is to pick up the Bildungsroman, as the literary form that 
inherits the matter of virtue- and character building. This also takes us from the early modern 
period to the romantic era, an epoch of integral importance to Rorty. Moreover, the romantics 
acquired a view of history as modelled on the ages of man – as moving from infancy, to adulthood, 
to maturity and wisdom – from Johann Gottfried von Herder and his 1774 
geschichtsphilosophische treatise Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der 
Menschheit (Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Humankind).21 The idea of 
Bildung has then, conveniently, a private and a public dimension, which might more easily 
accommodate both Rorty’s ‘I’-story and its parallel ‘we’-story.  
Bildung originally referred to a person’s development towards becoming a morally and 
intellectually mature individual. The evolution of character progressed towards the individual 
becoming a suitable, morally and intellectually fine-tuned citizen of a society. The emphasis on 
inner and authentic development, becoming a particular kind of human being, makes this a 
distinctive idea, from, for instance, French eighteenth-century ideas about instilling civility: the 
difference is between acting right (the latter), versus being, or becoming, the right kind of human 
being. However, this was not a simplistic idea. It went beyond the straightforward transformation 
of the quest-romance and was not formulaic, as the end-goal was not to turn oneself into an 
archetype. The goal was rather to gain autonomy, conceived not just as a capacity to act with 
volition, but as a form of inner freedom: becoming autonomous was to become your true self, as a 
mind and as a character. Moreover, this state of being was not necessarily to be achieved through 
mere formal education: the formation of an autonomous but also responsive self was tied to 
experience, to travel, to interactions with various kinds of people and the overcoming of 
intellectual challenges, and to writing and reading. The fully formed man (and it was usually a 
man) would exhibit mastery in matters of taste and judgement, and completing his formation thus 
depended on experience with making judgements. Hence, while the notion of Bildung might 
 
21 See Allen W. Wood, ‘Herder and Kant on History: Their Enlightenment Faith’, in Allen W. Wood, The 
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revolve around cultivating natural and individual talents, the appropriately formed character would 
nevertheless result in a certain kind of man – one that would, on the Kantian picture here adopted, 
autonomously subject himself to the moral law. It is a development from non-form to (con)form.  
Bildungsromane represent such formative experiences. To use Voparil’s words: 
 
Such novels trace the moral, psychological, and social development of a young character who 
journeys from youthful provinciality and innocence to a more complex social and personal 
maturity borne of conflict, growth, and, above all, newfound self-knowledge. But at the moral 
core of the Bildungsroman is the assumption, however faint and quixotic, that such tales might 
lead the reader to greater self-development as well.22 
 
Voparil rightly observes that some of us have come to Rorty’s work and found a body of work that 
not only displayed great self-development but inspired it. However, I think it is a mistake to 
deduce from this that the Bildung-theme, although occasionally evoked by Rorty, intimates how to 
approach his work. While I, too, find Rorty’s work inspirational, all kinds of narratives can inspire 
and make you feel, as Voparil quotes Rumana as having felt when he read Rorty, as though you 
‘click’ with the author.23 All sorts of works can deal with conflict and growth and lead to self-
development in the reader. And while Rorty does indeed hold that we constantly grow, learn, and 
forge new practical identities to cope with being in the world, this process – in Rorty – does not, as 
in traditional Bildung-plots, necessarily tend towards stability. In Rorty, self-creation is a continual 
process, open to ‘gestalt switches’ and moments of transformation, as the previous chapter 
indicated.24 There are no enduring or necessary constraints on conversation that make this process 
asymptotic.25  
One might object by saying Bildung should be apprehended as an ongoing process, 
especially post romanticism. And one might object that Rorty’s Bildung is that of Gadamer, who, 
as Rorty points out sees it as an element of spirit rather than an effort to converge on the absolute 
spirit.26 In PMN, when Rorty grappled with the difficulty of imagining what philosophy without 
epistemology might look like, he did indeed turn to Gadamer and hermeneutics, suggesting we 
substitute education, self-formation, for knowledge.27 
 
22 Voparil, ‘Philosophy as Bildungsroman’, p. 122. 
23 Voparil, ‘Philosophy as Bildungsroman’, p. 122. 
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I still hesitate. The Gadamerian impulse is intent on truth, endpoint, fusion, 
commensurability, and form, while Rorty eschews truth as anything more than intersubjective 
agreement, sees us as inextricably engaged in a never-ending process of redescription, and wants 
us to become comfortable with knowing our descriptions and schemes often will remain 
incommensurable. Furthermore, Rorty himself later stated that his turn to Gadamer had been a 
mistake. This part of PMN had been  
 
a false start: the contrast I drew there between “systematic” and “edifying” philosophy was not 
the one I wanted. ...when I wrote it I was just beginning to get acquainted with the line of 
thought that leads from Hegel through Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Derrida. I 
vaguely sensed that the trouble with analytic philosophy was that it had never advanced from 
Kant’s eternalization of the intellectual situation of eighteenth-century Europe to Hegel’s 
historicism. But I had not yet made myself sufficiently familiar with the post-Hegelian 
European philosophers who had resisted the temptation to go “back to Kant”. My invocation of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics were feeble and unproductive.28 
 
Even seen through a Gadamerian lens, Bildung is still related to arriving at a place where one fully 
understands. Bildung-plots trace such trajectories, and Bildungsromane, novels of formation, are 
shaped by faith in the possibility of arriving at this destination. Thus, deploying the notion of 
Bildung to get to grips with Rorty seems misguided. This ‘interpretive grid’ imposes too 
constrictive a narrative structure, too predictable a plot on Rorty’s stories and work, and, 
moreover, the underlying stance that it carries forth is at odds with the stance Rorty advances. The 
Bildung-idea jars in particular with Rorty’s firm dismissal of the idea of a ‘human nature’, a topic I 
return to in Chapter 5.  
Recall Rorty’s notion of a ‘final vocabulary’: the set of words we employ to justify our 
actions, beliefs, and lives; those in which we ‘formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our 
enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes’; the words in 
which we ‘tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives’.29 
What I am suggesting as a wider point here, is that philosophical attitude and choice of form are as 
interlinked as philosophical attitude and choice of ‘final vocabulary’. And, moreover, that when 
narrating how ‘things hang together’ in Rorty, we are well-served by not using the Bildung-
vocabulary, not deploying the Bildungsroman, as an interpretive grid, as a pedagogical device, for 
conceptualising Rorty’s project, because it indicates a paradigm most readers are predisposed to 
associate with attitudes that run counter to core elements of the Rortian spirit. 
 
28 Rorty, ‘IA’, p. 13. 






An Education in Play  
Although the idea of Bildung occasionally surfaces in Rorty’s work, it is not the idea of 
Bildungsroman he latches on to, but simply the roman – the novel. Rorty’s uses of actual novels 
for moral edification and political deliberation gets the most attention in the secondary literature, 
and I turn to this in Chapter 6. Here I want to show that another and largely underappreciated 
reason why this genre was vital to Rorty comes clearly into view if the above analysis is 
juxtaposed with an examination of how novels tell stories – of how attitude and form is related in 
this instance. I will illustrate my point by first looking at a novel Rorty invoked in his introduction 
to TLT in 1967, when he wondered if the future for philosophy lay in it becoming ‘...the activity of 
constructing new language-games for the sheer joy of it (as in Hesse’s Magister Ludi)’, and then at 
Rorty’s discussion of the novel as a genre in ‘Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens’.30 
Das Glasperlenspiel, the last of Hermann Hesse’s major novels, was published in German 
in 1943, and in English in 1949 as Magister Ludi, later as The Glass Bead Game.31 It tells the story 
of the intellectually, musically, and emotionally gifted orphan Joseph Knecht, his rise through the 
ranks of the elite academic institution and fictional province of Castalia, his climb to its pinnacle 
as ‘Magister Ludi’ – master of the Glass Bead Game – and his eventual rejection of not only 
position and power, but the game itself, subsequent defection from Castalia to become a teacher of 
the young, and ultimate death by drowning, in a lake on top of an earthly mountain. The older man 
attempts to befriend his first worldly, non-Castalian pupil by engaging in a swimming competition 
with the sportive adolescent and sinks, naked, into the glacial water. The young man is last seen 
wrapping himself in Knecht’s robe for protection against the natural elements. 
 The state of Castalia is the endpoint of the evolution of (a version of) the university: it is 
constituted by an all-male scholarly elite, lifted up from the general population at an early age, and 
educated so as to acquire the virtues and habits necessary to uphold this glorious institution. The 
whole purpose of it is to manifest, refine, and literally embody the ideal system for knowledge-
acquisition: removed from life’s ordinary and practical concerns, its scholars epitomize the ideal 
inquirers and vessels for learning. The ultimate symbol of Castalia, the summit of its achievements 
and its highest ceremony and only sport, is the Glass Bead Game. It is constructed around a 
 
30 Rorty, ‘Introduction to TLT’, p. 23. As Jefford Valbusch notes in ‘Novel Ideas: Notes toward a New 
Reading of Hesse’s Uternm Rad’, the US interest in Hesse ‘was beginning to surge’ in 1968 – just at the 
time when Rorty must have read Hesse. See Ingo Cornils, A Companion to the Works of Hermann Hesse, 
Camden House companion volumes (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2009), p. 17. 





synthesis and abstraction of all humanistic, artistic, and scientific knowledge – a system that 
captures the entirety of knowledge in a hierarchical system of correspondences: 
 
[The] eternal idea, which for us has been embodied in the Glass Bead Game, has underlain 
every movement of Mind towards the ideal goal of a Universitas Litterarum, every Platonic 
academy, every league of an intellectual elite, every rapprochement between the exact and the 
more liberal disciplines, every effort towards reconciliation between science and art or science 
and religion. Men like Abelard, Leibniz, and Hegel unquestionably were familiar with the 
dream of capturing the universe of the intellect in concentric systems, and pairing the living 
beauty of thought and art with the magical expressiveness of the exact sciences.32   
 
The narrator adds that the ‘Game of games had developed into a kind of universal language 
through which the players could express values and set these in relation to one another’. Hence, 
while its players believe it stands in a vague but ultimate correspondence-relationship with the 
‘real’ world, this is a language-game in pure form, axiomatic and inferential. Rorty’s rendition of 
Yeats’s ‘one vision’ would be aptly expressed by Hesse’s words. 
A string of moral and intellectual challenges lead Knecht to view the Game in a new light. 
Knecht’s dialogues with a non-Castalian historian show him that all human understanding is 
situated in time. While outside its walls, Knecht is exposed to the social, economic, and political 
side of running and preserving the ‘pure’ province of Castalia – it has real-term costs, but the 
larger society that sustains them gets no real-term returns. The game – the pageantry of which they 
share with the world – is beautiful but useless. Finally, he comes to understand that it is incumbent 
upon him to act on this knowledge. But when Knecht eventually defects from Castalia, he does not 
go searching for its opposite – does not go on a quest, to reuse that term, for the ‘real’ world. He 
holds on to what he has learned, who he has become, and takes it into the world to face whatever 
lies ahead. He puts his knowledge to use. 
It is not hard to draw parallels between the Game and epistemology, between Castalia and 
the institution of Philosophy – at least on Rorty’s depiction of it. Knecht also undergoes a process 
of intellectual growth remarkably similar to Rorty’s in TPP and TWO: Knecht, like Rorty, goes 
from being a ‘Seeker of Enlightenment’, to mastering the game of knowledge, to someone who 
sees themselves as a humble human (‘Knecht’ can, of course, mean ‘servant’), and comes to 
understand his former worldview as optional.33 A more extensive analysis of these parallels could, 
 
32 Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, pp. 7–8. 
33 Cf. John Krapp, ‘Hermann Hesse's Hegelianism: The Progress of Consciousness Towards Freedom in The 
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for instance, be used to illuminate Rorty’s Hegelianism, which is strongly present in both Hesse’s 
and Rorty’s account of identity-formation, but also to cast light on where and why they both break 
with the Hegelian account. While I hope to expand on this suggestion in the future, I now want to 
return to the specific question of form. 
The Glass Bead Game is a Bildungsroman of sorts. This is indeed a crucial part of what 
makes it, above many modernist and postmodernist novels, apt for illuminating Rorty’s work: it 
brings Hesse’s humanism to the forefront.34 However, the way Hesse constructs this novel 
simultaneously undermines the Bildung-idea and any attempt at comprehending the human 
experience within a closed structure. Hesse’s narrative is not didactic, continual, or unified in its 
form. The plotline is far from neat. The text is a juxtaposition of elements and it is left to the reader 
to determine how much weight to assign to each part. Examining the complex architecture of this 
novel will help set up what I want to suggest about Rorty’s work and its relation to the novel as a 
genre. 
The Glass Bead Game instantly and deliberately draws attention to itself as a literary 
creation. Its subtitle underscores the instability of its pretensions: ‘A tentative sketch of the life of 
Magister Ludi Joseph Knecht together with Knecht’s posthumous writings edited by Herman 
Hesse’. The intertwined texts that constitute it are, the title invites us to think, supposedly in 
existence, the story apparently true. The book is ‘dedicated to the Journeyers to the East’– a 
reference both mythological and intertextual, as it is the title of an earlier novel by Hesse. Its first 
part is a general introduction to the history of the Glass Bead Game, and the second is taken up by 
a recounting of Knecht’s life-story. But there are also parts within parts, multiple diegetic levels: 
the long letter Knecht sends to the Order informing them of his departure is a text within the text, 
where Knecht in his own words relate his intellectual progress-story – an account that at times is at 
odds with the official-sounding biographer’s (narrator’s) version. The final chapter of the 
biography-part takes us beyond what the narrator can establish from trustworthy sources and into 
‘legend’. The third and final part of the novel consists of Knecht’s Nachlass, which contains some 
poems and three stories Knecht wrote as part of his studies: these life-stories has a function akin to 
Zen Buddhist Koans – riddles to be meditated on, often paradoxical, and made to make the student 
of Zen strive to tease out their meaning, often only to find that they are not meant to be solved by 
the rational mind at all.35 
 
34 For a discussion of Hesse’s ‘Romantic humanism’, see Eugene L. Stelzig, Hermann Hesse's Fictions of 
the Self: Autobiography and the Confessional Imagination, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 46.  
35 The sheer number of juxtaposing of elements and positions that take place in this text, the frames within 





There is also the matter of the narrator. Hesse uses him to induce both sympathy and 
suspicion. His portrait of Knecht is kind but almost entirely surface: there is little psychological 
detail, and his view of the past is equally superficial. Hesse establishes the skewness and blindness 
of this point of view in a gently humorous manner which sets us as readers up to smile ironically at 
the gap between the narrator’s pretensions to profundity and lack of actual depth and 
understanding. We quickly come to question whether Castalia is the utopia he wants to portray it 
as – and to wonder who Knecht, this most humble and brilliant of children, and most selfless and 
gentle of servants to men, ‘really’ was, given that we cannot trust our narrator to truthfully 
represent this world. This reading-experience slants the point of view in such a way that we 
become aware of ourselves as thinking of the narrator as naïve and of his biography thus as 
reductive – we come to be mindful of ourselves as interpreters, to observe that we adopt a meta-
perspective. Taken as a whole, the novel thus becomes both a Bildungsroman and a satire of this 
genre; both a Bildungsroman and a novel we cannot help but view ironically as a Bildungsroman; 
as naïvely read if taken as such. The conspicuous artfulness of Hesse’s multi-tiered text pushes us 
to notice our efforts to understand and, importantly, our inability to close the interpretive circle.  
Why draw attention to this? Because Hesse’s novel demonstrates the kind of attitude the 
late modernist, and even more so the postmodernist author, writes from – and the stance such 
writing forces us to adopt as readers. This attitude both produces and is reflected in the complex 
indeterminacy of its form: in the elements that push a text like Hesse’s beyond the Bildungsroman, 
those that resist closure and confront us with incommensurability, instability, and process. The 
Glass Bead Game teaches us at every turn that it will burst open any ‘interpretive grid’ smaller 
than itself. If we respond with ever more fevered attempts to control and contain this kind of text, 
we will lose. Understanding is only won if we accept the instability and incommensurability and 
respond with curiosity and imagination, and play along in the act of creation. Magister Ludi also 
means Master of Play. Such novels instruct their readers in play, demonstrate its necessity. 
 
That this latter strategy of responsive and imaginative co-creation describes the Rortian attitude 
can be substantiated by looking more closely at Rorty’s most focussed discussion of the novel qua 
genre, contained in ‘Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens’ (hereafter HKD). This lecture was given in 
1989, the year CIS was published:36 as Voparil notes, Kundera’s ‘reflections on the novel, appear 
to have deeply affected Rorty’s thinking’ at this stage.37 In this lecture, Rorty examines Western 
culture and suggests the novel as the cultural artefact we should hold in the highest regard. Not as 
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the epitome of literary quality, but as the ‘characteristic genre of democracy, the genre most 
closely associated with the struggle for freedom and equality.’38 Borrowing from Kundera’s The 
Art of the Novel, Rorty puts it to us that whereas the metaphysical-philosophical attitude is 
authoritarian, controlling, the novel’s attitude is anti-authoritarian: the novel as a genre is a vehicle 
of ‘revolt against the ontotheological treatise’.39 He pits ‘theory, simplicity, structure, abstraction, 
and essence’ against the novel’s appreciation of ‘narrative, detail, diversity, and accident’, relates 
philosophy to ‘contemplation, dialectic, and destiny’, and the novel to ‘adventure, narrative, and 
chance’.40  
While it might appear as though Rorty is constructing a simple dichotomy, his point is 
more subtle. Rorty is articulating a literary attitude towards ideas, language, and selfhood, which, 
as the next chapter will elaborate, closely aligns with his pragmatist attitude. The defining trait of 
the novelistic attitude is that it finds the attitude of the philosopher comedic, sees that ‘[i]t is 
comical to use one’s quest for the ineffable Other as an excuse for ignoring other people’s quite 
different quests’, to ‘think that anyone could transcend the quest for happiness’. Rorty continues: 
‘[w]hat the novelist finds especially comic is the attempt to privilege one of these descriptions, to 
take it as an excuse for ignoring all the others. What he finds most heroic is not the ability sternly 
to reject all descriptions save one, but rather the ability to move back and forth between them.’ 
Instead, the novelist wants ‘a display of diversity of viewpoints, a plurality of descriptions of the 
same events’.41 As previously noted, Rorty would later describe the attitude he opposes as 
‘egotism’, defined as ‘self-satisfaction’.42 Here in HKD, the antithesis to the novelistic attitude, the 
attitude the novelist finds comedic, is precisely egotism in this sense, laced with a sense of 
entitlement and of having the right to be taken seriously. 
Rorty notes that Kundera makes the term ‘the novel’ roughly synonymous with ‘the 
democratic utopia’ in which nobody would think there is something more ‘real’ than pleasure or 
pain, a utopia of ‘tolerance and curiosity’: where ‘all that is left of philosophy is the maxim of 
Mill’s On Liberty, or of a Rabelaisian carnival: everybody can do what they want if they don’t hurt 
anybody else while doing it’.43 That Rorty here equates the attitude of Mill with that of Rabelais 
indicates the extent to which it is beyond the scope of the present moment to fully explicate this 
lecture. A full analysis would detail the intricate connections between Rorty’s Kunderan gloss of 
 
38 Richard Rorty, ‘Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others, pp. 66–82 (p. 68). 
39 Milan Kundera, The Art of the Novel (New York: Grove Press, 1988). First published in French in 1986. 
Rorty, ‘HKD’, p. 68. 
40 Rorty, ‘HKD’, pp. 73–74. 
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the novelistic attitude and his own when articulated in a more conventional philosophical jargon. 
But I want to stress one more aspect before considering what this means for attempts at describing 
Rorty in virtue-jargon: the unsubsumability of the novel’s innumerable characters. 
‘Kundera’s Utopia’, Rorty holds forth, ‘is carnivalesque, Dickensian, a crowd of eccentrics 
rejoicing in each other’s idiosyncrasies, curious for novelty rather than nostalgic for 
primordiality.’44 Dickens, Rorty submits, is the emblematic novelist, the ‘anti-Heidegger’.45 
‘Heidegger’s genre ‘...is the lyric: his hero is Hölderlin, not Rabelais or Cervantes. For Heidegger 
the other human beings exist for the sake of the Thinker and the Poet.’46 He is on a quest for 
transcendence. As the ‘anti-Heidegger’, the novelist’s quite mundane ‘job’ is to examine human 
life, most of all to report on both human ‘glory’ and ‘stupidity’, so that we might hope for ‘an age 
in which the prevalent varieties of stupidity will cause less unnecessary pain than is caused in our 
age by our varieties of stupidity.’47 
However, Rorty stresses, ‘[t]he job of the novelist’ can only be undertaken ‘with a whole 
heart’ by ‘someone untroubled by dreams of an ahistorical framework within which human history 
is enacted, a universal human nature by reference to which history can be explained, or a far-off 
divine event toward which history necessarily moves.’48 The novelist, in my terms, rejects the 
quest. This attitude is on display in 
 
Kundera’s insistence that the novel does not have a nature, but only a history, that the novel is 
a “sequence of discoveries.” There is no Platonic Form for the novel as a genre to live up to, no 
essential structure which some novels exhibit better than others, any more than there is such a 
Form or such a structure for human beings. The novel can no more exhaust its possibilities than 
human beings can exhaust their hope for happiness.49 
 
Rorty here explicitly relates the quest-motif to the matter of ‘Form’ and directly to the more subtle 
question of how what form we impose on the governing narrative we posit for human history, for 
human beings, matters. The novel’s rejection of a closed or Platonic form lets it attend to the 
multitudinousness of the human experience.  
Rorty in fact claims that the most memorable feature of Dickens’s novels is ‘the 
unsubsumable, uncategorizable idiosyncrasy of the characters’: 
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Dickens’s characters resist being subsumed under moral typologies, being described as 
exhibiting these virtues and those vices. Instead, the names of Dickens’s characters take the 
place of moral principles and of lists of virtues and vices. They do so by permitting us to 
describe each other as “a Skimpole,” “a Mr. Pickwick,” “a Gradgrind,” “a Mrs. Jellyby,” “a 
Florence Dombey.” In a moral world based on what Kundera calls “the wisdom of the novel,” 
moral comparisons and judgments would be made with the help of proper names rather than 
general terms or general principles.50 
 
The rise of the novel, and the reason it is to be lauded and learnt from, is that it helps us ‘treat 
apparent inconsistency not as something to be rejected as unreal or as evil, but as a mark of the 
inadequacy of our current vocabularies of explanation and adjudication’, a shift ‘correlated with an 
increasing ability to be comfortable with a variety of different sorts of people’ and ‘reflected in the 
rise of pluralistic bourgeois democracies, societies in which politics becomes a matter of 
sentimental calls for alleviation of suffering rather than of moral calls to greatness’.51  
‘It may seem strange’, Rorty adds, ‘to attribute this sort of willingness to the recent West – 
a culture [that is] racist, sexist, and imperialist.’ But that it is a culture ‘worried about being racist, 
sexist, and imperialist, as well as about being Eurocentric, parochial, and intellectually intolerant’ 
is something we owe more to the work of novelist than to either philosophers or poets.52  
Kundera’s passages on ‘the wisdom of the novel’ famously opens CIS. That an articulation 
of the novelistic attitude stands as the epigraph of this work has received comparatively little 
attention. This epigraph should be seen less as a preliminary and more as a program statement, as 
emblematic. For it seems clear both in HKD and in CIS, as I will show, but also in earlier essays as 
noted in the Introduction and as the next chapter will explore, that Rorty, in extensive and vital 
ways, saw his own attitude paralleled in the literary attitude – or, vice versa, his linguistic 
pragmatism as mirroring the attitude of the novel as a genre. Whether Rorty ‘gets’ the novel qua 
genre ‘right’, to use a Rortian idiom, is not a question that can be properly formulated within the 
Rortian paradigm, nor in point. What is in point is that Rorty’s conception of this genre and 
attitude is comprised of traits long associated with the novel as a form. There is abundant potential 
for further work here, especially for relating Rorty directly to the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin that so 
profoundly influenced Kundera, by emphasising Bakhtinian notions such as dialogue, 
differentiation, heteroglossia, carnivalisation, polyphony, the chronotope, or unfinalisability, and 
for exploring topics such as how Bakhtin’s opposition to the structuralism of Ferdinand de 
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Saussure relates to Rorty’s view of the novel as a vehicle for revolt against the metaphysical 
treatise.53  
Rorty articulates his progress and that of an ideal, imagined ‘literary culture’ as moving 
from theory to literature, completeness to incompleteness, commensurability to 
incommensurability, abstract to concrete, quest to adventure, hero to humanism, egotism and self-
satisfaction to solidarity and self-enlargement, mastery to coping, finding to making, seriousness 
and striving to comedy and play. What is most important about Rorty’s turn to literature, is, on my 
view, not that he recommends we use literary works for moral deliberation, but that literature and 
the literary vocabulary helps him delimitate and articulate the highly specific attitude he holds to 
be the most conducive to furthering the democratic project. I am suggesting, and subsequent 
chapters substantiate this view, that this shift towards a literary attitude is the transformation at the 
heart of Rorty’s idea of a ‘literary’ culture.  
 
Curtis, MacIntyre and the Quest for Narrative Unity 
To show why it matters to the broader reception of Rortian philosophy that we take this – Rorty’s 
literariness – as significant, I want to return to Curtis and sketch some implications of the above 
for his argument in Defending Rorty. I will suggest that casting Rorty as a virtue ethicist relies on 
inscribing the Rortian narrative into a unifying form incompatible with its ethos. 
In After Virtue MacIntyre gives ‘an account of the human good’, by which he means the 
virtues, defined ‘purely in social terms, in terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative unity of 
human lives’.54 The concept of ‘man’, to MacIntyre, ceases to be ‘functional’ unless it is 
understood in relation to a telos.55 ‘It is only’, MacIntyre holds, ‘because human beings have an 
end towards which they are directed by reason of their specific nature, that practices, traditions, 
and the like are able to function as they do’.56 On this model we can only understand a life as 
meaningful and discern good from bad, when these concepts are understood in relation to an 
overarching purpose. The basic premise of his argument is that any conception of ‘virtues’ relies 
on defining these in relation to both a ground and a teleology – on being defined within a story 
 
53 Cf., for instance, Maria Shevtsova, ‘Dialogism in the Novel and Bakhtin's Theory of Culture’, New 
Literary History, 23.3 (1992), 747. Shevtsova interestingly notes that the impact of Bakhtin’s ideas on 
contemporary intellectual life reached a new peak in the mid-80s following the 1981 publication of The 
Dialogic Imagination, which saw some of Bakhtin’s most important essays translated into English for the 
first time.  
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with a beginning and an end. Virtues are only intelligible, he insists, when their conception 
emerges within and is evaluated with reference to a unified and unifying narrative. To ‘adopt a 
stance on the virtues’, MacIntyre asserts, ‘will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of 
human life’.57 
‘Why this might be so’, MacIntyre contends, ‘is easy to understand’:  
 
If a human life is understood as a progress through harms and dangers, moral and physical, 
which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways and with a greater or 
lesser measure of success, the virtues will find their place as those qualities the possession and 
exercise of which generally tend to success in this enterprise and the vices likewise as qualities 
which likewise tend to failure. Each human life will then embody a story whose shape and 
form will depend upon what is counted as a harm and danger and upon how success and 
failure, progress and its opposite, are understood and evaluated. To answer these questions will 
also explicitly and implicitly be to answer the question as to what the virtues and vices are. 
…belief in the virtues being of a certain kind and belief in human life exhibiting a certain 
narrative order are internally connected.58  
 
The ‘shape and form’ that enables and embodies the idea of ‘virtue, is, then, the quest-narrative. 
‘The unity of a human life’, MacIntyre elaborates, ‘is the unity of a narrative quest. Quests 
sometimes fail, are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated into distractions; and human lives may in 
all these ways also fail. But the only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are 
the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest’.59 Moreover, ‘without some 
at least partly determinate conception of the final telos there could not be any beginning to a 
quest’.60 
The insight that unless one knows what something is to be good for one cannot evaluate its 
appropriateness is central to pragmatism as well. The difference is that a (Rortian) pragmatist will 
not want to articulate transcendent purposes, beyond the realm of ‘happiness’ (cf. Rorty on 
Dickens above) – the pragmatist is content with positing finite, concrete, local, and temporal goals 
and aspirations for human beings. If a Rortian pragmatist intellectual articulates her purpose in 
transcendental terms, quest-terms, she holds this view ironically, knowing it to be merely a 
narrative, a rhetorical move (see Chapter 5). Unlike MacIntyre, she will not unironically theorise 
premises for a ‘functional’ conception of ‘man’ and, thus, what counts as virtues (the good). 
Moreover, as MacIntyre points out, virtues must, as they are part of one’s ethical character, one’s 
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nature, carry over from the private to the public realm, and vice versa: one is not an honest man if 
one is not always honest. Thus, the virtue picture has the human character at its centre, 
functionally understood as a human being through its relation to a telos, judged by its acquisition 
of virtues derived from and within relation to its quest for its telos. This jars both with Rorty’s 
rejection of the notion of an essential ‘human nature’ and his separation of public and private aims 
and actions (also addressed in Chapter 5).  
In sum, if Macintyre is right, then talking about Rortian virtues requires there to be a 
unified, teleological narrative framework or form in place, that permits the derivation of virtues 
and vices. To fit Rorty in the virtue-grid, Rortian pragmatism must be (re)describable as a quest-
romance. Moreover, if Macintyre is also right about virtues transcending and unifying the public 
and the private, that must be squared with Rorty’s vocal rejection of both human nature and the 
desire, need or possibility to hold the private and the public in ‘one vision’ (cf. Chapter 2 and 5). 
Hence, if I am correct in my analysis and Rorty’s narratives spell out a subtle but radical break 
with the quest-narrative form, then a reading of Rorty as a virtue ethicist starts to look tenuous.  
One possible solution to this would lie in making a kind of deconstructive, or modernist-
novelistic move when writing one’s account of Rorty as a virtue ethicist: to either explicitly avow, 
or show using textual or literary techniques, that while one wants to advance a view of Rorty as a 
virtue ethicist, this suggestion is to be held and received ironically – with self-conscious awareness 
of it as just one more grid for grasping an aspect of Rorty, while fully cognisant of the virtue-
narrative’s problematic connotations relative to the Rortian attitude. The question then is if this is 
achieved. Rorty solved it in TPP by introducing diegetic levels, framing a story within a story, and 
by essayistically exposing his thought process and comedically questioning his preliminary 
interpretation. He solved it by writing a kind of literary text or analysis. In CIS, Rorty discussed 
whether Derrida succeeded in writing theory in such an ironic manner, ironist theory, and found 
that Derrida did not.61 Does Curtis succeed? 
When Curtis holds irony itself up as the Rortian virtue, his description of Rorty comes 
across as unironic. Curtis asserts early on that he ‘demonstrates’ that ‘Rorty’s entire intellectual 
project can best be understood as promoting a conception of virtue liberalism’.62  
Moreover, his account lapses into the teleological form when he specifies a telos. First as an 
idealised Silicon Valley – a community of educated ‘problem-solvers’ where people are judged 
solely by the ‘content of their character’ and ‘the usefulness and attractiveness of their ideas’; who 
celebrate plurality and the ‘clash and synthesis of ideas’, because this ‘constitutes’ the ‘creative, 
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risk-taking spirit of liberal culture’. Their purpose is to ‘creatively, deliberatively, progressively, 
and competitively innovate’, and thus this functional definition also defines the ideal virtues of this 
society.63 This holds even when Curtis appears to see the contours of the problem with detailing a 
final destination and attempts to evade it by using a work of fiction to provide his most extensive 
articulation of what this endpoint would be like. 
Curtis here turns to Huxley’s utopian novel Island. For ‘at the center of Huxley’s literary 
description of Palanese society is the beautiful, liberal character of the Palanese themselves, who 
have been carefully socialized and educated to exhibit the liberal virtues’.64 Curtis stresses the 
plurality, diversity and freedom of Palanese culture, that it aims to realise a ‘fully human’ 
happiness, that has room for ‘religious mysticism, humanistic science, hallucinogenic drug use for 
increased self-awareness, birth control for rational population management, natural resource 
conservation and sustainable development, eugenics, psychology, art, poetry, and Deweyan liberal 
education’.65 But despite the multiplicity of possibilities on display, the effect is still a whittling 
down, or a settling of form. An endpoint is specified, and thus the articulation of virtues – or a 
cardinal one – is made possible. 
That even using a work of utopian fiction as the endpoint by which we might define the 
good causes significant and tangible tensions in Curtis’s account to emerge, explains why Rorty 
only sketched his utopia, and otherwise mostly relied on dystopian fiction to negatively illustrate it 
– to show us the kind of future we do not want.66 Rorty, as Curtis notes, wants us to engage in 
utopian thinking to push the limits of what we deem possible and important, and to imagine a 
different future. And both Curtis and Rorty urge us not to read utopian writings uniroinically – as a 
social blueprint.67 But while Curtis finds it curious that Rorty did not use utopian fictions to 
portray possible futures, I would suggest that Rorty’s choice of dystopias makes sense when their 
less prescriptive nature is taken into account, and, moreover, how this leaning thus largely meant 
Rorty evade the teleological trap I see Curtis as falling into, because it let Rorty describe a 
desirable future in the negative; by indicating what we do not want to happen while leaving 
everything else open.  
 
63 All Curtis, p. 81. It is beside the point here, but I would firmly object to the claim that the Rortian utopia 
could be manifested by even a mythologised Silicon Valley: the capitalist liberalism invoked here is not the 
social democratic liberalism I understand Rorty as advancing. The wisdom of Silicon Valley is not the 
wisdom of the novel.  
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While I recognise and sympathise with Curtis’s desire to bring Rorty into dialogue with 
liberal theorists, Curtis’s vocabulary and form does not, in my estimation, function well for 
conveying the Rortian attitude and aims. As I have argued in above, and as MacIntyre also holds, 
moral attitudes and narrative forms are dynamically and intimately connected. 68 Curtis’s virtue-
redescription traces a form and indicates a philosophy that has not entirely left behind the desire to 
capture history and human progress in a quest-narrative. Through articulating what a good society 
is, and – by virtue of this conception – what constitutes a morally good character, Curtis appears to 
still want to anchor his account in a (quasi)metaphysical fashion. It reveals a conservative, or at 
least preservative, impulse, at odds with the Rortian emphasis on expansion, change and growth – 
on accepting that all we can do is work from where we are, with what we have, towards something 
we think might work.69 
My worry is, as stated at the outset, that the virtuous vocabulary obscures and even sets 
aside the most unique and radical part of Rorty – the part where he breaks with the teleological, 
quest-romance form and goes novelistic; becomes literary. This transgression of the tradition is the 
element of Rortian thought that is most original, unfamiliar, and potentially paradigm-shifting; the 
part that cannot be made intelligible within the conventional governing narrative. And this surplus 
and unfamiliarity – and the unsettling and defamiliarising effects of it has – thus represents what is 
most distinctive and useful in Rortian pragmatism. 
 
The Question of the Novel 
Paralleling the conclusion of the previous chapter, then, it might be contended that Rorty rejects 
not just the quest-romance but narrative form altogether. That would be to overstate my case. 
Neither Rorty nor the novel reject form in favour of formlessness, but both embrace 
experimentation with form, and the proliferation of forms as many and diverse as there are human 
viewpoints – the novel as a genre does not postulate an overarching form for each novel to 
instantiate. Instead, what I have wanted to argue in these two chapters is that Rorty not only 
wanted us to break free ‘from the governing metaphors of mind and knowledge in which the 
traditional problems of epistemology and metaphysics... are rooted’, as we saw Ramberg put it in 
 
68 MacIntyre, p. 243. 
69  This echoes a line from Roosevelt’s autobiography: ‘There is a bit of homely philosophy, quoted by 
Squire Bill Widener, of Widener's Valley, Virginia, which sums up one's duty in life: “Do what you can, 
with what you've got, where you are.”’ I imagine Squire Widner and William James might have made good 
friends. See Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography: With Illustrations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 





the Introduction, but that he also wanted us to break free from the governing narrative form that 
shapes, or at least exerts significant pressures on, our understanding of, and conversations about, 
historic, intellectual, and moral progress.70  
The unified and unifying teleological form is instantiated by the quest-romance form, the 
end-of-history trajectory, the end-of-inquiry story, the Truth-finding plot, and latent also in the 
Bildungsroman, as is discernible in its drive towards the formation of a stable, integrated, and 
persistent ethical character. This is significant because Rorty’s narrative about how the history of 
our intellectual culture hangs together with its best possible future constitutes his moral 
philosophy: Rorty follows Sellars in seeing morality as a matter of ‘we-intentions’ and holds that 
‘the core meaning of “immoral action” is “the sort of thing we don’t do”’ – he tells us that on this 
picture, ‘moral philosophy takes the form of an answer to the question “Who are ‘we’, how did we 
come to be what we are, and what might we become?”’.71 The story we tell about who we are, why 
we are this way, how we want to be in the world is the narrative that allows us to make sense of 
and frame talk about what is or was good or bad, right or wrong, helpful or unhelpful. Curtis 
correctly discerns that Rorty’s multifaceted, repeatedly retold and elaborated narrative about the 
history and future of our culture is co-extensive with his moral philosophy. What is not usually 
noted, and that I am stressing, is that the question of what kind of narrative Rorty formulates in 
response to this question then matters a great deal. 
Thus Rorty would have, I want to suggest, benefitted from stating this formal discontinuity 
more plainly than he did, precisely because it brings to the fore the attitudinal shift he advances. It 
also brings into view the more subtle but important point that it might be less conducive to talk 
about Rorty as advocating a specific transformation of character, and more helpful to talk about 
Rorty as urging us to, self-consciously, change our stance towards ourselves as characters. 
Articulating Rorty’s break with traditional forms helps us see that he insists that we write a 
different kind of story about human history and cast ourselves in a different kind of role. It brings 
out the ‘stupidity’ in thinking we can transcend the human experience, the comedy of our quests, 
and the philosophical priest’s self-satisfaction. It shifts attention to and embraces our idiosyncratic, 
individual humanity, and instead of seeing the loss of the dream of the overman as tragic, it 
welcomes the carnival.    
This, however, might not sound like a suitable approach to take if the aim is to forge a 
solidaric ‘we’ capable of getting anything done. Voparil has elsewhere concluded that  
 
 
70 Ramberg, ‘Richard Rorty’. 





the complexity and irony of great literature cannot easily be reconciled with the kinds of moral 
sentiments Rorty needs literature to disseminate to further the communal ends of his “liberal 
utopia.” Despite appearances to the contrary, Rorty’s appeal to literature looks not to irony but 
to sentiment for its political import. Kundera’s subversive conception of the novel’s irony 
undermines Rorty’s bourgeois liberalism to the point where the two can coexist only by 
instituting a sharp division between public and private. This is the paradox of Rorty’s political 
thought: while he intimates a conception of democracy grounded in an ironical, 
nonmetaphysical culture, he resists the full force of the human ambiguity and plurality of irony 
in public.72  
 
Voparil stresses that we ‘must address the possibility Rorty raises: can complexity, irony, and 
ambiguity provide a sufficient basis for collective action?’.73 He simultaneously concludes that it 
cannot, and moreover suggests that it is in order to overcome this problem and to enable the 
formation of a stable, collective moral identity capable of action, that Rorty blocks off private 
irony from public solidarity. 
Voparil asks the right questions but, in my estimation, draws conclusions that miss the 
mark, albeit not by much. Voparil’s hesitation is about the moral and political efficacy of the 
Rortian attitude. As the next chapter shows, Rorty worried about the same matter in the essays that 
introduced his idea of a ‘literary culture’. Voparil’s doubt is also about whether the novel as a 
genre in the twentieth century, the modernist and postmodern novel in all its complexity and irony, 
has been a vehicle of moral progress. While Voparil appears to read Rorty as saying that only 
‘didactic, middle-brow, “sentimental” novels’ are useful for spurring the liberal ‘we’ to change, I 
read Rorty as responding to this question – as he does to the question of whether pragmatist 
thought has advanced our intellectual and moral development – with an emphatic yes, it does.74 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis explore how Rorty offers a model for ethical thought where 





72 Voparil, ‘The Politics of the Novel’, p. 62. 
73 Voparil, ‘The Politics of the Novel, p. 62. 






From Romanticism to Textualism to Pragmatism  
 
 
Whereas this inquiry began by asking ‘why describe it as a “literary” culture and not simply a 
“pragmatist culture”?’, now there is also the question ‘why “literary culture” and not merely 
“novelistic culture”?’. This distinction is important. Despite his emphatic identification with the 
Kunderan novelistic attitude, Rorty does not tell all philosophers to become novelists, nor does he 
become one himself. He asks philosophers to become literary critics. While Rorty is impatient 
with Heidegger’s reification of the lyric as a means for transcendence, he makes room for all 
variants of literature in his work. ‘Sentimental’ novels that address systemic injustice and cruelty 
play a vital part. He weaves poetry into his writing, for instance when he uses Philip Larkin’s 
‘Continuing to Live’ to explain his view of selfhood in CIS. When Rorty knew he was dying, he 
wrote that only poetry had been able to bring him comfort:  
 
I suspect that no comparable effect could have been produced by prose. Not just imagery, but 
also rhyme and rhythm were needed to do the job. In lines such as these, all three conspire to 
produce a degree of compression, and thus of impact, that only verse can achieve. Compared to 
the shaped charges contrived by versifiers, even the best prose is scattershot.1 
 
Rorty is not insensitive to the art and effect of poetry.2 Moreover, he also invokes literature ‘in the 
narrow sense’ and means poetry, plays, and novels.3 This implies that there is literature in a 
broader sense and, also, that even the narrow sense extends well beyond the genre of the novel. 
The survey of the literary aspect of Rorty’s work in the Introduction combines with the 
overarching conception of the Rortian narrative and stance in chapters 2 and 3 to create a 
substantial case for viewing Rorty’s literariness as vital to Rortian philosophy, but there is clearly 
more to unpack.  
Rorty might have been the son of a poet, but he started his career as an analytic 
philosopher. The two previous chapters traced a development in his philosophy which might, in 
the vocabulary I am employing, be said to move from an analytic to a pragmatist to a literary, or 
 
1 Richard Rorty, ‘The Fire of Life’, Poetry, 191.2 (2007), 129–31 (p. 130). 
2 Rorty’s father was a journalist, writer, and published poet. See James Rorty, Children of the sun, and other 
poems (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926). For more on the younger Rorty’s formative years, see 
Gross. 





poeticist, stance. This suggestion can be motivated by looking closely at the essays in which Rorty 
introduced the idea of a ‘literary culture’, which is also where he began to consider the 
characteristics and merits of literary criticism as a genre, and at the later development of this term 
in CIS. Thus, this chapter investigates the origins of Rorty’s literary vocabulary, especially his 
adoption and adaptation of the term ‘literary culture’. The next turns to Rorty’s conception of it in 
CIS. As this and subsequent chapters will show, unpacking the above questions reveals vital 
insights about Rorty’s relationship to literature.  
Literature, related terms, and descriptions of impulses and attitudes that align Rorty’s 
pragmatist stance with the literary artist’s mindset occur regularly and frequently in Rorty’s 
writings from the seventies onwards. Accounting for all these instances is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. I will thus concentrate on two vital junctures in his career: the time of publication of PMN 
and of CIS – the two works customarily taken to be his most defining. This chapter will focus on 
PPTC (1976), which is where the term ‘literary culture’ first appeared, and NITT (1981), where 
Rorty not only developed this idea more fully but also sketched the project he came to undertake in 
CIS. I describe how Rorty originally conceived ‘a literary culture’ as a subculture standing in 
opposition to a scientistic culture and trace his increasing identification with the literary 
‘highbrows’. I also show that after PMN Rorty begins to give this idea a broader, culture-
encompassing scope: the next chapter turns to CIS where the literary culture takes over.4 I 
conclude this chapter by briefly examining Felski’s worry about the position Rorty expresses in 
NITT, specifically his approval of the ‘strong’ critic’ – and by offering some thoughts on how the 
reading I extend better enables us to address her concerns. 
 
The Attitude that Scandalises C. P. Snow 
The term ‘literary culture’ first appeared in ‘Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist 
Culture’, originally given as a talk at the Bicentennial Symposium of Philosophy, held in New 
York in October 1976 under the caption of ‘Philosophy in the Life of a Nation’.5 Rorty’s talk 
pitted professionalised academic philosophers against a less easily circumscribed ‘culture’, which 
transcended disciplinary boundaries and distinctions between academia and broader society. By 
insisting on ‘autonomy’, Rorty complained, professionalised philosophy was removing itself from 
the rest of the academy and the concerns of the society it operated within, to focus on problems 
 
4 Cf. Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 4. 
5 The New York Times’ archives give an insight into this “ponderous event”: see Israel Shenker, ‘LIFE OF 
A NATION’ IS PONDEROUS EVENT  <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/10/archives/life-of-a-nation-is-





created by its own formalisms.6 The pragmatist tradition of the past, so central to the theme of the 
conference, had urged philosophers to turn away from this kind of self-absorbed, idealist thinking 
– a call American philosophy had not heeded. Instead, the insights it had offered were being 
developed in continental philosophy and ‘highbrow literary culture’.7 
Even though C. P. Snow is only briefly referred to in Rorty’s essay, it seems clear that 
Rorty adopted the term ‘literary culture’ from Snow.8 In The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution (1959), Snow argued that Western society has split into two distinct cultures, the 
sciences and the humanities, and, moreover, that this division is a problem for humanity as it faces 
more complex and threatening issues. Snow pitted ‘the literary intellectuals’ against ‘the natural 
scientists’, and in between them, he claimed to find ‘a gulf of mutual incomprehension’, ‘hostility 
and dislike’, and ‘most of all a lack of understanding’.9 
As Stefan Collini notes, this ‘cultural anxiety’ about the divide between ‘two cultures’ 
would not have been properly intelligible prior to the nineteenth century.10 Only in the romantic 
period does this take on a recognisable form, but then primarily as a distinction between ‘the 
fulness of creative or emotional energy released by poetry’ and ‘the impoverished conception of 
human life underlying the “dismal science” of political economy’.11 While Snow sharpens this 
distinction and held ‘the literary culture’ to mean a diverse group of intellectuals who shared only 
a near total ‘incomprehension’ of science; a backward looking, ‘traditional’ culture, Rorty rethinks 
and redescribes this division.12  
‘Highbrow culture’, Rorty explained, consists of those who produce poems, plays and 
novels, literary criticism, and ‘what... we can call “culture criticism.”’13 The ‘mark of the literary 
intellectual’ is their attention to interpretation rather than verification – to ‘what the arts and the 
“sciences of man” have in common’.14 Whereas analytic philosophers want to mine old 
philosophical texts for ‘hypotheses or instructive examples of conceptual confusion’ – that is: for 
 
6 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 762. All citations in this thesis is from this version.  
7 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 762. 
8 It could be speculated that Rorty borrowed this term from Bloom, but while ‘literary culture’ does appear 
in Harold Bloom, Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), it 
does not in the earlier Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973). This is of course not conclusive evidence, but it indicates Snow as the direct source. 
It could be that Bloom adopted this term from Rorty: Rorty does develop his take on this idea here in PPTC 
in 1976, and more fully in NCITT in 1981, and we know Bloom was a great admirer of Rorty.  
9 C.P Snow, The Two Cultures, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Canto Classics, p. 4. 
10 Stefan Collini, ‘Introduction’, in The Two Cultures, iv-lxxii, (p. ix). 
11 Collini, ‘Introduction’, in The Two Cultures (p. x-xi). 
12 Snow, The Two Cultures, p. 11. 
13 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 758. 





ahistorical, eternal insights – participants in the literary culture still treat the great dead 
philosophers ‘in the old-fashioned way’, as heroes or villains..15 Professionalised thinkers distrust 
‘stories’ as unscientific. And ‘so they are’, Rorty interjects, but despite the lack of rigorous 
methodology, highbrow writing forms ‘a genre…which is quite indispensable’, because 
 
[b]esides the need to ask whether certain propositions asserted by Aristotle or Kant or 
Kierkegaard are true or were validly inferred, there is also the need to adopt an attitude towards 
such men, just as one must adopt an attitude towards Alcibiades and Euripides, Cromwell and 
Milton, Proust and Lenin. Because the writings of the great dead philosophers form a bundle of 
intertwined dialectical sequences, one has to have attitudes towards many of them to justify 
one’s attitude towards the others. Nor can one’s attitude towards Kant, for example, be 
independent of one’s attitudes towards Wordsworth and Napoleon.16  
 
Rorty continues: ‘Developing attitudes towards the mighty and dead and their living rivals – 
dividing the pantheon into the divine and the daemonic – is the whole point of highbrow culture.’17  
At this stage, Rorty still saw himself as a metaphilosopher intent on building greater 
understanding between analytic and non-analytic strands of philosophy. He later argued more 
firmly against analytic philosophy – not as providers of tools for thinking, but as a group, a ‘we’, 
whose self-image and collective identity rest on a self-proclaimed ability to reveal and provide the 
foundations of truth and knowledge.18 This is presumably why the litany of names above connects 
the literary with the philosophical with the political and historical: it moves by example against 
those who believe works of philosophy can be disconnected from their cultural and historical 
context. Before continuing, some remarks on Rorty’s practice of listing figures are required. 
As the previous chapter showed, Rorty came to connect the use of proper names to the 
novelistic attitude of Kundera and Dickens. He tied this rhetorical practice to both his aesthetic and 
his humanistic stance: the invocation or creation of multitudinous characters was portrayed as a 
technique that, because it underscores the unsubsumability of life itself, serves to advance both 
anti-representationalism and anti-authoritarianism. Making the connection between anti-
 
15 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 762. 
16 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, pp. 762–63. 
17 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 763. 
18 Gross, pp. 149–52. That PPTC stems from a transitionary phase is observable in Rorty’s simultaneous 
insistence on, on the one hand, the need for both analytic and non-analytic philosophy and, on the other, the 
privileging of ‘highbrow culture’ implicit in his suggestion that while the productions of analytic philosophy 





representationalism and anti-authoritarianism explicit was at the heart of Rorty’s project.19 
Moreover, populating a gallery of figures and indicating or provoking us to adopt an attitude 
towards these, serves to draw attention to the writing as writing – as a text written from the 
perspective of an identifiable author who has certain dispositions. Drawing attention to the made 
and material character of writing was a move Rorty already in the seventies had identified as one 
of Derrida’s crucial manoeuvres for undermining the Kantian tradition.20  
Importantly, this also relates to Rorty’s privileging of ‘conversation’. Recall from PRI and 
Chapter 2 that Rorty held that ‘...the pragmatist knows no better way to explain his convictions 
than to remind his interlocutor of the position they both are in, the contingent starting points they 
both share, the floating, ungrounded, conversations of which they are both members’.21 Chapter 2 
also provided an example of how Rorty deploys lists of figures that function in such a reminding-
capacity: he directed our attention to Prospero and Faust, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and comparable 
narratives to the one he was telling, in order to deepen our understanding of the transformational 
moment in TPP.22 In this quote from PRI, Rorty is pointing to the Wittgensteinian 
recommendation that philosophers see themselves as assembling reminders for particular purposes, 
a topic Rorty takes up in another essay published the same year as PPTC.23  
In the same essay where he brings up Wittgensteinian reminders, Rorty also notes that 
Dewey hoped that philosophy would ‘join with poetry as Arnold’s “criticism of life”’.24 In 
Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey draws on Matthew Arnold to suggest that poetry is, if not in 
intent, then in effect, a ‘criticism of life’. Dewey means by this that ‘the arts of literature, poetry, 
ceremony, amusements, and recreation which obtain in a community, furnishing the staple objects 
of enjoyment in that community... supply the meanings in terms of which life is judged, esteemed, 
 
19 Elucidating how the Rortian conception of romanticism and idea of a literary culture relates to these 
themes is a key aim for Schulenberg, who wants to show how ‘pragmatism, humanism, anti-
authoritarianism, and postmetaphysics are linked’. See Schulenberg.  
Voparil, in a later article than those discussed in the previous chapter, underscores the potential for using 
Rortian thought to address epistemic injustice. Christopher Voparil, ‘Rorty and James on irony, moral 
commitment, and the ethics of belief’, William James Studies, 12.2 (2016), 1–30 
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26203802> (pp. 14–15). This is an important insight. It relates to 
Schulenberg’s work, and to the connection between Rorty’s literary stance and matters such as trust and 
acknowledgment, a connection I attempted to address in a conference paper given in 2019, entitled ‘What 
Literary Studies Might Teach Us About Public Discourse in a Post-Truth Society’. I hope to develop this 
into a publishable paper in the future.  
20 Rorty, ‘PKW’, p. 146. 
21 Rorty, ‘PRI’, p. 736. PRI was originally a lecture held in 1979. 
22 Rorty, ‘TPP’, pp. 90–91. 
23 Rorty, ‘Heidegger and Dewey’, pp. 294–95. See also for instance Philosophy as Cultural Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), Philosophical Papers, 4, p. 191, and Rorty, CIS, 57 and 58. 





and criticized.’ These artefacts and practices supply the material for critical evaluation of the life 
of that community. 25 In CIS, Rorty repeatedly uses the Arnoldian word ‘touchstones’ for such 
Wittgensteinian reminders. But what he means is triangulation-points for creating shared 
understanding and coordinating linguistic behaviour.26  
This is not what Arnold had in mind. Arnold believed that poetry had a ‘high destiny’, 
which was to ‘interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us’: ‘Without poetry, our science will 
appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be 
replaced by poetry’.27 Such ambitions necessitated setting a high standard for the art of poetry (in 
the traditional sense): poems must be of a certain quality to do ‘good’. Arnold thought that to judge 
if a work was of the necessary standard, we should compare it to passages or lines from works we 
already knew to be of the highest literary quality. This would help us see beyond our own time and 
our subjectivity: ‘Indeed there can be no more useful help for discovering what poetry belongs to 
the class of the truly excellent, and can therefore do us most good, than to have always in one’s 
mind lines and expressions of the great masters, and to apply them as a touchstone to other 
poetry’.28 He quotes lines from Homer and Sophocles, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, Goethe and 
Wordsworth. But Chaucer, Dryden, Pope and Shelley fall short – they lack high seriousness. 
(From our vantage point, this list appears to reach beyond neither time nor subjectivity.) 
Talk of ‘touchstones’ was never exclusive to Arnold. It was already then a familiar 
construct, implying any object against which we might measure the worth or validity of another. A 
‘touchstone’ is usually understood as a verified example of the class to be circumscribed or added 
to; as an instance of a universal idea.29 Rorty instead employs this word much like Americans use 
the phrase ‘touch base’ in colloquial speech. For ‘touchstones’ to Rorty are invoked to delimit and 
clarify our vocabulary (rather than whether something is, essentially, a thing), and thus to help us 
to arrive at the kind of shared understanding that enables a focused conversation on the same 
subject – conversations more likely to result in shared goals or collective action. Touchstones 
serve as objects that set up triadic joint attention to coordinate minds and meanings. 
 
25 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 204. 
26 That Rorty appropriates this expression from Arnold is further substantiated in a later essay on the value of 
‘great’ literature, where Rorty juxtaposes ‘Arnold’ and ‘touchstones’ in the same paragraph. Rorty, ‘The 
Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature’, p. 136. See also Chapter 6, p. 161-62. 
27 William Harmon, Classic Writings on Poetry (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 464. 
28 Harmon, p. 469. 
29 In PMN this word occurs occasionally, but always as Rorty calls out this traditional method of evaluation 
by comparison to the highest ideal; to an essential idea (see for instance p. 212). Rorty recommends a 
comparative practice as well, but one that is mindfully lateral and pragmatic (between, say, possible self-





Rorty’s constant placement of figures then functions to clarify the subject and his stance. It 
furthermore functions to fashion a kind of writing that moves away from the argumentative 
rhetoric of analytic philosophy and towards a literary and writerly sort of persuasion. Thus, this 
practice is deliberately cultivated as a kind of stylistic resistance against the representationalist 
paradigm.  
After hearing Arnold lecture, Walt Whitman dismissed him as a ‘literary dude’.30 Rorty’s 
constant invocation of figures also demonstrates his growing identification with literary 
‘highbrows’, for highbrow culture encourages, Rorty observes, this kind of ‘name-dropping’.31 I 
want to make one more point regarding the literariness of this practice, relevant to this thesis and 
to reading Rorty more generally, before returning to the text of PPTC.  
Rorty is, then, well-known for peppering his prose with names, often without giving much 
or any explanation of why, exactly, he chooses to include these names in any given context. We 
might, however, want one. For despite the above and despite knowing that it would be a mistake to 
attempt to work out precisely what Rorty really means when he drops specific names – this would 
be to fall into the trap of reading him in the manner he mildly satirised in TPP: as if on a search for 
the ‘code of codes’ – his touchstones are not randomly chosen.32 They are deliberately chosen to 
remind, to support or amplify a point: Rorty uses them to construct a topology of ideas, to sway us, 
in a distinctly literary manner, as he gives them relative weight through assembling and 
juxtaposing them. 
However, it might then be surmised that we are better off attempting to receive these 
invocations in a literary manner. The systems of thought, or vocabularies, these names stand for 
are, of course, of some consequence: we might be better readers of Rorty if we comprehend the 
arguments of Kant, or Hegel, or Dewey, or Davidson. But more often than not, Rorty also provides 
brief restatements of the ideas we need to get his drift. These litanies of names can thus frequently 
simply be taken as allusions to ideas and as hints towards attitudes, rather than as representations 
of exact ideas, theories, or historical persons. Rorty both strongly confirms his identification with 
the literary intellectual and tells us that ‘alluding’ can indeed be used to characterise what he does, 
when he in PTG echoes Derrida’s well-known essay ‘Che cos'è la poesia?’, and casts himself as 
the Derridean creature of potery: ‘I am a hedgehog who, despite showering my reader with 
allusions and dropping lots of names, has really only one idea: the need to get beyond 
representationalism, and thus into an intellectual world in which human beings are responsible 
 
30 Harmon, pp. 461–62. 
31 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, p. 763. 





only to each other.’33 Rorty is often accused of not getting these figures ‘right’ when he deploys 
them in this fashion, but raising such a challenge seems to me to miss the point – and to stem from 
a failure to notice and attend to the literariness of Rorty’s philosophical practice. 
Rorty might nevertheless be selecting names or referencing works or ideas to create a 
specific effect, erect a stage, or set a mood. Or we might be interested in looking at these to 
discover instructive patterns – such as the fact that his pointers are almost exclusively to white men 
in the Germanic and Anglo-American tradition. But elucidating every such reference would be not 
only a superfluous but almost unsurmountable task – in PPTC alone we would have to touch upon: 
Santayana, Calvin, Dewey, Royce, Palmer, Heidegger, Tarski, Carnap, Derrida, W. James, Hook, 
Otto, Meiklejohn, Kallen, Fichte, Hegel, Gurwitsch, Schuetz, Reichenbach, Emerson, Husserl, 
Russel, Descartes, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Kierkegaard, Alcibiades, Euripides, Cromwell, 
Milton, Proust, Lenin, Wordsworth, Napoleon, Goethe, Macauley, Carlyle, Vaihinger, Valéry, 
Marlowe, Hobbes, Forster, Moore, Green, Keats, Shakespeare, Sartre, Danto, Wittgenstein, 
Foucault, Snow, Whitman, Eliot, Wilson, Trilling, Goodman, Bloom, Johnson, Socrates, Niebuhr, 
Edwards, Jefferson, H. James, Stevens, Pierce, and Veblen. Sixty-nine in total. Recognising that 
these allusions do not necessarily need to be taken as pieces in a line of logical exposition – and 
can be understood as characters on Rorty’s stage – makes it clear why following each such lead is 
not obligatory. I suspect that knowing this might also make Rorty’s writing appear more 
accessible. If each name is taken as part of a code that must be solved to understand what Rorty 
‘truly’ means, approaching it might seem daunting – seen as an array of characters, some minor, 
some major, Rorty’s assemblage of figures instead serve to enrich his narrative. Moving forward, I 
will thus not discuss every name he drops into the conversation. I will, however, pause and 
deliberate where there is room for it and where it seems that doing so would inform my overall 
narrative. 
 
The points made above regarding Rorty’s literary, writerly practices, tie in well with the argument 
he makes in PPTC for the indispensability of literary criticism. Using these kinds of techniques, 
coming at matters from such a disposition, the name-dropping, moral-attitude-adopting, 
vocabulary-evaluating, moving-from-touchstone-to-touchstone literary culture produces an 
‘indispensable’ genre of writing:  
  
 
33Jacques Derrida, ‘Che cos'è la poesia?’, in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. by Peggy Kamuf 
(New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 322–37. 





Beginning in the days of Goethe and Macauley (sic) and Carlyle and Emerson, a kind of 
writing has developed which is neither the evaluation of the relative merits of literary 
productions, nor intellectual history, nor moral philosophy, nor epistemology, nor social 
prophecy, but all these things mingled together into a new genre. This genre is often still called 
“literary criticism”... for an excellent reason. The reason is that in the course of the nineteenth 
century imaginative literature took the place of both religion and philosophy in forming and 
solacing the agonized conscience of the young. Novels and poems are now the primary means 
by which a bright youth gains a self-image. Criticism of novels is the principal form in which 
the acquisition of a moral character is made articulate. We live in a culture in which putting 
one’s moral sensitivity into words is not clearly distinguishable from exhibiting one’s literary 
sensibilities.34  
 
The account offered in Chapter 2 of this thesis illuminates this passage: Rorty is indicating that the 
emergence of literary criticism as a genre marked the start of our cultural moment of overcoming.  
Rorty here places the rise of this genre, the start of this moment, in the romantic era, 
broadly conceived. While literary criticism can partly trace its roots to Plato, the changes in the 
perception and uses of literature of the romantic period mean we might very well talk about a ‘new 
genre’ emerging. As we saw Collini note above regarding the Snow-Leavis controversy, the idea 
of a ‘literary culture’ would hardly have been possible to imagine before this moment: 
philosophical, religious, and poetic writing was too intertwined. Rorty perceives this. He echoes it 
when he later suggests that the ‘takeover’ of a ‘literary culture’ would be ‘unlike anything that has 
existed in the past’. In fact, it seems that Rorty uses ‘romantics’ and ‘romanticism’ not exactly to 
refer to a historical period, but rather to denote the start of a defining shift in our collective spirit. 
Not a development that brings us a step closer to the end of history, but that pushed us in the 
direction of becoming able to entertain the mindset the ‘takeover’ of a ‘literary culture’ implies. A 
mindset Rorty suggests Kant could not have grasped, as it entails the complete naturalisation and 
dissolution of the idea of Reason as such.35 Rorty assigns the romantics a lead role in his narrative 
because the wide range of ideas they set in play did not result in the formation of a new 
philosophical picture of the ‘one vision’ kind, but rather plucked on the warp of the Kantian arras. 
This ‘indispensable’ ‘new genre’ was defined by its awareness not just of its situatedness 
in time, but also in space. Marshall Brown describes how the romantics ‘worried about their 
 
34 Rorty, ‘PPTC’, pp. 763–64. 
35 See Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 4.  
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not as endowed with a truth-tracking faculty called “reason”, but rather as endowed with language and thus 
with the ability to engage in social cooperation’. An appreciation of the consequences of Darwin’s 





historical role and studied poetry in its historical unfolding’, and ‘used poetics to project destinies: 
utopia becomes an aesthetic realm lodged in the distant future’. 36 With ‘Herder’s historicism as 
both symptom and cause’, Brown continues, the romantics turned their attention to their material 
moment in history, geographically, and sociologically. As Brown furthermore points out, this turn 
to worldly concerns and uses also resulted in an aestheticising, idealising reaction in ‘defence of 
poesy’, which in Kant and Schiller was expressed through its valuation of ‘play itself as a 
humanizing and elevating moral value’: art, Brown explains, ‘becomes not the representative of 
religion but its propaedeutic (Hegel) or even its substitute... High and low come together in the 
more dizzying tributes to Romantic irony.’ Brown suggests that from ‘the varieties of Romantic-
era criticism can be derived both the elitist formalism of the modernists and the anti-elitist high 
jinx of postmodernists, though both tend to strip Romantic motifs of their sublime, metaphysical or 
transcendental dimensions.’.37 Rorty’s claim that literary criticism as we know it emerged at this 
time is thus well-founded. 
Rorty often stresses the democratisation of knowledge taking place in this period. While 
this was intimately related to the evolution of a scientific mindset that drove a process of de-
divinisation – compelling readers, as Rorty emphasises, to see literature as a secular source for 
material that might impart moral insight – it was also furthered by literary writing and writing 
about literature. Literary thinking turned its attention to the role of writing and reading in broader 
society, and criticism paid attention to religious writing, philosophy, and other forms in other areas 
of culture, as writing. Literary writers increasingly saw literature as having a variety of uses and 
themselves as writing for a broader public. As Brown notes, 
 
since the Romantic era literary criticism has been concerned not just with works but with 
writers and readers. When Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical ballads defines the poet as ‘a man 
speaking to men’, he is, to be sure, making a point about the democratization of letters 
(‘man’=common man) and missing one about the situation of women and women writers. But 
he is also making a novel statement about the communicative value of literature. The writer 
does not just provide moral exempla and frame a golden world; literature is there to be read 
and understood.38  
 
This is when and why hermeneutics becomes important for philosophy: the democratisation of 
literature means the question of how the ‘common reader’ will understand literary works becomes 
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pressing. ‘Earlier genre criticism’, Brown continues, ‘concerned the laws of composition of 
different types of writing; now it also considers their different purposes and audiences.’39  
Literary writing and criticism thus became much more diverse in its attentions and 
expressions. It cultivated an interest in local literary traditions, the forms alive and in use in the 
lower classes, and the novel, the genre of the middle class and women, increased in standing. 
Although the ‘attention to women as writers and readers of literature’ was still, as Brown notes 
‘incipient and uneven’, discussion of ‘ literature and the other arts’ became ‘richer and less 
judgmental’.40 To put it in Rorty’s terms, this ‘new genre’ emerged as literary criticism adopted a 
more open, pluralistic, egalitarian, democratic, conversational stance and looked beyond (although 
not past) its own formalisms.41 And it became ‘indispensable’ because of the attitude it emerged 
from, developed, and furthered.  
Hence, when Rorty is charged with not fully appreciating the complexity of romantic 
thought or of not justly portraying specific philosophers or poets of this era, the accusation might 
be correct and still be a critique that misses its mark. While, for instance, Milnes – convincingly – 
argues that the romanticist conception of truth and knowledge, especially that of Keats, Shelley, 
and Coleridge, was much more pragmatic than Rorty assumed, supplementing Rorty’s narrative 
with Milnes’s knowledge, merely strengthens Rorty’s overall narrative.42  
What is likely to still jar in the above quotation of Rorty’s – even if one concurs that 
literary critics can function as moral guides – is his claim that he is talking about literary criticism. 
The worry about his use of this term is further compounded when Rorty adds that in this 
‘highbrow culture’, in the ‘new genre’ of literary criticism, which Rorty here also equates with 
‘culture criticism’, 
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[p]hilosophy is treated as a parallel genre to the drama or the novel or the poem, so that we 
speak of the epistemology common to Vaihinger and Valéry, the rhetoric common to Marlowe 
and Hobbes, the ethics common to E.M. Forster and G. E. Moore. What culture criticism does 
not do is to ask whether Valéry wrote more beautiful lines than Marlowe, or whether Hobbes 
or Moore told more truths about the good. In this form of life, the true and the good and the 
beautiful drop out. The aim is to understand, not to judge. The hope is that if one understands 
enough poems, enough religions, enough societies, enough philosophies, one will have made 
oneself into something worth one’s own understanding.43 
 
This passage is a prime example of Rorty dropping names for both philosophical and stylistic 
purposes, and considering it from a prosodic point of view might indeed be instructive.   
Rorty’s exemplars are pertinent to his point: the particular selection of figures makes our 
attention vacillate between literature and philosophy; they are subsequently recombined along 
disciplinary lines, a move Rorty then rejects as too narrow-minded for ‘the form of life’ that is the 
highbrow culture. If we know that G.E. Moore exerted a great influence on the Bloomsbury circle, 
in which E.M. Forster was included, this adds another layer to Rorty description for us – and might 
very well make us feel like we ‘click’, to use Voparil’s term, with Rorty the author because we 
share a detailed insight: we care about the same things.44 But while Rorty could have achieved this 
effect through any number of combinations, he has also carefully chosen names to create an added 
poetic effect. There are several alliterations in these lines, the most obvious being the repeating Vs. 
But there are more: a string of os follow; ‘ethics’ and ‘common’ resonate with E.M. Forster and 
G.E. Moore. These two names taken together compose a pleasing melody from the high-pitched E 
down to the G and up again. The closeness of these two double-initialled names makes the crisp 
Englishness of their abbreviated form stand out. Hence, while it might be that for the wide-
ranging, discipline crossing, highbrow literary critic, the ‘true and the good and the beautiful’ 
might become ancillary concerns to fostering understanding, Rorty is simultaneously 
demonstrating that he is not opposed to the writing of beautiful, rich prose. The fact that he 
chooses to write like this underwrites that he is deliberately aligning himself with a specific kind of 
literary intellectual – who cares about writing as writing. And it also shows that while he appears 
to dismiss the value of beautiful writing above, that is not the case: he is not devaluing literature in 
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the traditional sense. But if ‘the true and the beautiful and the good’ drops out, what is left of 
literary criticism as we know it?  
 Two observations might clarify this. The first is that Rorty, as here demonstrated, is not 
aiming to stop us from caring about ‘beautiful lines’. Working out how and why texts persuade, 
resonate, comfort, inspire, trigger, or are boring is a kind of detailed scholarly labour and care 
which can complement the project that Rorty, using a broad brush, is sketching. A recent doctoral 
thesis by Kristian Bjørkdahl details how studies of rhetoric can supplement Rorty’s work, and a 
similar treatise could be imagined from the perspective of literary studies.45 The second thing to 
observe here is that Rorty is not, in fact, talking about actual texts. He is talking about a mode of 
critical practice – about a spirit of intellectual analysis rather than its objects – where the aim is to 
‘understand, not to judge’. The aim is to understand what unites epistemologies, rhetoric, ethics 
and hope – what we claim to know, how we talk about it, what we do, and what we believe is 
possible and important.  
Rorty’s overall point is thus that ‘highbrow culture’ is a culture made up of people who 
have adopted a specific attitude:  
 
It is the attitude that there is no point in raising questions of truth, goodness, or beauty, because 
between ourselves and the thing judged there always intervenes mind, language, a perspective 
chosen among dozens, one description chosen out of thousands. On one side, it is the lack of 
seriousness which Plato attributed to poets, the “negative capability” for which Keats praised 
Shakespeare. On another, it is the Sartrean sense of absurdity which Arthur Danto suggests 
may befall us when we give up the picture theory of language and the Platonic conception of 
truth as accuracy of representation. In the later Wittgenstein, it was the wry admission that 
anything has a sense if you give it a sense.46  
 
The ‘lack of seriousness’, the absurdity, the wryness might recall the moment when the protagonist 
in TPP ‘comes down with the giggles’ as he realises that all theories, all governing metaphors, are 
simply one description out of countless possible. It also points forward to the ‘ironism’ of CIS and 
the satire and carnival Rorty associated with the Kunderan stance – an element he also associated 
with Wittgenstein and Derrida from the early seventies onward. The point here is that as the 
highbrow comes to think that no type of description has an innate right to be privileged over 
others. All theoretical distinctions between kinds of texts are levelled. This is, Rorty tells us, ‘the 
attitude of the literary intellectual towards science which scandalizes C. P. Snow: the view of, say, 
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quantum mechanics as a notoriously great, but quite untranslatable, poem, written in a lamentably 
obscure language’.47  
 
For Rorty, then, ‘literary culture’ from the very beginning means something quite radically 
different from what it did for Snow – while aspects of the literary culture frustrated Snow, the 
literary attitude as Rorty conceives it would undoubtedly scandalise him. For Rorty, it is a culture 
comprised of individuals who, while they might have a great deal of knowledge about science, do 
not think that science – nor any human way of thinking or speaking – reveals ultimate Truths by 
being the correct description of the world. Rorty does not doubt the existence of the world, or 
elementary particles, or feelings, for that matter – as a pragmatist, he is profoundly anti-sceptic. 
Simultaneously, his pragmatist fallibilism also commits him to the view that the words we use to 
talk about the world and experience can always change. Rorty’s linguistic redescription of 
classical pragmatism transposes this stance in such a way that it brings the poetic nature of all our 
descriptions into focus. 
By this point, it is hard to tell the pragmatist from the literary highbrow, for they will both 
see all texts, even the theories of physics as poems – in the sense of products of the human 
imagination. It is striking to find such consistency here, between Rorty’s first attempt at 
circumscribing a ‘literary culture’ and what Russell B. Goodman has called the ‘central thesis of 
Rorty’s mature pragmatism’: ‘that all new language, whether in the sciences, philosophy, or 
literature, is poetry’.48 But in the following, vital differences between ‘highbrows’ and pragmatists 
emerge.   
 
The Important Issue about Textualism and Pragmatism 
Rorty did not deploy the idea of a ‘literary culture’ in PMN. In Part III he sketched what 
philosophy might become after metaphysics, but, as noted in the previous chapter of this thesis, 
Rorty later saw this attempt as a false start, too intent on the German hermeneutic tradition and 
lacking in insight into contemporary continental thought.49 Two years later, in Nineteenth-Century 
Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism (hereafter NITT), Rorty returned to the idea of a 
‘literary culture’ and attempted to articulate it more fully by setting out the difference between 
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idealists, postmodernist yet quasi-essentialist textualists, and strong, ‘fully-fledged’ pragmatist-
textualists. Moreover, in the concluding paragraphs he – for the first time, as far as I have been 
able to ascertain – explicitly outlined the question at the core of CIS. While NITT, for the most 
part, dwells on what unites and differentiates idealism and ‘textualism’, the most significant 
distinction Rorty makes is between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ textualists. As I see it, Rorty is here, once 
again, rehearsing that moment of making the ‘fundamental choice’ of accepting or not accepting 
the contingency of all starting points. 
Rorty begins, somewhat counterintuitively, by lumping together the romantic idealist of 
the nineteenth century with those he calls the ‘textualists’ of the twentieth: ‘people who write as if 
there were nothing but texts... for example, the so-called Yale school of literary criticism centering 
around Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartmann, and Paul De Man, “post-structuralist” French thinkers 
like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, historians like Hayden White, and social scientists like 
Paul Rabinow’.50 What unites them, he asserts, is an antagonistic position to natural science. 
Neither tradition believes that human thought culminates in the application of scientific method; 
both insist ‘that we can never compare human thought or language with bare, unmediated, reality’ 
– a point they use, Rorty observes, to ‘put science in its place’. And both offers ‘to what C.P. Snow 
called the “literary culture” a self-image, and a set of rhetorical devices’. 51  
These schools arrived at their overlapping points of view via different routes. The idealists 
took Kant to have shown that the concepts of natural science were merely instruments and that 
science could only ever know a phenomenal world. ‘In textualist terms’, Rorty continues, this 
‘becomes the claim that the vocabulary of science is merely one among others’.52 Another key 
difference lies in their stated attitude towards the idea of truth. The idealists were metaphysicians 
who believed that ‘art could put us in touch with that part of ourselves – the noumenal, free, 
spiritual part – which science cannot see’.53 The textualists, on the other hand, disavowed the idea 
that we could get to truth in itself. But they nevertheless, Rorty holds – and this is a vital point in 
his analysis – saw themselves as being able to represent things more truthfully by the power of this 
knowledge, this dismissal. This kind of textualist exalted the ‘literary artist’s awareness that he is 
making rather than finding’, more specifically ‘the ironic modernist’s awareness that he is 
responding to texts rather than to things’ – and this ironic attitude allowed the textualist to think 
the scientist naïve.54 Conceiving themselves as the less naïve party permitted the textualists to 
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think of themselves as closer to what is ‘really’ going on.55 Both schools of thought thus hold there 
to be a point of view higher than that of science. The inability of (some) textualists to fully let go 
of essentialism is made visible in this transposition of the scientistic worldview: a reversal rather 
than a dissolution of the problem textualists of this sort Rorty classes, in Bloomian terms of poetic 
strength, as ‘weak textualists’.  
The textualists nevertheless make important progress. Whereas idealism was based upon a 
distinctive metaphysical thesis, textualism was not. Their goal is not to articulate foundations. Instead, 
as Rorty explains, they attempted to formulate something new: 
 
When philosophers like Derrida say things like “there is nothing outside the text” they are not 
making theoretical remarks, remarks backed up by epistemological or semantical arguments. 
Rather, they are saying, cryptically and aphoristically, that a certain framework of inter-
connected ideas – truth as correspondence, language as picture, literature as imitation, for 
example – ought to be abandoned.56   
 
Nevertheless, whereas the nineteenth century placed science, in the form of absolutist philosophy, 
at the centre of culture, twentieth-century textualism places literature at its core because textualist 
culture simply treats science and philosophy as literary genres.57 The aim must be to move beyond 
this cycle of reversals.58   
Rorty here defines science and literature in non-traditional ways. ‘By “science”’, Rorty 
says, ‘I shall mean the sort of activity in which argument is relatively easy – in which one can 
agree on some general principles which govern discourse in an area, and then aim at consensus by 
tracing inferential chains between these principles and more particular and more interesting 
propositions’.59 Science is defined in terms of being a rule-governed practice in the service of a 
particular purpose or intent, progressing from a shared understanding of these, of the criteria for 
success, and thus from an explicit and implicit intersubjective agreement on the vocabulary to be 
used.60 Philosophy (analytic, professionalised) is then a science in the sense that it purports to be a 
methodologically governed practice which aims to ‘discover those general principles which made 
scientific discourse scientific, and thus to “ground” both the other sciences and itself’. 61 That is: 
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56 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 156. 
57 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 157. 
58 Cf. Rorty, ‘Introduction to TLT’, pp. 1–2. 
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(analytic) philosophy sees itself, because its core concern is the very nature and characteristics of 
truth, as having the right to adjudicate between all knowledge claims. 62 To use the vocabulary of 
TPP and chapters 2 and 3: philosophy has the self-image of a ‘hero’ who, on behalf of humankind, 
is on a ‘quest’ for Truth.  
‘Literature’, on the other hand, is an activity where the dominant vocabulary is constantly 
up for grabs: 
 
It is a feature of what I shall call “literature” that one can achieve success by introducing a 
quite new genre of poem or novel or critical essay without argument. It succeeds simply by its 
success, not because there are good reasons why poems or novels or essays should be written 
in the new way rather than the old. There is no constant vocabulary in which to describe the 
values to be defended or objects to be imitated, or the emotions to be expressed, or whatever, 
in essays or poems or novels. The reason “literary criticism” is “unscientific” is just that 
whenever somebody tries to work up such a vocabulary he makes a fool of himself. We don’t 
want works of literature to be criticizable within a terminology we already know; we want both 
those works and criticism of them to give us new terminologies.63  
 
And he continues: By “literature”, then, I shall mean the areas of culture which, quite self-
consciously, forego agreement on an encompassing critical vocabulary, and thus forego 
argumentation.’64 
This is a rather unusual way to define literature. However, once again, Rorty is clearly not 
talking about specific texts. Nor is he offering an institutional account of literature: his description 
provides no criteria for delimitating conventions. And again, we must view matters in terms of 
attitudes and practices. For viewed through that lens, Rorty is saying that literary writing, critical 
or otherwise, is the kind of writing that impacts without relying on established (in Kuhnian-Rortian 
terms: ‘familiar’) argumentative forms; on fulfilling already known criteria.65 Instead, they take us 
beyond those. Significantly, he is also claiming that it is only by degrees of relative ease of 
reaching agreement that science and literature are different: neither activity is, on the pragmatist 
picture, anything more than a set of behaviours (linguistic behaviours here included) – both are 
practices, merely governed by more or less strict but equally contingent and intersubjectively 
constituted rules. ‘Science’ and ‘literature’ here, to use a construct important to my argument in 
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the next chapter, denote segments of a spectrum rather than ontologically different or even 
ontologically significant constructs.66 
Rorty is not saying that literary critics, theorists, scholars, or writers are incapable of, or 
unwilling to engage in, rational argument. He is saying that arguments – reasons that are fully 
explicable – can only be formulated in a familiar language. He is also, as R.B. Goodman 
emphasises, already here working on how we can have rationality without argument.67 Note how 
Rorty concludes that this is a matter of self-awareness: the actors in the literary activity knowingly, 
‘quite self-consciously’, reject the idea that there is or could be a master-vocabulary in which all 
descriptions, problems and solutions ultimately could be stated. This is, vice versa, to knowingly 
accept pluralism of vocabularies, methods and descriptions.  
While Rorty accepts that this is a ‘crude’ way to cast the difference between science and 
literature, it permits him to recast this distinction as that between ‘finding out whether a 
proposition is true and finding out whether a vocabulary is good’.68 Once more, Rorty is going far 
in equating the literary attitude with the pragmatist stance: James told us that for the pragmatist, 
what matters is what is good in ‘the way of belief’, and translated into to Rorty’s post-linguistic-
turn idiom, this becomes how it is good for us to talk.69 Here Rorty equates ‘literature’ with 
working on finding out whether a way to talk is good. However, Rorty does not make this 
identifying move directly – he goes via a return to the romanticist roots of pragmatism. 
Rorty defines romanticism, too, in a nonstandard way: ‘Let me call “romanticism” the 
thesis that what is most important for human life is not what propositions we believe but what 
vocabulary we use.’70 Romanticism, he says:  
 
inverts the values which ...Kant assigned to the determinate and the reflective judgment. It sees 
the determinate judgment – the activity which ticks off instances of concepts by invoking 
common, public, criteria--as producing merely agreement. Kant thought “knowledge,” the 
name for the result of such activity, was a term of praise. Romanticism accepts Kant’s point 
that objectivity is conformity to rule, but changes the emphasis, so that objectivity becomes 
mere conformity to rule, merely going along with the crowd, merely consensus. By contrast, 
romanticism sees the reflective judgment – the activity of operating without rules, of searching 
for concepts under which to group particulars (or, by extension, of constructing new concepts 
which are “transgressive” in that they do not fit under any of the old rules) – as what really  
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matters. Kant, in saying that aesthetic judgment is noncognitive, because it cannot be brought 
under rules, is assigning it a second-best status – the status which the scientific culture has 
always assigned to the literary culture. Romanticism, on the other hand, when it says that 
science is merely cognitive, is trying to turn the tables.71  
 
It is not Kant as such, then, that paved the way for seeing science and philosophy as just genres on 
par with other genres, but the romantics’ re-evaluation of Kant and their insistence on poetry as a 
more essential genre. Herein lies their paramount importance as pathbreakers for pragmatism. 
The most vital figure for this re-evaluation of Kant was, Rorty submits, Hegel. Kantian 
scientism fell with the advent of Hegelian thought:  
 
Hegel kept the name of “science” without the distinctive mark of science--willingness to accept 
a neutral vocabulary in which to state problems, and thereby make argumentation possible. 
Under cover of Kant's invention, a new super science called “philosophy,” Hegel invented a 
literary genre which lacked any trace of argumentation, but which obsessively captioned itself 
System der Wissenschaft or Wissenschäft der Logik, or Encyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften.72  
 
To say that Rorty’s redescriptions of Kant and Hegel are idiosyncratic is not to say anything new. 
What matters here is to note that in Rorty’s narrative, the origins of literary criticism and the 
literary culture lies in Hegel’s historicism. 
That Rorty casts Hegel in this role was set out in TWO and Chapter 2: Hegel and Proust 
taught him to be content with trying to hold our time and its particularities in thought. Here Rorty 
casts Hegel in the exact same role in his story about the moral and intellectual progress of Western 
culture; in the ‘we’-story. And, moreover, Rorty suggests that the ‘best formula to express the 
sense of liberation from science which was Hegel’s legacy’ is to see Hegel as the inventor, not of a 
new philosophy, but, as he also claimed in PPTC, a new literary genre, one that 
 
exhibited the relativity of significance to choice of vocabulary, the bewildering variety of 
vocabularies from which we can choose, and the intrinsic instability of each. ...Hegel showed 
how the passion which sweeps through each generation serves the cunning of reason, providing 
the impulse which drives that generation to self-immolation and transformation. He writes in 
that tone of belatedness and irony which, as Snow rightly says, is characteristic of the literary 
culture of the present day.73  
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In this story, metaphysical idealism becomes a short-lived stage on the way to romanticism, and 
philosophy a stage on the way to replacing science with literature as the ‘preceding cultural 
discipline’.74  
The choice between saying Hegel was right, or Hegel was wrong, Rorty deduces, is then 
the ‘choice between Snow’s “two cultures”’ – between a scientistic culture or a literary one.75 
Because Hegel unwittingly wrote ‘the charter of our modern literary culture’, a culture which  
 
claims to have taken over and reshaped whatever is worth keeping in science, philosophy, and 
religion – looking down on all three from a higher standpoint. It claims to be the guardian of 
the public weal – Coleridge’s “clerisy of the nation.” This culture stretches from Carlyle to 
Isiah Berlin, from Matthew Arnold to Lionel Trilling, from Heine to Sartre, from Baudelaire to 
Nabokov, from Dostoievsky to Doris Lessing, from Emerson to Harold Bloom. Its luxuriant 
complexity cannot be conveyed simply by conjoining words like ‘poetry’, ‘the novel’, and 
‘literary criticism’. This culture is a phenomenon the Enlightenment could not have 
anticipated. Kant has no place for it in his threefold division of possible human activities into 
scientific cognition, moral action, and the free play of the cognitive faculties in aesthetic 
enjoyment. But it is as if Hegel knew all about this culture before its birth.76  
 
It is the attitude of the literary culture Rorty believes Kant would find difficult to place, but he 
thinks Hegel would understand. For Hegel inadvertently exemplified, Rorty believes, what such a 
culture could offer: ‘namely, the historical sense of the relativity of principles and vocabularies to 
a place and time, the romantic sense that everything can be changed by talking in new terms’.77  
Recall the quote from PTG I have used as a touchstone throughout this thesis, where Rorty 
says that bringing about a fully literary culture, its ‘takeover’, would ‘herald a new dawn’, bring 
about a ‘new self-image for humanity’, and also that it would be ‘a culture unlike anything that has 
existed in the past’.78 This culture – or more precisely this attitude – is a new, post-romanticist 
possibility.   
 
Importantly, however, the romanticist turn was not sufficient to realise this possibility. One more 
step is required – a pragmatist transformation:  
 
74 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 168. 
75 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 164. 
76 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 164. 
77 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 165. That is: historicism, anti-foundationalism, and ‘poeticism’. Rorty uses the term 
‘poeticised culture’ in CIS to talk about a culture in which this literary attitude has become universal. This is 
the topic of the next chapter.  






This was the step taken by Nietzsche and William James. Their contribution was to replace 
romanticism by pragmatism. Instead of saying that the discovery of vocabularies could bring 
hidden secrets to light, they said that new ways of speaking could help get us what we want. 
Instead of hinting that literature might succeed philosophy as discoverer of ultimate reality, 
they gave up the notion of truth as a correspondence to reality.79  
 
The pragmatist shift moves us towards accepting that no discipline, no group, no interpretive 
culture, are the heirs of the quest for Enlightenment, for truth, and that our different ways of 
speaking serve different aims and characterise different modes of being in the world. Rorty again 
pitches this as a change in self-image: unlike Marx, Rorty says, Nietzsche and James ‘self-
consciously abandoned’ the search for a point of view which would let them survey ‘all of 
culture’.80 We recognise this moment as the transformational moment from TPP, TWO, and PRI. 
Furthermore, the pragmatist shift in philosophy was, Rorty tells us, ‘paralleled by a change in the 
literary culture’s self-conception’.81 Whereas the poets of the nineteenth century still attempted to 
discover and represent reality truthfully, the modernists of the twentieth gave up that quest. They 
stopped believing we could find something permanent and stable to rely on outside the 
complexities, materiality and processuality of human experience. Rorty thus closely associates 
pragmatism and literary modernism. 
Rorty has now arrived at the point where he can make a critical distinction between ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ textualists. The role of textualism in our culture, Rorty suggests, is best understood ‘if 
we see it as an attempt to think through a thorough-going pragmatism, a thorough-going 
abandonment of the notion of discovering the truth...’.82 However, while all textualists reject the 
model of interpretation intent on recovering authorial intention, they can go on in one of two ways. 
They can either treat the text as ‘a machine which operates quite independently of its creator’. Or, 
they can ‘offer what Bloom calls as “strong misreading”’.83 The former group’s attention is 
entirely on the text – they pride themselves on ‘not being distracted’ either by what the author 
might have meant or what others have said about it. They still retain the image of a ‘secret of the 
text’, a code to be deciphered. Their aim is, Rorty suggests, to get more out of a text than the 
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author or intended audience could have. Nevertheless, they think there are limits to interpretation – 
horizontal limits, limits to what might be juxtaposed or inferred.84  
Thus, these textualists are, I take Rorty to say, still formalists.85 Such a stance reveals a 
‘half-hearted pragmatist’, just ‘one more victim of realism, of the “metaphysics of presence”’, who 
 
thinks that if he stays within the boundaries of a text, takes it apart, and shows how it works, 
then he will have “escaped the sovereignty of the signifier,” broken with the myth of language 
as mirror of reality, and so on. But in fact he is just doing his best to imitate science – he wants 
a method of criticism, and he wants everybody to agree that he has cracked the code.’86  
 
This textualist is a ‘weak’ textualist, as opposed to a ‘strong’ one in the Bloomian sense of fully 
autonomous. 
The ‘strong textualist’, on the other hand 
 
asks neither the author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the text into a shape 
which will serve his own purpose. He makes the text refer to whatever is relevant to that 
purpose. He does this by imposing a vocabulary – a “grid,” in Foucault’s terminology – on the 
text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and 
seeing what happens.87  
 
Recall Rorty’s (later) use of the word ‘grid’ in TPP: a heuristic narrative device that helps us 
understand; one possible story about how things, as Rorty said with Sellars, ‘hang together’. While 
the strong textualist also needs such narrative grids, interpretive devices, what he succeeds in 
leaving behind entirely, is the overarching narrative, the ‘framework of inter-connected ideas – 
truth as correspondence, language as picture, literature as imitation, for example...’.88 He thus sees 
no useful ‘distinction between discovery and creation, finding and making’ – he is ‘in it for what 
he can get out of it, not for the satisfaction of getting something right’.89 That is, he rejects the idea 
that there is one ultimate, eternal, all-encompassing grid – only locally applicable and adaptable 
 
84 Cf. Umberto Eco, ‘Interpretation and overinterpretation’, in Interpretation and overinterpretation, ed. by 
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85 It is helpful here to recall Rorty’s discussion of Eco’s Foucault’s Pendulum it in TPP. See Chapter 2 on 
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ones that might help us do particular things with words. He, in my terms, rejects the quest and 
works towards mere mundane or material aims. 
Rorty is nevertheless fully aware that for a reading to get traction, it is as necessary for 
strong textualists as for anyone else to provide persuasive reasons for why he reads the way he 
does. Strong textualists, also on this view, must justify their approach and account for elements 
that might resist their readings, especially within the academic institution. The strong textualist is 
not irrational.90 His objection is not towards approaching a task or a problem thoroughly and 
systematically. It is, more subtly, towards belief in the possibility of a predefined method because 
this presupposes the existence of a privileged vocabulary that can ‘get it right’: a vocabulary that 
can – if we only can discover it – get to the essence of what the text “itself” is about. ‘Nietzsche 
and James said that the notion of such a vocabulary was a myth’ Rorty adds, ‘that even in science, 
not to mention philosophy, we simply cast around for a vocabulary which lets us get what we 
want’.91  
 
Rorty elaborates this ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ textualist distinction because it has broader 
implications. To Rorty, the strong textualist is also the stronger romantic. This claim lets Rorty 
cast pragmatism as the continuation of romanticism – and emphasise its affinity with literary 
modernism: 
 
Romanticism was aufgehoben in pragmatism, the claim that the significance of new 
vocabularies was not their ability to decode but their mere utility. Pragmatism is the 
philosophical counterpart of literary modernism, the kind of literature which prides itself on its 
autonomy and novelty rather than its truthfulness to experience or its discovery of pre-existing 
significance.92   
 
The ‘great modernists’, like the pragmatist figures that drove cultural development towards a fully-
fledged strong-textualist literary culture, explored, on Rorty’s view, ‘what our lives might be like 
if we had no hope of what Nietzsche called “metaphysical comfort.”93 With the rejection of 
underlying truth, the possibility of a master-vocabulary, the comfort of foundational beliefs, all 
distinctions between texts are levelled: for the ‘strong misreader’, the strong critic or poet, the 
‘full-fledged pragmatist’, or the modernist literary artist, ‘there is no interesting difference between 
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tables and texts, between protons and poems. To a pragmatist, these are all just permanent 
possibilities for use, and thus for redescription, reinterpretation, manipulation’.94 
The Derridean claim that ‘there is nothing outside the text’, Rorty concludes, is ‘right 
about what it implicitly denies and wrong about what it explicitly asserts’. He continues: ‘[t]he 
only force of saying that texts do not refer to non-texts is just the old pragmatist chestnut that any 
specification of a referent is going to be in some vocabulary’. Textualism, then, has nothing to add 
to this pragmatist point than the ‘misleading image’ of ‘the world as consisting of everything 
written in all the vocabularies used so far’.95 However, what writers like Derrida have succeeded in 
showing us, is that vocabularies the author of a text did not know can be deployed to construct 
strong and useful descriptions of their work. Demonstrating this, however, needs no ‘metaphysical 
or epistemological or semantic back-up’. Its newness and unfamiliarity, which is also its strength, 
make it ‘the sort of claim which becomes convincing only through the accumulation of examples 
of the practices it inspires’.96  
And this – inspiring a practice simply through accumulating examples of how talking or 
acting in new ways can make a difference – is what the ‘literary culture’ has been doing ‘with 
great success’. It is   
 
what science did when it displaced religion and what idealist philosophy did when it briefly 
displaced science. Science did not demonstrate that religion was false, nor philosophy that 
science was merely phenomenal, nor can modernist literature or textualist criticism 
demonstrate that the “metaphysics of presence” is an out-dated genre. But each in turn has 
managed, without argument, to make its point.97 
 
Rorty elaborates:   
 
It is just not the case that one need adopt one’s opponents’ vocabulary or method or style in 
order to defeat him. Hobbes did not have theological arguments against Dante’s world-picture; 
Kant had only a very bad scientific argument for the phenomenal character of science; 
Nietzsche and James did not have epistemological arguments for pragmatism. Each of these 
thinkers presented us with a new form of intellectual life, and asked us to compare its 
advantages with the old. Strong textualists are currently presenting us with such another new 
form of life.98 
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The literary culture is, like ‘literature’ on Rorty’s definition, succeeding simply by succeeding. 
Notice how Rorty here expands the scope of the idea of a ‘literary culture’. It might not be 
taking on the paradigmatic dimension it has in CIS, not yet be at the ‘takeover’, ‘new dawn’-
moment of Rorty’s utopia, but Rorty is no longer merely imagining a Snowian ‘highbrow’ science-
contrary subculture.  
 
Interestingly, the detailed analysis of these essays this chapter offers, reveal NITT as the text in 
which Rorty first sets out the problem that CIS, which I turn to in the next chapter, addresses. 
Having settled his epistemological case, Rorty raises an objection along another line – one he 
thinks applies equally to both textualism and pragmatism: ‘the serious objections’ to the strong 
textualist practice, he stresses, ‘are not epistemological but moral’.99 Humanist critics such as 
Gerald Graff, Lionel Trilling, and M. H. Abrahams side with Bloom, Rorty observes, when he 
protests against Derrida and Foucault’s elimination of the author of a text, because they see this as 
substituting ‘inhuman intertextuality for human influence’.100 But while Bloom encourages strong, 
idiosyncratic readings, the former three want to hold us accountable to a common moral 
consciousness, which – problematically if Rorty’s epistemological case is taken as settled – 
requires the existence of a privileged, universal vocabulary within which to argue about what is 
right and good for human beings. Their objection to textualism, Rorty concludes, could thus be 
restated as 
 
a moral objection to pragmatism’s claim that all vocabularies, even that of our own liberal 
imagination, are temporary historical resting-places. It is also an objection to the literary 
culture’s isolation from common human concerns. It says that people like Nietzsche and 
Nabokov and Bloom and Foucault achieve their effects at a moral cost which is too much to 
pay.101  
 
This objection, Rorty emphasises, ‘states the really important issue about textualism and about 
pragmatism’. ‘I have’, he adds, ‘no way to dispose of it’.102 
It might help, he suggests, to draw one more distinction, this time between two kinds of 
strong textualists, between ‘for example, Bloom and Foucault’:  
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Bloom is a pragmatist in the manner of James, whereas Foucault is a pragmatist in the manner 
of Nietzsche. Pragmatism appears in James and Bloom as an identification with the struggles 
of finite men. In Foucault and Nietzsche it appears as contempt for one’s own finitude, as a 
search for some mighty inhuman force to which one can yield up one’s identity. Bloom’s way 
of dealing with texts preserves our sense of a common human finitude by moving back and 
forth between the poet and his poem. Foucault’s way of dealing with texts is designed to 
eliminate the author – and indeed the very idea of “man” – altogether. I have no wish to defend 
Foucault’s inhumanism, and every wish to praise Bloom’s sense of our common human lot. 
But I do not know how to back up this preference with argument, or even with a precise 
account of the relevant differences.103  
 
And, Rorty adds, ending his essay: ‘To do so, I think, would involve a full-scale discussion of the 
possibility of combining private fulfilment, self-realization, with public morality, a concern for 
justice.’104 This discussion is what Rorty undertakes in CIS.  
 
The Dangers of Making Things Up 
Rorty is regularly accused of not being sensitive to the ethical dimension of the approach he 
advocates. In PTG, for instance, Rorty recounts Richard J. Bernstein calling his readings ‘ruthless 
and violent’. Rorty admits that his strong readings can be taken as such but defends them in the 
context of the work he aims to do – they are not, he insists, merely ‘eliminable extravagances’.105 I 
believe the analysis offered in this chapter might go some way towards showing that Rorty’s 
distinctive readings are performed for specific reasons. His writing, his rendering of figures as 
characters we must adopt attitudes towards, his stylistic choices, are part of a writerly, material 
resistance against representationalism, and integral to his attempt to move beyond it, by example, 
through developing a mindfully pragmatist writerly practice. Moreover, that Rorty above stresses 
the ethical objection against the attitude he prefers makes it clear that he wants a pragmatism that 
is also a humanism. And that he later writes CIS to provide, as he puts it, a ‘full-scale discussion’ 
of these matters, shows that he does not take his ethical responsibilities lightly. 
In The Limits of Critique Rita Felski takes exception to Rorty’s recommendation that we 
‘beat the text into shape’. ‘I find myself disagreeing with Richard Rorty’, Felski avers, ‘when he 
expresses his wholehearted admiration’ for the kind of critic, who is (Felski quotes from NITT) 
‘“in it for what he can get out of it, not for the satisfaction of getting something right”’. She 
underscores that we 
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cannot afford to be quite so cavalier about the difference between finding things out and 
making them up, between imposing our ideas on a text and learning something from a text. 
And while not even the most unkind of obtuse commentary can “do violence” to a text, it can 
certainly do harm to the text’s author or to a community of readers who cherish it. Reading, in 
this sense, indisputably has an ethical dimension.106 
 
As the above shows, Rorty does not disagree with Felski that interpretation has an ethical 
dimension. In the light of the above, it seems to mischaracterise his stance to say that Rorty 
expresses his ‘wholehearted admiration’ for the strong textualist – Rorty reserved his admiration 
for the strong textualist who is also concerned with our ‘common humanity’ (the kind of person he 
in CIS comes to call the liberal ironist). While he rejects the possibility of metaphysically 
grounding his convictions, he also explicitly states that he is concerned with respecting and 
preserving individual identity, not to be cruel or humiliate.  
Furthermore, the indictment that Rorty is in it for what he gets out of it, rather than to get it 
right is damning – but only when taken out of the context detailed in this chapter, and, more 
significantly, only if one thinks it possible to ‘get it right’. Rorty does not. ‘Getting it right’ on the 
universal, atemporal scale is, on the Rortian view, a misconstrued project. It is the quest he rejects. 
To talk about getting something right, doing it well, in a local, temporal, conversational, 
pragmatic, purpose orientated manner is often useful, as long as we remain cautious of not lapsing 
into universalism, as Rorty also acknowledges. Felski appears to be broadly pragmatist in her 
outlook and would presumably agree that the universalist sense of getting it right should be set 
aside. Her complaint against Rorty nevertheless makes it appear as though she lapses into the 
fallacy Rorty attributes to the ‘weak textualists’ and retains a semi-essentialist conception of 
interpretation where there is a proper and correct way to get it right. For without maintaining this 
on some level, holding on to the distinction between finding and making, Felski’s worry could not 
be formulated. 
Is Rorty cavalier? Rorty holds that making is what we always do. Concluding that he does 
not care about the difference our making makes would be mistaken. In the next chapter, I turn to 
CIS and Rorty’s ‘full-scale’ discussion of the ramifications of his views and his vision of a 
‘poeticized’ culture.  
  
 















In this chapter and the next, I bring the insights of the previous chapters to bear on a reading of 
Contingency, irony, and solidarity (1989). While CIS has been widely discussed, there is no study 
of this work as a whole that foregrounds its characteristic literariness or understands it in the light 
of Rorty’s earlier writings on the literary. In the documentary Richard Rorty: the man who killed 
truth, Rorty recalls being invited to deliver a set of lectures at University College, London. He 
notes that this prompted him to collect his thoughts on literature, a gathering that would result in 
CIS.1 Since CIS is widely recognised as the work in which Rorty most fully sets out his post-PMN 
position – what Ramberg calls Rorty’s ‘positive’ project – it is significant that this finds its 
expression as Rorty assembles his reflections on literature.2 This concurrence speaks to the integral 
relevance of the literary aspect to Rortian philosophy.  
Foregrounding the literary aspect moreover allows a new approach to what is at stake in 
CIS to emerge. It reveals the close connection between NITT and CIS as it renders CIS as a direct 
response to the challenge Rorty expressed at the end of NITT. Rorty saw his endorsement of the 
‘strong critic’ to bring the ‘really important problem’ with both ‘textualism and pragmatism’ into 
focus. The vital issue was how to address the ‘moral objection’ to pragmatism’s denial of the 
existence of a vocabulary that permitted us to defend our liberal values as inherently right.3 Rorty 
also restated this as the problem of how we could back up our ‘intuition’ that the ‘humanism’ of 
James and Bloom was preferable to the ‘inhumanism’ of Nietzsche and Foucault. While he 
condones their pragmatism, he takes exception to Nietzsche and Foucault’s ‘contempt’ for their 
own ‘finitude’, their ‘isolation from common human concerns’. The kind of intellectuals they 
exemplify purchase ‘the stimulus to [their] private moral imagination’ at the ‘price of [their] 
separation from... fellow-humans’, a ‘moral cost which is too much to pay’.4 Addressing this 
matter, Rorty submitted in NITT, would require ‘a full-scale discussion of the possibility of 
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combining private fulfilment, self-realization, with public morality, a concern for justice’.5 This is, 
as noted at the end of Chapter 4, what he undertakes in CIS.  
The objection articulated in NITT was, in turn, a re-conception of the question of whether 
pragmatism is ‘morally dangerous’ which Rorty previously had addressed, ‘inconclusively’, in PRI 
(the essay in which he suggested that the pragmatist attitude arises from making the ‘fundamental 
choice’ to ‘accept the contingent character of all starting points’).6 PRI was given as a lecture the 
year PMN was published. It seems that while Rorty considered his philosophical argument in PMN 
successful, this ‘moral objection’ was crystalising as its remainder. The question PMN, PRI, and 
NITT left unanswered was, then: how might we adopt the Rortian radically anti-essentialist 
pragmatist stance where no vocabulary has an intrinsic right to privilege and also advance an 
ethically responsible, solidaric, pragmatist practice? In this chapter and the next, I read CIS as 
Rorty’s response to this persistent question in his pre-CIS work.  
To encompass Rorty’s ‘full-scale discussion’ in these chapters, I use the separation 
between attitude and practice that has helped me structure my argument since the Introduction, and 
which Rorty’s remarks on the ‘really important problem’ also indicate. When he compared James 
and Bloom, on the one hand, to Nietzsche and Foucault on the other, he cast all four as 
(proto)pragmatists, and separated them into humanist or ‘inhumanist’ based on whether they also 
identified with ‘the struggles of finite men’ and preserved this sense in their writing, their 
intellectual practice.7 I follow this lead. Hence, this chapter explores and discusses the literary 
attitude CIS articulates and why Rorty argues for a poeticised culture rather than, simply, a 
pragmatist one, and the next examines what kind of practice CIS recommends and asks why Rorty, 
who at one point refers to ‘literature’ as ‘whatever the literary critics criticize’, nevertheless places 
literature in a narrow sense at the heart of this culture.8  
I begin by submitting that it is helpful to see CIS as a literary work in the Rortian sense; as 
doing a literary kind of work. This helps me clarify Rorty’s public-private distinction as a 
rhetorical device rather than an ontologically vested theoretical concept. I explicate Rorty’s view 
of language and metaphor, and show how, on Rorty’s account, aestheticising our private and 
public lives begins to appear as moral obligations. To conclude, I ask what kind of added value 
Rorty gets from using the words ‘literary’ or ‘poeticised’ to talk about his utopian culture. 
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The Literary Work of Contingency, irony, and solidarity 
Bernard Williams complained that CIS was not sufficiently coherent, a flaw he put down to it 
being ‘rather untidily derived’ from lectures.9 CIS is, although not entirely, based on lectures given 
at University College, London, in 1986, four Clark Lectures given at Trinity College, Cambridge 
in 1987, and a Belitt Lecture given at Bennington College in 1988 and later published as a 
Bennington Chapbook on Literature.10 Parts of the material had also been published in the London 
Review of Books.11 Rorty subsequently extended and reworked the UCL and Clark lectures to turn 
them into ‘Part I: Contingency’, and added two further parts, ‘Ironism and Theory’ and ‘Cruelty 
and Solidarity’, of which a slightly amended version of the Belitt Lecture makes up one chapter of 
the latter part.12 The remaining material was written for CIS. Rorty rehearses his anti-essentialist 
stance, stressing the contingency of language and of personal and communal identity. He outlines a 
response to the quandary of how to reconcile our desire to pursue individual goals and private 
pleasures with the liberal’s moral conviction that our fellow human beings also have a right to 
flourish in their lives. Lastly, he discusses Lolita and 1984 to show why literature, especially 
novels, can help those of a liberal conviction see their own shortcomings as liberals more clearly 
(this is a core topic of the next chapter). 
In NITT, Rorty thought he had to develop an ‘argument’, or at least a ‘precise account of 
the relevant difference at stake’ between inhumanist and humanist pragmatists.13 However, by the 
time he writes CIS, his tactics have changed. Rorty now says he forgoes argumentation, that he 
 
9 Bernard Williams, ‘Getting it Right: Review of Contingency, Irony and Solidarity by Rorty, R.’, London 
Review of Books, 11.22 (1989), 3–5 <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v11/n22/bernard-williams/getting-it-right> 
[accessed 3 November 2019]. 
10 The Barber of Kasbeam: Nabokov on Cruelty, ed. by Alvin Feinman (New York: Bennington College, 
1989), The Bennington Chapbooks in Literature. 
11 Richard Rorty, ‘The Contingency of Language’, London Review of Books, 8.7 (1986) 
<https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v08/n07/richard-rorty/the-contingency-of-language> [accessed 5 May 
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which one might wish that it did: the series, in the years between 1978 and 1992, included lectures by, 
amongst others, Frank Kermode, Harold Bloom, Saul Bellow, René Girard, Nadine Gordimer, and Seamus 
Heaney. Rorty’s lecture was Lecture Eleven, delivered on October 27, 1988. While the Bennington 
Chapbook is out of print and I have not been able to get hold of a copy, Rorty’s lecture and others is 
available in print in Stanley J. Scott (ed.), The Ordering Mirror: Readers and Contexts: the Ben Belitt 
Lectures at Bennington College (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993). 





will simply suggest new ways to talk.14 As observed in Chapter 4, Rorty dubbed this kind of 
approach ‘literary’ when he defined literature as the kind of writing that does not rely on argument 
but succeeds simply by succeeding. He suggested that what we want from this kind of writing was 
for it to give us new terminologies.15 This is indeed what Rorty tells us he will do in CIS: ‘I am not 
going to offer arguments against the vocabulary I want to replace’, he asserts, ‘[i]nstead, I am 
going to try to make the vocabulary I favor look attractive by showing how it may be used to 
describe a variety of topics’.16 The aim is to 
  
redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for 
appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the adoption of new scientific 
equipment or new social institutions. This sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, 
analyzing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis. Rather, it works holistically and 
pragmatically. It says things like “try thinking of it this way” – or more specifically, “try to 
ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the following new and possibly 
interesting questions.”17  
 
Rorty’s approach is, by his standards, ‘literary’.  
Ramberg, writing on CIS, insightfully emphasises that Rorty aimed to ‘contribute to the 
large-scale cultural maturation project that he describes in world-historical terms, precisely by 
depicting it as he does, in the terms that he uses.’18 Ramberg’s observation adds to the case for 
reading CIS in a literary spirit: the implication is that its rhetorical strategies and literary qualities 
are matters of substance (i.e., not merely a matter of ‘style’). His evaluation and Rorty’s broader 
argument indicate that we might understand CIS more productively from the stance of the literary 
critic, who sets aside the requirement for truth as correspondence and reads with attention to 
writing, words, and their effects, rather than from the attitude of the truth-uncovering philosopher 
aiming to assess whether Rorty ‘gets it right’. Ramberg’s observation moreover supports my view 
of Rorty as displaying, through his word-choices and in his style and form, a poetic readerly and 
writerly practice: a rhetorical mode of conduct; a use of ‘noises and marks’ that is self-consciously 
modulated to be in keeping with and substantiate his philosophical attitude (cf. chapters 2 and 3 of 
this thesis, and the next chapter).19  
 
14 Rorty, CIS, p. xi. 
15 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 157. 
16 Rorty, CIS, p. 9. 
17 Rorty, CIS, p. 9. 
18 Ramberg, ‘Irony's Commitment’. My italics.  





Whereas Williams could forgive Rorty for the untidiness of CIS, he nevertheless found it 
‘deeply unsatisfying’ for an entirely different reason: that Rorty had ‘lost the sense of... anything 
that needs to be got right’.20 Rorty did not lose this need but deliberately left it behind, and I 
suspect CIS might seem unsatisfying unless one is prepared to entertain the possibility of doing so. 
One key issue critics frequently allege to be unsatisfactorily resolved in Rorty’s work is his 
conception of the public-private distinction. This topic has been intensely debated.21 I want to 
propose that Rorty’s division is comprehended more straightforwardly if we adopt a literary 
approach. It helps us not fall into the trap of seeing this as an ontologically vested construct. 
Instead, it emerges as a rhetorical ‘grid’ pragmatically deployed to structure the story Rorty wants 
to tell. 
Rorty begins CIS by addressing Western culture’s millennia-long attempt to ‘fuse’ the 
public and the private.22 He naturally does not invent this distinction, which carries a heavy 
theoretical and historical burden. His aim is rather to redescribe it, and he approaches this by 
objecting to the belief that it is possible to run all aspects of our lives together in one theoretical 
scheme; that we can capture human diversity of purposes in one description or vocabulary (recall 
Rorty’s rejection of the ‘one vision’ ambition in TWO). Nevertheless, I take Rorty to suggest, it 
might be helpful to consider some pursuits as more directly useful to our public, liberal project, 
and others to be less so, in order to talk about what to prioritise, and when. 
Rorty here deploys a rhetorical strategy he observably uses at least from PMN onwards 
and explicitly sets out in ‘Texts and Lumps’ (1985) when he says that his 
 
holistic strategy, characteristic of pragmatism (and in particular of Dewey), is to reinterpret 
every such dualism as a momentarily convenient blocking-out of regions on a spectrum, rather 
than as recognition of an ontological, methodological, or epistemological divide. So I shall 
construct such a spectrum and use it as a heuristic device....23 
 
Rorty also echoes this in CIS when he says he uses a ‘crude’ way of ‘blocking out a difference’ to 
discuss Proust versus Nietzsche and Heidegger.24 We should hold Rorty’s terms as loosely as 
Rorty does, as aesthetically and ‘lightly’, lest we get stuck on trying to ‘get them right’ (evaluate 
whether his words correspond to ‘the truth’) – and miss his point. The difference Rorty assigns to 
 
20 Williams, ‘Getting it Right’.  
21 Llanera provides a helpful overview of the debate. See Tracy Llanera, ‘Redeeming Rorty’s Private-Public 
Distinction’, Contemporary Pragmatism, 13.3 (2016), 319–40 (p. 319). 
22 Rorty, CIS, p. xiii. 
23 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, p. 8. 





‘private’ and ‘public’ is a wholly pragmatic, rhetorical one.25 It is a device for grabbing hold of (to 
use a favourite phrase of Rorty’s) aspects of our experience, and by this be able to construct a 
narrative about how things ‘hang together’.26 Rorty’s ‘dualisms’ are generally best understood in 
this manner.27  
Taken in this spirit, Rorty appears to suggest that it might be of help to us, as we grapple 
with how to foster and further a humanistic liberal culture, to group the things we do into two, 
rough, heuristic categories: activities that more directly further our shared efforts towards this end 
(public), and those that are less directly useful to it (private).28 The ‘public’ and the ‘private’ now 
look like words for ranges of activities that are on opposite ends on a spectrum of direct pragmatic 
usefulness to the liberal project (as we will see, private activities are dynamically and organically 
linked to this shared project, but their potential effects take time to emerge, and the path from 
action to effect is more complex). ‘Activities’ must here be understood broadly and includes using 
words, writing, reading, persuading, arguing, and so on. This is reflected in Rorty’s assertion that 
there are vocabularies and modes of conversation that are better suited than others for successful 
shared, public deliberation to take place.29  
Rorty is concerned to stress that our public duties are not intrinsically more important than 
our private desires and activities, nor the other way around.30 Moreover, he is not, as some critics 
appear to presume, precluding the possibility that what we do and say in our pursuit of a 
flourishing life might not come to have an impact on our shared imagination and discourse – or 
vice versa. Milnes notes that Rorty later wished that CIS had more clearly expressed the ‘interplay 
between the private and the public’, but this merely conveys a familiar writer’s regret: there are 
 
25 That pragmatist will only make pragmatic distinctions is the essence of Rorty’s second ‘sloganistic’ 
characterisation of pragmatism in PRI. See Rorty, ‘PRI’, p. 723, and Chapter 2, p. 43. 
26 Cf. the start of Chapter 2. 
27 I interpret several of his distinctions in this manner in the course of this chapter and the next, and the 
results are helpful.  
28 See also Rorty, CIS, p. 68, where Rorty talks about how Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida are, looked at 
from a public point of view, ‘at best useless’. He is talking about their usefulness from the point of view of 
fulfilling public or private needs. There is further support on p. 83n4, where Rorty says that ‘all the 
traditional metaphysical distinctions can be given a respectable ironist sense by sociologizing them’ – that is, 
we should consider the private/public distinction along just such sociological lines, rather than ontological 
ones.   
29 Rorty, CIS, p. xiv. These two vocabularies are ‘blockings out’ separated by degree of familiarity 
(literalisation, or ‘finality’), as we will see. There is further support for this on p. 7 when Rorty suggests we 
do not need a ‘break’ between vocabularies. I see Rorty as simply tasking liberals wanting to facilitate 
shared discourse with using words wisely.  





always, in hindsight, better ways to articulate one’s point.31 That Rorty posits a dynamic interplay 
between the private and the public in CIS is quite clear. He, for instance, suggests we associate 
‘morality’ with the voice an individual uses as a member of a community, when we ‘appeal to the 
interests of the community’. As he makes clear, he is not suggesting that the speaker, when 
engaging herself in such concerns, splits herself into two and leaves her private self, or full breadth 
of experience and knowledge, behind. On the contrary, he points out that it might lead to 
‘dilemmas’, and that she might need to set some of her idiosyncratic, private priorities and pursuits 
aside for the time being.32 The public and private in Rorty is no more separable than his first-
person-singular perspective was from his first-person-plural perspective in Chapters 2 and 3; his I-
story was from his we-story.33 
At one point, Rorty says he needs a ‘firm’ distinction between the private and the public 
for the purpose of his argument.34 Critics have invoked this moment in evidence of Rorty 
constructing a theoretical, ontologically significant distinction between a private and a public 
realm. This applies even to some pragmatist critics, like Misak, who recently affirmed her view of 
Rorty as suggesting a kind of split that forces us to ‘sea-saw’ between two sets of beliefs and 
modes of operation.35 Remnants of a perception of Rorty’s ‘firm’ distinction as ontologically 
significant also surfaces in sympathetic commentators such as Voparil and Llanera. It subtly rises 
to the surface in phrases such as Rorty ‘admitting’ that public and private commitments can 
conflict, and Rorty cutting ‘moral responsibility in half’.36 It is perceptible when Voparil calls 
Rorty’s approach ‘bifurcated’ and elsewhere suggests that Rorty from this institutes an unrealistic, 
unworkable split between types of literary works (sentimental for public purposes and ironic for 
private).37 I appreciate both Llanera’s and Voparil’s subtle and largely persuasive analyses, but 
their vocabulary choices on these occasions appear to reveal vestiges of a theoreticising mode of 
approach that desires ‘one vision’, one whole cut in half. The rhetoric relies on the kind of picture 
that permits the perception of conflict or break.  
 
31 Milnes, ‘Rorty, Romanticism’, p. 27. See for instance Henry James on this phenomenon: Henry James, 
The Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces (New York, London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), pp. 338–39. 
32 Rorty, CIS, p. 59. 
33 Bacon connects the private and the public in Rorty by way of a discussion of the public utility of romantic 
irony and a useful emphasis on the liberal ironist as a Bloomian poet-figure. See Michael Bacon, ‘Rorty, 
irony and the consequences of contingency for liberal society’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 43.9 
(2017), 954–65. See also below for a discussion of the liberal ironist. 
34 Rorty, CIS, p. 83. 
35 Misak, ‘End of the Liberal Ironist’. See also Misak, ‘Rorty's Place in the Pantheon’. 
36 Llanera, ‘Redeeming the Private-Public Distinction’, see in particular 319-323, and 334. 





Both Llanera and Voparil draw the conclusion that Rorty’s distinction indicates significant 
problems with his account, whereas I would argue that we instead need to reassess how we 
approach this distinction.38 For even when he states his need for a ‘firm’ distinction, Rorty, I would 
argue, is merely setting up a firm pragmatic ‘grid’, a ‘blocking out’ for the purpose of defending a 
view of what kind of writing (what kind of intellectual practice) is conducive to cultivate an 
attitude (‘ironism’, I turn to this concept below) and a ‘habit’ (‘of taking literary criticism as the 
presiding discipline’).39 This here, also, appears as a thoroughly rhetorical, pragmatic move on 
Rorty’s part, or, in the language of his later works, as a distinction made for reasons of ‘cultural 
politics’.40 
Establishing a useful way to perceive this matter at the outset is important, because as 
Günther Leypoldt puts it,  
 
the most unconvincing critiques of Rorty’s literary criticism misinterpret his references to 
public and private domains as a theoretically watertight demarcation of distinct and mutually 
autonomous areas of social experience. Indeed it is hard to see why Rorty would have to be 
told (in a critique by the pragmatist aesthetician Richard Shusterman) that firm public-private 
distinctions are “untenable because the private self and the language it builds upon in self-
creation are always already socially constituted and structured by a common field.” The social 
dimension of private pursuits does not invalidate Rorty’s point that people’s self-culture can, 
intermittently at least, fail to harmonize or clash with or have little relevance to their moral and 
social responsibilities.41 
 
I would maintain, then, that seeing CIS as a ‘literary’ work in the sense outlined helps us perceive 
Rorty’s reasoning in a more useful spirit and evade the mistake of thinking of these ‘blockings out’ 
on a spectrum as anything but ‘heuristic’ devices.42 It helps us see the literary kind of work that 
CIS does. I will thus proceed in this manner. 
 
 
38 Which is indeed also Llanera’s aim in ‘Redeeming the Private-Public Distinction’. But whereas she wants 
to supplement Rorty to ease a problematic, or at least ambiguous, split, I am arguing that the resources are 
there, in Rorty’s writing, to render this distinction unproblematic. 
39 Rorty, CIS, p. 83. Rorty here proposes that a specific strand of theory, which he calls ironist theory, is 
helpful for cultivating ironist awareness, but not directly helpful for large-scale shared projects. I discuss this 
in Chapter 6.  
40 See Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics. 
41 Günter Leypoldt, ‘Uses of Metaphor: Richard Rorty's Literary Criticism and the Poetics of World-
Making’, in Remembering Richard Rorty, ed. by Ralph Cohen (= New Literary History, 39 (2008)), pp. 145–
63 (p. 150). 





An Ironist who is also a Liberal 
Rorty’s redescription of the private-public split is mirrored in his creation of the central character 
of CIS: an ‘ironist’ who is also a liberal.43 Situating this character requires addressing Rorty’s view 
– or rather dismissal – of ‘human nature’. 
The original mistake that led us to believe we could hold the private and the public in one 
commensurated vision, Rorty offers, was to think we all possessed an essence that defined what it 
meant to be human.44 What he contends in these pages is, in summation, that as long as we believe 
in a common human nature, say, a Kantian (moral) self, or a Christian soul made in the image of 
God, we will fall into the trap of thinking that to come to know oneself is to come to understand 
the human nature in which we partake – which we then would believe amounted to clarity on what 
is right and good for human beings as such. This fallacy leads us to think that what is most 
important to us is also what is – or should be – most important to everyone else.45 We become 
convinced that the ways we cope with the world must be how everyone should go about it – and 
that they would if only they adopted our point of view; if our perspective and experiences could be 
shown to be universally valid.  
If we give up the idea of an essential human nature, however, the need for a theory about 
what a (morally good) human being is, disappears. It is from this vantage point that it makes sense 
to think of the practices we engage in, whether motivated by private or public needs or desires, as 
complementary but not necessarily commensurable human activities, or pursuits. We might need 
to talk about these in a variety of ways, and because each of these will be intimately linked to our 
needs, doings, and experiences, one is not necessarily reducible to another. The value we derive 
from our varied pursuits, and various ways of describing these will, conversely, not be possible to 
capture in one master-vocabulary. CIS begins from this outlook, and it is a recognisable vantage 
point, for it is the view of the Pragmatist after he underwent the transformational moment at the 
heart of TPP (see chapters 2 and 3). CIS stakes out a direction from this contingent starting post.  
Rorty posits two interrelated goals to move towards: to ensure individual liberty and 
flourishing to the extent that it is not realised at the expense of the liberty and flourishing of others, 
and to foster the broadest possible sense of human solidarity while taking care to ensure this has 
the smallest possible impact on our opportunities for individual flourishing. He moreover wants us 
 
43 Rorty, CIS, p. 84. Bacon notes that what is most distinctive about CIS is Rorty’s creation of this character. 
Bacon, ‘Rorty, irony and the consequences’, p. 954. Both Bacon and Ramberg, in their respective articles on 
CIS, ironism, and the liberal ironist, offer more insight than I here can provide into the philosophical 
criticism against Rorty’s protagonist. 
44 Rorty, CIS, pp. 6–11. 





to give both pursuits – private perfection and public solidarity – equal weight in principle, and for 
us to deliberate continually and pragmatically on what to prioritise, say and do. We cannot know 
the answer to ‘when to struggle against injustice and when to devote [oneself] to private projects of 
self-creation?’ in advance, as that would only be possible to determine on the basis of a 
foundational theory of human nature from which we could derive right and wrong. This question is 
  
 as hopeless as the questions “Is it right to deliver n innocents over to be tortured to save the 
lives of m × n other innocents? If so, what are the correct values of n and m?” or the question 
“When may one favor members of one’s family, or one’s community, over other, randomly 
chosen, human beings?” Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded theoretical answers 
to this sort of question – algorithms for resolving moral dilemmas of this sort – is still, in his 
heart, a theologian or a metaphysician. He believes in an order beyond time and change which 
both determines the point of human existence and establishes a hierarchy of responsibilities.46  
 
When to prioritise public need over private desires and interests will, on this model, be a matter of 
constant and active, pragmatic deliberation. 
Rorty is not saying that we cannot make ethical choices. He says that these are decisions 
we must make again and again, for problems defined in concrete terms, fully aware that the 
practical circumstances and real-life consequences that play into the decision are and will be 
relentlessly in flux. There is no escape from the messy, complex materiality of the human 
experience. This, however, makes it painfully clear that the problem from NITT remains. Indeed, it 
makes it more evident why this is a quandary in the first place: how can we justify the humanist-
pragmatism of James over the inhumanist-pragmatism of Nietzsche? Given the above, Rorty 
cannot make a theoretical case for this moral choice that requires us to assent to a conception of 
human nature, and by virtue of this requires us to assent to treat others with consideration. That we 
will act in such a way is nevertheless the real-life outcome he desires. But without recourse to 
theory, Rorty must build his case for a humanistic pragmatism in another way. Thus, he takes up 
another literary tool and creates fictional characters. 
The central character of CIS is ‘the liberal ironist’. ‘I use “ironist”’, Rorty explains, ‘to 
name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and 
desires - someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those 
central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance.’47 An 
ironist thus accepts the pragmatist position and is self-consciously aware of all our concepts, 
including her idea of who she is, as historically and culturally contingent products of the human 
 
46 Rorty, CIS, p. xv. 





imagination. Rorty’s central protagonist is ‘also’ a liberal.48 While this largely carries the familiar 
meaning of ‘humanist’ from NITT and PRI, Rorty now redefines it in terms of cruelty, suffering, 
and humiliation: ‘I borrow my definition of “liberal” from Judith Shklar, who says that liberals are 
the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do.’49 ‘Liberal ironists’, then, ‘are people 
who include among [their] ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, 
that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease.’50 Note that the liberal 
ironist is someone who has adopted the ironist attitude and then also chooses to include in their 
‘ungroundable desires’ a personal hope for a future where we are less cruel. 
Rorty writes to show us the possibility and utility of cultivating a type of character, someone 
who holds their concepts lightly, ironically, and yet holds firmly on to their moral convictions: a 
pragmatist and a humanist in the manner of James and Bloom, who were defined by their 
‘identification with the struggles of finite men’.51 He wants to ‘disentangle’ the question of 
whether the ‘absence of metaphysics [is] politically dangerous?’ from the question ‘is ironism 
compatible with a sense of human solidarity?’.52 Ramberg recognises this when he suggests that 
Rorty narrates a ‘problem situation’ and writes the liberal ironist as a character who responds to 
this situation, and furthermore notes that Rorty proceeds through ‘both telling and showing’ to 
‘bring about recognition in the reader’.53 I agree with Ramberg and Bacon that even while Rorty 
later came to see his description of the liberal ironist as flawed, this does not mean Rorty’s 
protagonist is not worth our attention, although it might be that there are better was to describe or 
explicate this character.54 It seems Rorty here, too, is expressing the kind of familiar writer’s regret 
mentioned above. 
The challenge Rorty faces, a challenge he recognises and articulates, is to make this 
character psychologically believable – for the liberal ironist will seem psychologically implausible 
to the extent that ironism is seen as inherently opposed to care and principled action. And as Rorty 
notes, ‘[l]ots of people, from Julien Benda to C. P. Snow, have taken a connection between 
ironism and antiliberalism to be almost self-evident.’55 In the closing pages of CIS Rorty says that 
‘[t]he fundamental premise of the book is that a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought 
worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper 
 
48 Rorty, CIS, p. 84. 
49 Rorty, CIS, p. xv. 
50 Rorty, CIS, p. xv. 
51 Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 173. 
52 Rorty, CIS, p. 87. 
53 Ramberg, ‘Irony's Commitment’, pp. 145–46. 
54 Ramberg, ‘Irony's Commitment’, p. 147. Bacon, ‘Rorty, irony and the consequences’. 





than contingent historical circumstance’56 The possibility of such a character – that this is a 
workable, helpful attitude to adopt – is what he attempts to embody in the liberal ironist. 
The psychological believability of the liberal ironist is substantiated if it is considered that 
it is complete acceptance of, as Rorty put it in PRI, the contingency of all starting points that 
permits her steadfast defence of what she holds to be good. As chapters 2 and 3 discussed, it was 
the transformational moment described in TPP and TWO – a moment of profound and self-
conscious awareness of the inevitability of contingency – that made fully aware commitment 
possible in these narratives. Hence, when Rorty in CIS says that ‘if the demands of a morality are 
the demands of a language, and if languages are historical contingencies, rather than attempts to 
capture the true shape of the world or the self, then to “stand unflinchingly for one’s moral 
convictions” is a matter of identifying oneself with such a contingency’, I take his point to be that 
as long as we are caught up in trying to ‘get it right’, we will never reach clarity.57 We will be 
caught up in that never-ending quest for Enlightenment, or Truth. For in the quest-narrative, it is 
only when we reach our final destination (Truth) that will we be able to say with certainty ‘now I 
can unflinchingly stand for this claim’. If one instead rejects the quest-romance as the governing 
form for our account of inquiry (or of moral progress, and so on), and thus the very possibility of 
ever arriving at certainty, then it is possible to understand oneself as simply taking a stand where 
one happens to be. Only then might we stand unflinchingly for what we believe, without a nagging 
doubt about whether it is the theoretically, philosophically, epistemologically right, or true, thing 
to believe. 
The above argument also speaks to the believability of the liberal ironist in other ways. 
While Rorty renders the liberal ironist relatively flat, it is not a non-complex character: she is 
shaped by perpetual tension between commitment and doubt – doubt in the pragmatist sense of 
leaving open the possibility that there might be more useful things to say or more rewarding 
causes. This is not the doubt of existentialism, and not the doubt of Cavell: while Rorty’s and 
Cavell’s thinking overlaps in significant ways, Cavell takes ‘the truth of skepticism’, the anxiety 
brought on by the recognition of our own mere, frail and limited, humanity, as epistemically and 
existentially significant in a way Rorty does not.58 The doubt of the liberal ironist is self-doubt, it is 
the worry that she is not (yet) the person she would want to be. She is not oscillating or vacillating, 
not ‘in alternate moments, Nietzsche and J. S. Mill.’ 59 The liberal ironist is engaged in the same 
task Rorty tells us that he, as noted above, is engaged in when he writes this character: to 
 
56 Rorty, CIS, p. 189. 
57 Rorty, CIS, p. 60. Rorty borrows the term ‘unflinchingly’ from Isiah Berlin, see pp. 45-60. 
58 See for instance Mahon, p. 41. 





‘untangle’ the question of whether ironism is incompatible with a sense of human solidarity.’60 The 
liberal ironist is thus believable because she is written as a (Rorty-like) kind of intellectual who is 
aware enough to worry about her moral conduct in the face of her own ironism, and not as a type 
to stand, allegorically, for Everyman. 
One might, however, still be concerned about the liberal ironist’s trustworthiness: she will 
necessarily also be an ironist about her commitment to liberalism. She is only human and might, as 
Rorty accused Nietzsche and Foucault of doing, decide to purchase self-realisation at the cost of 
solidarity. It is, however, not Rorty’s job to assure us of the perpetual trustworthiness or sameness 
of all instances of a kind – that is what theory purports to do, not literature. Literature gives us 
examples. And Rorty points out further reasons for why ironism is not inherently hostile towards 
liberalism or democracy: since the ironist cannot envisage a final theoretical solution, she will cast 
ethical problems in practical terms. Moral progress in Rorty is thus reimagined in terms of 
practical and imaginative effort, as a species of creative work: 
 
In my Utopia, human solidarity would be seen not as a fact to be recognized by clearing away 
“prejudice” or burrowing down to previously hidden depths but, rather, as a goal to be 
achieved. It is to be achieved not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see 
strange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is 
created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of 
other, unfamiliar sorts of people.61  
 
In Rorty’s literal culture, moral progress would be, self-consciously, understood as a matter of 
making, poiesis.62 An ironist can hence chose to prioritise working to lessen suffering – there is 
nothing inherent in ironism that says this must be her choice, but nor is there anything that dictates 
an antiliberalist agenda (or even mere detachment) for all ironists. 
The liberal ironist is moreover created to serve as an exemplar citizen of this utopia who 
drops traditional ideas of Truth and ‘morality’ to attend to the practical work of making not just a 
larger, more solidaric ‘we’, but creating the kind of we where she can be an ironist. The ironist 
knows she depends on making a specific kind of culture that engenders the sort of freedom that 
gave rise to ironism and is capable of furthering it.63  She depends on ensuring the continuation of 
a society where she is at liberty to make herself and her communities. Thus, her political task has 
 
60 Rorty, CIS, p. 87. 
61 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 
62 Ramberg comes at this matter from a different angle than mine, and suggests, insightfully, that ‘the 
recognition of contingency is good for liberalism, because, on the whole, in a post-metaphysical culture it 
will be more difficult to argue for its competitors’. Ramberg, ‘Irony's Commitment’, p. 145. 





two defining aspects. The poeticised culture Rorty envisages in CIS would not just see solidarity as 
the work in progress but also the ‘realization of Utopias, and... still further Utopias’, see 
themselves engaged in ‘an endless, proliferating realization of Freedom, rather than a convergence 
toward an already existing Truth.’64  
 
Self-Making as Moral Obligation 
Not surprisingly, Rorty’s utopian culture is a culture where ‘ironism, in the relevant sense, is 
universal’.65 A culture where historicism and nominalist anti-essentialism is taken as common 
sense.66 He describes a society that recognises and understands that we all take part in making the 
culture we live in: its values, discourse, and institutions. However, while the citizens of this utopia 
appreciate the contingent and made nature of these artefacts, Rorty’s narrative makes it clear that 
there is one act of making that even in this culture is pragmatically more important than others: the 
making of selves, both individual and communal, because these form the (moral) loci that enable 
us to act. Rorty would later speak of these as ‘practical identities’.67 Still transient, these sites of 
identity-experience make deliberate, self-aware forging possible. And their primary pragmatic 
utility in Rorty’s scheme renders self-making the closest one might come to a moral obligation 
within this framework of thought.68 This, and hence the above explication of the liberal ironist, is 
considerably more closely tied up with the idea of the ‘literary’ or a ‘literary attitude’ in Rorty than 
first might be evident. 
To set out his view of selfhood, Rorty begins by setting out his views on language and 
metaphor. For it would also be ‘emblematic’ of the utopian literary culture he describes that it has 
accepted the ‘contingency of language’.69 In CIS, as in PMN, Rorty’s case centres on his objection 
to the idea of language as a medium, something that stands ‘between the self and the nonhuman 
reality with which the self seeks to be in touch’.70 While the world might contain ‘the causes of our 
being justified in holding a belief’, it ‘cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other 
 
64 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 
65 Rorty, CIS, pp. xv–xvi. 
66 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. I return to the distinction Rorty appears to make between commonsense ironism and the 
ironism of intellectuals and strong poets below.  
67 Philosophy as Cultural Politics, pp. 201–02. 
68 Utility relative to the purpose of fashioning a liberal democratic society. I stress this because it is vital to 
note that Rorty is not suggesting there is a fundamental function that defines ‘man’ as a concept, as for 
instance MacIntyre does. Cf. Chapter 3.  
69 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 





human beings can do that.’71 Rorty’s line of reasoning should be familiar from the exposition this 
thesis has offered thus far: after accepting the contingency of all starting points, what we have to 
go on, are the remarks of our fellow inquirers. 
In CIS, Rorty uses Davidson to extend and detail his Wittgensteinian-pragmatist view of 
language.72 For Davidson, the boundary between ‘knowing a language and knowing our way 
around the world generally is erased’.73 Rorty explains elsewhere that Davidson asks us to think of 
human beings as simply ‘trading marks and noises to accomplish purposes’, and to ‘see this 
linguistic behavior as continuous with nonlinguistic behavior, and to see both sorts of behavior as 
making sense just insofar as we can describe them as attempts to fulfill given desires in the light of 
given beliefs’.74 Moreover, Davidson helps us see that while we might find it useful to talk of truth 
and representation, doing so only makes sense relative to a local scheme devised for a particular 
purpose.75 The resulting view naturalises language and makes its relation to the world causal.76 
Language is perceived more akin to a tool than as a medium. Our concern becomes to understand 
what kind of linguistic practices work for us: it is ‘more like discarding the lever and the chock 
because one has envisaged the pully, or like discarding gesso and tempera because one has now 
figured out how to size canvas properly’.77 
Rorty points out that the tool-analogy is not entirely apt. We do not always know what 
tools we need at the outset: –sometimes we can only state aspirations and desires after developing 
the vocabulary that lets us imagine these. Considering this leads Rorty to speak of ‘poets’ and 
mean it in a very ‘wide sense of the term – the sense of “one who makes things new”’; who extend 
the set of possibilities for what we might imagine, articulate, or do.78 ‘Poetry’ is thus of vital 
importance because it keeps us alive to the possibility of better ways of talking, keeps open the 
possibility that we might engage in other, yet unseen, purposes. Rorty elsewhere and repeatedly 
credits the romantics and Shelley in particular for instigating the cultural shift that made this view 
of language and imagination possible. As Rorty later put it: ‘At the heart of Romanticism... was the 
 
71 Rorty, CIS, pp. 5–6. 
72 For details of how Rorty considers Davidson to supplement and improve on Wittgenstein, see Rorty, 
‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, pp. 345–46. Rorty relies on Donald Davidson, ‘A 
Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald 
Davidson, ed. by Ernest Leopore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
73 Rorty, CIS, p. 15. Rorty is quoting Davidson, ‘A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs’, p. 446. 
74 Rorty, ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, p. 346. 
75 Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction: Pragmatism as Anti-Representationalism’, in John P. Murphy, Pragmatism: 
from Peirce to Davidson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) (p. 2). 
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claim that reason can only follow paths that the imagination has first broken. No words, no 
reasoning. No imagination, no new words. No such words, no moral or intellectual progress’.79  
Rorty’s allusion to Ezra Pound’s modernist ‘make it new’ slogan is not accidental either. 
He first mentions this phrase in the 1978 essay ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing’ where he 
describes Derrida’s différance as ‘a name of the situation which the dialectical philosopher starts 
from the wish to revolt against the eternalization and cosmologization of the present vocabulary by 
creating a new vocabulary which will not permit the old questions to be asked’, and adds ‘it is the 
“make it new” which Pound thought expressed “modernism.”’80 It seems noteworthy that Rorty 
here uses the term ‘cosmologization’, which in the context of modernist poetry cannot but bring to 
mind Yeats’s cosmology in ‘A Vision’, which played an important part in TWO (see chapters 2 
and 3 of this thesis). Rorty does not elaborate on his modernist allusions, however, but ties this to 
passages in Derrida that underscore both Derrida’s own call for newness, but also for action, 
strength, as well as satire and play: ‘There will be no unique name [for différance]... we must 
affirm it – in the sense that Nietzsche brings affirmation into play – with a certain laughter and 
with a certain dance.’81 Rorty’s allusions to the poets of romanticism and modernism go together 
to accentuate the themes of imagination, creativity, strength, originality, but also play and 
playfulness, satire and laughter that suffuses CIS.  
Viewing language in the way Rorty proposes, as a human-made device that serves as a tool 
for communication and also for expanding our scope for meaningful awareness – the set of what 
we currently see as ‘possible and important’ – implies that our concepts have a history.82 It means, 
Rorty submits, that ‘the arts, the sciences, and the moral sense’ can be thought of as the history of 
metaphor. 83 The history of our achievements and leaps of imagination, is traceable in the history 
of our uses of ‘noises and marks’.84 We, human animals, use noises and marks for human 
purposes, experiments, needs, and pleasures. Against this background, Rorty offers a 
 
79 Rorty, ‘The Fire of Life’, p. 129. 
80 Rorty, ‘PKW’, p. 153. 
81 Rorty, ‘PKW’, p. 154. Rorty is citing Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon, pp. 158-59. 
82 The phrase ‘possible and important’ is repeatedly used in CIS. See p. 17, 23, 39, 48, and 82. 
83 Rorty, CIS, p. 16. Rorty also relies on Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean’, Critical Inquiry, 5.1 
(1978), 31–47. My italics.  
The Nietzschean and deconstructive undertones are obvious here (Rorty discusses Nietzsche, metaphors and 
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of Metaphor” in Revolutions and reconstructions in the philosophy of science, ed. by Mary B. Hesse 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). See also Susan Haack, ‘Surprising Noises: Rorty and Hesse on 
Metaphor’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88 (1987), 293–301 
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reconceptualisation of metaphor defined in contrast to, but not ontologically separated from, 
literalised language. For once again, Rorty describes a ‘blocking out’ on a spectrum, this time on a 
spectrum of familiarity. 
While to Rorty there is no difference in kind between literal language and metaphor, there 
are differences in how easily we can assimilate a ‘noise’ into ordinary language. Whereas literal 
language is made up of familiar noises that we already have known uses for, metaphors are 
constellations of marks or noises that are still unfamiliar – that make us stop in our tracks and 
ponder how we might use these, or cause a reaction which we later might try to make sense and 
use of. ‘In this view’, Rorty explains, explicating Davidson,  
 
tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long 
enough to make a face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or 
pointing at a feature of the surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor’s face, or kissing him. 
Tossing a metaphor into a text is like using italics, or illustrations, or odd punctuation or 
formats.85 
 
One can only ‘savour or spit’ metaphors, not rephrase them.86 
Rorty’s view of familiar language and metaphor is very much akin to how we view the 
difference between novels and poetry: we tend to associate poetry with original and unfamiliar or 
defamiliarising uses of language, and with a focused emotional impact. We recognise that poems 
might affect us, even though we might not be able to articulate what happened – at least not yet, 
for we accept that we might have to work hard to interpret poems. Furthermore, live metaphors, 
just like lines of what once was the most original kind of poetry, can eventually, if they catch on, 
become a part of our shared language, and die off into literalness.87 Rorty creates an organic 
metaphor of his own to describe this process: 
 
Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught us to think 
of the history of a coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, and then 
serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors. This analogy lets us think of “our language” – 
that is, of the science and culture of twentieth-century Europe – as something that took shape as a 
result of a great number of sheer contingencies. Our language and our culture are as much a 
contingency, as much a result of thousands of small mutations finding niches (and millions of 
others finding no niches), as are the orchids and the anthropoids.88  
 
85 Rorty, CIS, pp. 17–18. There is obvious potential for further work here, on comparing Rorty’s view of 
poetry and metaphor to the theories of the (Russian) formalists. I touch on this in Chapter 6. 
86 Rorty, CIS, p. 18. 
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Our language, for language is not a thing in itself, grows like a coral reef, or, in James’ very 
similar organic metaphor, like a tree expanding, its inner wood hardening as it grows a new layer 
of cambium. 89 They both see developments and progress as happening organically in response to 
our needs and desires. 
To Rorty, then, all language began as metaphor, as poetry. In his extended sense as the ‘one 
who makes things new’, the ‘poets’ includes Galileo and Darwin alongside Hegel and Yeats 
because they gave us new metaphorical resources and opened up frontiers for growth and 
expansion of human imagination. Thus, when we see ‘human history as the history of successive 
metaphors’, we will see ‘the poet, in the generic sense of the maker of new words, the shaper of 
new languages, as the vanguard of the species.’90  
 
 
How does Rorty’s discussion of language tie in with his reconception of selfhood? To Rorty, all 
meaningful awareness is ‘a linguistic affair’ – a doctrine he attributes to Wittgenstein and sees as 
extended by Sellars, as well as Derrida.91 To have a meaningful view of oneself, it is not sufficient 
to have reactions and attitudes and unarticulated beliefs. We must be able to put these into words, 
words that accumulate their meaning (literalisation) through use. Thus, it follows that we – 
individuals and communities alike – also have a metaphorical history. Rorty puts it to us that we 
are defined by the words we use, a set of words, or metaphors, where some matter more to our 
sense of self than others. These Rorty call our ‘final vocabulary’:  
 
All human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their 
beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate praise of our friends and 
contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest 
hopes. They are the words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes 
retrospectively, the story of our lives. I shall call these words a person’s “final vocabulary.” 
It is “final” in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has 
no noncircular argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he can go with language;  
beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force. A small part of a final 
vocabulary is made up of thin, flexible, and ubiquitous terms such as “true,” “good,” “right,” 
and “beautiful.” The larger part contains thicker, more rigid, and more parochial terms, for 
example, “Christ,” “England,” “professional standards,” “decency,” “kindness,” “the 
Revolution,” “the Church,” “progressive,” “rigorous,” “creative.” The more parochial terms do 
most of the work.92  
 
89 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green 
and Co, 1907), p. 64. 
90 Rorty, CIS, p. 20. 
91 Rorty, ‘PKW’, pp. 150–51. 





This definition occurs a little later in CIS than Rorty’s discussion on metaphor, but juxtaposing 
these discussions makes it apparent that our ‘final vocabulary’ stands to selfhood as literalised 
metaphors stand to language: they are the hardened part of the coral reef, or the core-wood of 
James’s tree, below the live space for growth that is the cambium. Removing these hardened parts 
will cause permanent and significant transformation. Notice that our ‘final’ vocabulary is not 
something in and of itself – it, too, appears as a ‘blocking out’ on a spectrum, here of words 
arranged according to the degree to which it would alter our sense of self if they were taken from 
us. 
The making of a self is then also an ongoing, creative process of finding our language, our 
metaphors – poetic to the extent that we are able to make ourselves anew. To understand why 
Rorty imbues this process with moral significance, or at least a kind of pragmatic primacy, it helps 
to read his earlier essays on Freud. In ‘Freud and Moral Reflection’ (1986), Rorty pits Hume 
against Freud in terms of what they did for our self-image.93 While Hume mechanised the mind, he 
did not de-divinise the self. After Hume there was still a common moral consciousness at the heart 
of human nature.94 This did not change with Kant, although he ‘recognized the ad hoc and 
factitious character of [the] Cartesian attempt to keep the world safe for nonmechanism’. Instead, 
Kant 
 
developed a ...more drastic, strategy to achieve the same end. He was willing to put mind and 
matter on a par, and to follow Hume in dissolving what he called “the empirical self” into 
predictable associations of mental atoms. But he distinguished that self from the true self, the 
moral self, the part of the self that was an agent, rather than a subject of scientific inquiry.95 
 
‘This still smaller and more mysterious enclave of nonmechanism’, Rorty observes, ‘became the 
preserve of a subject called “moral philosophy”’. 96 
After Kant, the romantics wanted to place the idiosyncratic poetic imagination at the heart 
of human selfhood, but, as also described in Chapter 4, Rorty sees this as another iteration of an 
 
93 Richard Rorty, ‘Freud and Moral Reflection’, in Pragmatism’s Freud: The moral disposition of 
psychoanalysis, ed. by Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan, Psychiatry and the humanities, v. 9 
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essentialising view of human nature: it was still a ‘divinized self’.97 The divinised self stands in 
relation to an external power. On Rorty’s view, this casts us as mere players in a narrative 
presumed to be already written by nonhuman forces (God, the Absolute, Nature). This view of the 
self was not overcome until Freud helped us see ourselves as contingent products of our biology, 
experiences, and language – and just that. Freud did not simply produce one more iteration in a 
millennia-long sequence of essentialising conceptions of what a human being is. As Rorty says in 
CIS, Freud did away with the idea of a moral or essential self altogether.98 Recall from above how 
important this is to Rorty – belief in an essential human nature was the mistake that led us to 
believe we could ‘fuse’ the public and the private, have a moral philosophy, and believe in the 
intrinsically good and evil. 
In his 1986 essay, Rorty explains more clearly than in CIS how Freud also turns the 
making of a self into a relational and conversational process. Freud’s metaphors, Rorty explicates, 
make it seem like there are, within our minds, ‘quasi people with whom to struggle’.99 He 
‘populated inner space... with analogues of persons — internally coherent clusters of belief and 
desire’. 100 Freud made it conceivable that an individual brain might be able to formulate more than 
one set of beliefs – imagine more than one way of being. And, moreover, that these clusters of 
beliefs and desires can affect one another. In Rorty’s words, they form part of a ‘single unified 
causal network’.101 Each conceptualization of who we are, each ‘quasi-person’, might ‘shoulder 
aside’ our rational (central) self and say and do things it would not do, and thus cause us to change 
or adjust who we think we are. To (re)gain and preserve a stable sense of self, we must ‘wish to 
become acquainted with these unfamiliar persons, if only as a first step toward killing them off.’102 
This requires us to enter into dialogue with them.  
Rorty is not necessarily taking Freud’s metaphors literally. He examines the effects of 
Freudian language on our culture. One effect was that rather than seeing a person as made up of a 
rational self and lower ‘passions’, we started to think of our inner reflective process as a holistic 
dialogue between ‘intellectual peers’.103 Another was that the notion of a true, divine, moral self, ‘a 
common human nature that is somehow the source and locus of moral responsibility’, was no 
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longer available.104 We became, in Rorty’s words, centreless webs of beliefs and desires.105 
Elsewhere Rorty describes both texts and lumps as ‘nodes within transitory webs of relationships’, 
which also captures Rorty’s conception of minds well because it emphasises how he sees us as 
constituted by our mind-internal and external conversational, narrative relations. 106 
The moral implication is that we are responsible for creating our locus of moral 
responsibility: for imaginatively, poetically making ourselves as moral agents. Thus, it becomes 
imperative to understand our idiosyncratic self – our inner conversation. We must study the ‘raw 
material’: our current sense of self, our metaphorical history, and the worldview from which we act 
as moral agents. 107 Rorty draws a striking conclusion from this: finding out about our unconscious 
motives will thus no longer be ‘just an intriguing exercise’, but becomes ‘more like a moral 
obligation’.108 Freud’s formulation of selfhood lets one ‘see oneself as a Rube Goldberg machine 
that requires much tinkering, rather than as a substance with a precious essence to be discovered 
and cherished’.109 And our task becomes ‘to find new self-descriptions whose adoption will enable 
one to alter one’s behavior’.110 Freud thusly, Rorty observes, ‘remoralizes’ the mechanistic self.111 
This moralisation of the naturalised self is not to be understood as a resurrection of the 
moral self. It is not only that on this picture, ‘the contingencies of our upbringing’ shape our 
conscience, as Rorty puts it in CIS.112 But also, as he stresses in the earlier essay, that the very idea 
of ‘conscience’ becomes a product of human imagination, time, and place: ‘[i]t makes conscience, 
like passion, one more set of human beliefs and desires — another story about how the world is, 
another Weltanschauung. Most important, it makes it just another story — not one that (in the case 
of the passions) is automatically suspect nor one that (in the case of conscience) is automatically 
privileged’.113 Rorty echoes this in CIS when he says that Freud ‘treats rationality’ as ‘a 
mechanism which adjusts contingencies to other contingencies’. 114 For this is another way of 
articulating the idea, familiar from Chapter 2, that what we do is to create narratives that make 
‘things’ – or in Freud’s case, selves – ‘hang together’. 
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It is thus vital, lest we lapse into essentialism and representationalism, that we take this 
activity of self-creation lightly, understand it as an open-ended poetic endeavour. ‘Maturity will’, 
Rorty tells us in his essay on Freud,  
 
consist... in an ability to seek out new redescriptions of one’s own past – an ability to take a 
nominalistic, ironic view of oneself. By turning the... parts of the soul into conversational partners 
for one another, Freud did for the variety of interpretations of each person’s past what the Baconian 
approach to science and philosophy did for the variety of descriptions of the universe as a whole. 
He let us see alternative narratives and alternative vocabularies as instruments for change, rather 
than as candidates for a correct depiction of how things are in themselves’.115  
 
A change in what appears as relevant and useful to do is implied here. The search for one’s ‘true 
self’, a desire to become ‘a simpler and more transparent being’, is replaced by a desire for ‘self-
enlargement’, a desire to ‘embrace more and more possibilities, to be constantly learning, to give 
oneself over entirely to curiosity, to end by having envisaged all the possibilities of the past and of 
the future... Freud is an apostle of this aesthetic life, the life of unending curiosity, the life that 
seeks to extend its own bounds’.116 
Rorty adds that for most of us, ‘the principal technique of self-enlargement will be... the 
enrichment of language. One will see the history of both the race and oneself as the development 
of richer, fuller ways of formulating one’s desires and hopes, and thus making those desires and 
hopes themselves – and thereby oneself – richer and fuller.’ Rorty continues: 
 
I shall call such a development the “acquisition of new vocabularies of moral reflection.” By “a 
vocabulary of moral reflection” I mean a set of terms in which one compares oneself to other 
human beings. Such vocabularies contain terms like magnanimous, a true Christian, decent, 
cowardly, God-fearing, hypocritical, self-deceptive, epicene, self-destructive, cold, an antique 
Roman, a saint, a Julien Sorel, a Becky Sharpe, a red-blooded American, a shy gazelle, a 
hyena, depressive, a Bloomsbury type, a man of respect, a grande dame. Such terms are 
possible answers to the question “What is he or she like?” and thus possible answers to the 
question “What am I like?” By summing up patterns of behavior, they are tools for criticizing 
the character of others and for creating one’s own. They are the terms one uses when one tries 
to resolve moral dilemmas by asking “What sort of person would I be if I did this?”.’117 
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Here, again, the immediate connection between self-making and moral progress is made clear: 
moral progress becomes a matter of enlarging our vocabulary and enhancing our capacity for 
nuanced deliberation. On my reading of Rorty, moral deliberation becomes the activity of 
reflecting on the possibility of a self in a possible world, a character in a story.  
Freud is furthermore of integral importance to Rorty because Freud democratises what 
Nietzsche wanted to reserve for the elite – the ability to create an original self: 
 
For Freud, nobody is dull through and through, for there is no such thing as a dull unconscious. 
What makes Freud more useful and more plausible than Nietzsche is that he does not relegate the 
vast majority of humanity to the status of dying animals. [His account] shows us how to see every 
human life as a poem – or, more exactly, every human life not so racked by pain as to be unable to 
learn a language nor so immersed in toil as to have no leisure in which to generate a self-
description. He sees every such life as an attempt to clothe itself in its own metaphors.118  
 
On the Freudian picture, all minds become faculties for creating metaphors.119 Rorty does not think 
everyone succeeds in creating an original, autonomous self, but Freud helps us see that we all, 
given the chance, have the potential to do so. 
Rorty uses this to do away with the essentialising idea of poetic genius. He recognises that 
some people are more skilful with words, that some brains are wired for creating ‘iridescent 
patterns’, as he calls it when discussing Nabokov.120 However, whether poetic innovations succeed 
is also a matter of ‘luck’.121  A wide range of factors will go into whether the population at large 
will begin to literalise the metaphors at hand. Rorty thinks that ‘poetic, artistic, philosophical, 
scientific, or political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a 
public need’.122 We ‘call something “fantasy” rather than “poetry” or “philosophy”’, he notes, 
‘when it revolves around metaphors which do not catch on with other people – that is, around ways 
of speaking or acting which the rest of us cannot find a use for.’123 The difference between genius 
and eccentricity becomes a matter of degree of uptake and subsequent literalisation of an 
individual’s preferred metaphors. 
This democratisation of poetic genius is integral to the role Rorty gives to Freud in his 
narrative about the intellectual and moral progress of culture towards a literary one. Rorty sees 
Freud as having played the same kind of role as Kant did. By de-throning religion and placing 
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philosophy in its stead, Kant taught the rising generation that the disciplinary hierarchy was 
negotiable. Hence Kant unwittingly paved the way for the romantic inversion of it. Likewise, by 
helping us see the self as re-configurable, Freud helped us articulate the possibility that we might 
not have a determinate self at all. It was not Freud’s specific vocabulary that was his gift to us. It 
was that he helped us see that ever new vocabularies for talking about the self could be invented. 
This brought us one step closer to a fully poeticized culture because he, like Kant, dislodged 
something presumed fixed and showed it instead to be as human-made and re-mouldable as all our 
other ideas. 
This last observation makes Freud appear significantly more important to Rorty’s work than 
is often noted. His import to Rorty argument is then not primarily to be found in the novel 
vocabulary Freud invents, in, as Voparil puts it (referencing Richard Rumana), in his offering of ‘a 
new set of psychic metaphors for creating one’s own life story’.124 Freud did extend our 
vocabulary in this way. But the effect of it was to usher in a pivotal shift in our understanding of 
how we might view and talk about ourselves as a species, and this is the point of greater 
significance to Rorty’s narrative. Freud’s imagination, like Kant’s and the romantics’, broke – as 
Rorty might put it, a path down which collective reason could follow.  
 
Rather than genius, Rorty, as we know from the previous chapter, talks about strength. He talks 
about the ‘strong maker’: poets, textualists, critics. He also distinguishes between commonsensical 
ironists versus intellectuals. These distinctions, which can appear unclear, can be made to ‘hang 
together’ as elements of Rorty’s overarching narrative if we understand them as I described 
Rorty’s public-private distinction and his division between literalised language and metaphor: as 
blockings out on a spectrum, this time of awareness. 
‘Ironism’, Rorty explains, ‘results from awareness of the power of redescription’.125 An 
ironist is someone who has ‘radical and continuing doubts’ about her final vocabulary. She knows 
this doubt will be there, whatever vocabulary she adopts, for there is no one, right and true 
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because their realization that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, 
and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between final vocabularies, 
puts them in the position which Sartre called “meta-stable”: never quite able to take themselves 
seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to 
change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of 
their selves.127 
 
Awareness is the operative word here. Notice that the ironist’s awareness of contingency also leads 
her to become less self-assured. 
The antithesis to ironism is ‘common sense’. ‘Common sense’ is:  
 
the watchword for those who unselfconsciously describe everything important in terms of the 
final vocabulary to which they and those around them are habituated. To be commonsensical is 
to take for granted that statements formulated in that final vocabulary suffice to describe and 
judge the beliefs, actions and lives of those who employ alternative final vocabularies.128  
 
‘Unselfconsciously’ is here the operative word. This is then not common sense as Heidegger and 
Nabokov saw it, as ‘a self-deceptive apologia for thoughtlessness and vulgarity’ – although it 
might be that, too.129 Rorty appears to equate common sense with a kind of un-questioning 
conservatism of ideas, an un-awareness of contingency and its intellectual consequences, and also 
with a kind of self-assuredness he later discussed as ‘egotism’.130 When Rorty says that in his 
utopia, ironism would be ‘in the relevant sense’, universal, I take him to mean that getting by 
without recourse to foundational ideas would be something the citizens of this culture would be as 
habituated into as the greater part of the population now is to get by without recourse to religious 
doctrine.131 The metaphors of historicism and nominalism would be literalised into ordinary 
language. The people of this utopia would take it for granted that this vocabulary suffices to 
describe and to judge. They would be ‘blasé’ about their final vocabularies being contingent and 
meet doubts about their way of talking with requests for concrete alternatives for how they might 
instead talk or what they might instead do.132 
Intellectuals are those who do actively question the ways we think and talk. In the hope of 
finding better alternatives, ironist intellectuals will, moreover, deliberately expose themselves to 
new vocabularies. However, Rorty democratises the idea of ‘the intellectual’, just as he does with 
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‘genius’. Intellectuals are not inherently different from other people. What sets them apart is that 
they deal in words, the  
 
intellectual (the person who uses words or visual or musical forms for this purpose) is just... 
somebody who does with marks and noises what other people do with their spouses and 
children, their fellow workers, the tools of their trade, the cash accounts of their businesses, the 
possessions they accumulate in their homes, the music they listen to, the sports they play or 
watch, or the trees they pass on their way to work. Anything from the sound of a word through 
the color of a leaf to the feel of a piece of skin can, as Freud showed us, serve to dramatize and 
crystallize a human being’s sense of self-identity.133  
 
Notice that this does not say that all intellectuals have always been, or are, ironists, but that they 
are always engaged in redescription: ‘Redescription is a generic trait of the intellectual, not a 
specific mark of the ironist’.134  
In Rorty’s narrative, strong poets are intellectuals who also have a powerful desire to leave 
behind an imprint of their idiosyncratic self. The strong poet seeks to make a mark that will make a 
difference and, additionally, desires that this mark is recognised as theirs, that it testifies to their 
existence. Rorty moreover tells us that the strong poet is aware that their desire to leave such a 
mark is a result of their recognition of their own human limitations and frailty. Everyone has, to 
Rorty, an unconscious need to come to terms with who they are – to respond to mortality by 
making a self, and to understand themselves in a context.135 The strong poet goes beyond this 
aiming to ‘demonstrate that he is not a copy or replica’.136 
‘Strong’ here then refers to an intellectual and artistic strength by which some individuals 
overcome the ideas and language they were given. Furthermore, the strong poet has the greater 
awareness of ironism – of the power of redescription: 
 
If, with Davidson, we drop the notion of language as fitting the world, we can see the point of 
Bloom’s and Nietzsche’s claim that the strong maker, the person who uses words as they have 
never before been used, is best able to appreciate her own contingency. For she can see, more 
clearly than the continuity-seeking historian, critic, or philosopher, that her language is as 
contingent as her parents or her historical epoch. She can appreciate the force of the claim that 
“truth is a mobile army of metaphors” because, by her own sheer strength, she has broken out 
of one perspective, one metaphoric, into another.137  
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Because of her powerful ironist sensibility, she can also acknowledge her own making as a 
response to the existentialist reckoning that full acceptance of contingency can cause. The ‘strong’ 
maker, in Rorty’s rhetoric, is thus the concept that ‘blocks-out’ a portion on the very end of a 
spectrum of awareness, or appreciation, of contingency, a spectrum that runs from 
commonsensical, unquestioning acceptance of nominalism and historicism, to the fully 
contingency-cognisant, and thus as autonomous as possible, strong poet.  
This still has obvious Nietzschean overtones. Rorty tempers these by using Bloom to 
further deflate ingrained ideas about poets and poems. The importance of Bloom in this context 
does not primarily lie in giving us a fuller vision of the strong, romantic poet.138 It lies in Bloom’s 
de-divinisation of the Nietzschean strong poet. Bloom is important because he  
 
de-divinizes the poem, and thereby the poet, in the same way in which Nietzsche de-divinized 
truth and in which Freud de-divinized conscience. He does for romanticism what Freud did for 
moralism. The strategy is the same in all these cases: It is to substitute a tissue of contingent 
relations, a web which stretches backward and forward through past and future time, for a 
formed, unified, present, self- contained substance, something capable of being seen steadily 
and whole. Bloom reminds us that just as even the strongest poet is parasitic on her precursors, 
just as even she can give birth only to a small part of herself, so she is dependent on the 
kindness of all those strangers out there in the future.139  
 
‘Parasitic’ here points to the fact that while metaphors are un-familiar uses of words, this is only 
possible ‘against the background of other old words being used in old familiar ways’.140 However 
strong a poet is, she can never escape the debt of her language to the language of other people. For, 
Rorty says, languages, whatever use they are put to, ‘remain media of communication, tools for 
social interaction, ways of tying oneself up with other human beings’.141  
Bloom thus helps Rorty show that even the strongest of poets is not some mythical 
overman, but one of us, who, in part due to a stronger drive to leave behind a mark, in part due to 
intellectual maturity (degree of self-consciousness about their uses of noises and marks), in part 
due to skill and luck and how well their poetic suggestions happen to coincide with public need, 
succeeds in making their mark. Recall the problem articulated at the end of NITT and restated at 
the start of this chapter: how, Rorty asked, could we make a case for the humanist-pragmatism of 
James and Bloom over the inhumanist-pragmatism of Nietzsche and Foucault? Freud’s view of the 
self and Bloom’s pragmatic view of the poem as a product of both individual ingenuity and that of 
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others permits Rorty to keep the romanticist belief in the power of the imagination and expression 
while simultaneously conceiving the process of poetic creation as entirely prosaic and utterly 
dependent on our relations to other people. Although making an autonomous self is something to 
strive for as it drives and is driven by greater ironist awareness, which is desirable because an 
ironist attitude is more conducive to facilitating a self and a culture open to change, even the most 
autonomous self is deeply indebted to and interlinked with the self-creative projects of other 
people. We can never evade, to speak with Bloom, those traces that go from poem to poem.142 This 
recognition, and its traceability in Bloom’s own writerly practice, was what defined Bloom’s 
‘humanism’ for Rorty at the end of NITT.143 In Bloom’s theory of poetry, attention to these traces 
is what defines the literary critic – the kind of critic Rorty wishes philosophers would become. 
 
Aestheticising the Life of our Culture 
As the Freudian vocabulary grew in use and influence, Rorty observes, the broader shift that took 
place was that it became possible to ‘take the activity of redescription more lightly’ than ever 
before – we became ‘able to juggle several descriptions’, and more able to accept them as merely 
tools.144 Freud’s de-centring of not just the human self, but with it a worldview that placed the 
human moral self at its centre, galvanised a tendency into something that had the power to affect a 
discernible change in our collective mindset:  
 
It is unlikely that Freud’s metaphors could have been picked up, used, and literalized at any 
earlier period. But, conversely, it is unlikely that without Freud’s metaphors we should have 
been able to assimilate Nietzsche’s, James’s, Wittgenstein’s, or Heidegger’s as easily as we 
have, or to have read Proust with the relish we did. All the figures of this period play into each 
other’s hands. They feed each other lines. Their metaphors rejoice in one another’s 
company.145  
 
Together, the metaphors of these figures de-divinised and de-essentialised our ideas of truth, 
knowledge, language, and the self. In other words: the collective imagination and skills of a range 
of writers working at this time resulted in a broadly enveloping shift in intellectual culture towards 
an anti-essentialist, anti-metaphysical, aesthetic, poetic (intent on making) attitude. 
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 Rorty emphasises that it would be a mistake to think this development inevitable: ‘This is 
the sort of phenomenon it is tempting to describe in terms of the march of the World-Spirit toward 
clearer self-consciousness, or as the length of man’s mind gradually coming to match that of the 
universe. But any such description would betray the spirit of playfulness and irony which links the 
figures I have been describing’.146 Rorty’s words constitute another warning against inscribing 
ourselves into a quest-narrative, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. And as noted in previous 
chapters, play and playfulness are again shown to be a vital component of the Rortian attitude. The 
suggestion made is not that we at this turn stopped or should stop taking what matters to us or 
others seriously – merely that as a culture, and as individuals in this culture, we developed an 
ability to hold our descriptions of these matters more lightly, aesthetically. That is, we became 
more able to adopt a literary attitude towards all human marks and noises. 
While this development was not inevitable, Rorty nevertheless underscores that the 
emergence of liberal democracies represents progress relative to earlier non-liberal, non-
democratic societies. Continuing and improving this culture is thus an explicit aim. Because Rorty 
sees ‘intellectual progress’ as materialising through a process of literalising ‘selected metaphors’ 
the question of which metaphors to work with matters a great deal.147 The vocabulary best suited to 
sustain and develop liberal democracies, Rorty submits, is the vocabulary of ‘metaphor and self-
creation’ he has promoted when talking about individual identity-making.148 This vocabulary can 
help ‘reformulate the hopes of liberal society in a nonrationalist and nonuniversalist way’.149 
Rorty’s suggestion emerges from a practical evaluation: talking in these terms can strengthen a 
historical tendency in our (intellectual) culture, one he sees as already having contributed to 
lessening human suffering and oppression. 
Thus reformulating his hopes for the future of liberal society in these preferred metaphors, 
Rorty sketches an argument familiar from the above but transposed from the individual to the 
communal level. Not only the self, but the ‘world’ would be ‘de-divinized’.150 People, in general, 
would be able to recognise the contingency of their consciences and yet remain faithful to them.151 
The chief virtue of such a society would be the recognition of contingency as freedom: recall the 
discussion above on the recognition of contingency as enabling us to stand ‘unflinchingly’ for 
what we believe in.152 This culture would recognise that ‘rational’ argument can only occur within 
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a familiar language but that it is ‘irrational’ change, outside our familiar bounds, that drives 
progress. They would understand that new metaphors, through such poetic transgressions of the 
ordinary, materialise as causes of new beliefs.153 And they would see it as an aim in and of itself to 
foster a shared, public, conversational culture, content to see as true ‘whatever the upshot of [free 
and open encounters] turns out to be.’ 154 
As we work towards such a culture, Rorty indeed insists that what we need is not more 
secure philosophical foundations but ‘an improved self-description’.155 Our culture has built its 
self-image around identification with Enlightenment scientism, but ‘unfortunately the 
Enlightenment wove much of its political rhetoric around a picture of the scientist as a sort of 
priest, someone who achieved contact with nonhuman truth by being “logical,” “methodical,” and 
“objective.”’ While this was useful and brought progress at the time, it is not the most helpful 
image to place at the heart of our cultural identity anymore. Although ‘the sciences have 
burgeoned a thousandfold since the end of the eighteenth century, and have thereby made possible 
the realization of political goals which could never have been realized without them, they have 
nevertheless receded into the background of cultural life.’ Rorty suggests that this is largely due to 
the increasing need for specialist knowledge to follow the developments within this branch of 
culture. He proposes that this is not something to rectify, but to ‘be coped with’ through ‘switching 
attention to the areas which are at the forefront of culture, those which excite the imagination of 
the young, namely, art and Utopian politics.’156 
Thus, he suggests, we need to reimagine the democratic project of Western culture as an 
effort to bring about a ‘poeticized’ culture: ‘We need a redescription of liberalism as the hope that 
culture as a whole can be “poeticized” rather than as the Enlightenment hope that it can be 
“rationalized” or “scientized.” That is, we need to substitute the hope that chances for fulfillment 
of idiosyncratic fantasies will be equalized for the hope that everyone will replace “passion” or 
fantasy with “reason.”’ 157 Recall Rorty’s objection to the idea of human nature and his rejection of 
the possibility of ‘fusing’ the private and the public on one theoretical scheme that would allow us 
to know who we are and what to do. His description of a poeticised culture articulates the kind of 
pluralist vision which dismissing the traditional ‘human nature’ line of reasoning leads to. It results 
from his insistence that we must not attempt to subsume private idiosyncrasy under an abstract 
conception of what it means to be human. 
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Hence, in Rorty’s view, 
 
an ideally liberal polity would be one whose culture hero is Bloom’s “strong poet” rather than 
the warrior, the priest, the sage, or the truth-seeking, “logical,” “objective” scientist. Such a 
culture would... no longer be haunted by specters called “relativism” and “irrationalism.” ...it 
would drop the idea of [foundations]. It would regard the justification of liberal society simply 
as a matter of historical comparison with other attempts at social organization – those of the 
past and those envisaged by Utopians. 
To think such a justification sufficient would be to draw the consequences from 
Wittgenstein’s insistence that vocabularies – all vocabularies, even those which contain the 
words which we take most seriously, the ones most essential to our self-descriptions – are 
human creations, tools for the creation of such other human artifacts as poems, Utopian 
societies, scientific theories, and future generations.158 
 
What we should do, Rorty suggests, is to ‘build the rhetoric of liberalism around this thought’. 159 
‘A poeticized culture’, he continues, ‘would be one which would not insist we find the real wall 
behind the painted ones, the real touchstones of truth as opposed to touchstones which are merely 
cultural artifacts. It would be a culture which, precisely by appreciating that all touchstones are 
such artifacts, would take as its goal the creation of ever more various and multicolored 
artifacts’.160  
This instant in Rorty’s CIS-narrative echoes the conversion from a desire for purification 
to a drive towards aestheticisation and enlargement Rorty introduced in his discussion of Freud. It 
also suggests the moment in TPP and TWO when ‘the Seeker of Enlightenment’ becomes ‘the 
Pragmatist’ and comes to understand all descriptions as mere possible, contingent descriptions, and 
yet as possibly useful instruments for change. It resonates with Rorty’s wish for us to accept the 
contingency of all starting points in PRI. And it describes the moment of the ‘takeover’ of a 
literary culture in PTG. 
 
Rorty’s claim that we need a ‘poeticization’ of culture is thus not based on a foundational 
understanding of this as ‘good’ as such, but of it as good for a purpose. It is set out as a pragmatic 
suggestion for how it would be useful for us, as individuals and as a collective, to view ourselves 
and the task before us, given that this is to work to lessen cruelty and oppression. Rorty is standing 
‘unflinchingly’ for his own conviction: that, as we approach a broader cultural recognition and 
acceptance of the contingency of all starting points, we are best served by actively cultivating an 
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ironist, poetic attitude because the development of such a stance towards our ideas, concepts and 
institutions has led to progress in this respect, comparatively measured, and approaching the task 
of sustaining and furthering this development from such a stance is thus likely to be helpful. 
 Underscoring the parallels between what Rorty here says about the relation between our 
moral and intellectual progress and communal identity-making and what he said above about self-
making as a moral obligation can serve to bring out that acting to make a collective self-image is 
also an act that comes as close to a moral obligation it is possible to come within the Rortian 
paradigm. The naturalised, centreless, conversational self is mirrored in a contemporary culture 
that understands itself as a contingent, centreless product of human evolution and history. This 
culture has no essential identity, for it no longer believes in ‘human nature’. It is a culture in which 
no idea or doctrine retains a foundational claim to furnish our collective conscience – not God, not 
the Moral Law within. We, and our moral sense and customs, are the product of history, just as 
individual consciences are the products of their upbringing. The Freudian reconception of the self 
as minds populated by ‘quasi-persons’, ‘intellectual peers’, who conversationally shape the 
individual’s self-image, is, moreover, mirrored in Rorty’s utopian conversational culture, where 
equal peers articulate, revise and negotiate its shared self-image. And just as Freud allowed us to 
stop thinking of our selves as made up of reasons and passions, the literary culture lets us do away 
with the notion that there is any ontological difference between rational and irrational discourse.  
Open and curious collective conversation then becomes our culture’s best available means 
for forging a shared ‘source and locus of moral responsibility’, to borrow that phrase from Rorty’s 
discussion of Freud.161 Seen like this, it also becomes imperative on the collective scale to work to, 
as Rorty put it in his 1986 essay on Freud, ‘wish to become acquainted with these unfamiliar 
persons’, if only so as to become able to articulate a more stable sense of self to work from.162 For 
also on the collective level, persons might come along and ‘shoulder aside’ the dominant self-
conception. Other persons, or other collective identities, become, on this scoped-up culture-
encompassing model of self-making, part of the causal network that might lead us to think, or talk, 
or do something out of character. ‘Know thyself’ becomes an instructive dictum also on a societal 
level. 
And, conversely, if those acting out of character – different to the norm – seem persuasive, 
we might have to rethink our collective identity in order to integrate their (linguistic) behaviour 
into our sense of who ‘we’, as a moral community, are. Recall Rorty’s adoption of Sellars’ 
understanding of immoral action as ‘the sort of thing we don’t do’.163 A ‘we’ can expel or repress 
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someone acting out of character on the communal level. That would be the purification-strategy of 
those searching for a ‘true’ self. The other strategy, as Rorty explained in his discussion of Freud, 
is one of ‘self-enlargement’, which involves turning conversationally towards the ‘quasi-persons’ 
of the self, to broaden and change one’s sense of self to accommodate these, and through this 
awareness-work become a more resilient, adaptive and diversely capable whole. Likewise, a 
community, a moral ‘we’, might expand its sense of self to accommodate difference or novelty. 
Being open and curious about others becomes the source and driver of cultural self-understanding 
and what enables us to forge a useful sense of who we are – a ‘bundle’ capable of deliberation and 
action. Finding out about our communal ‘unconscious’, so to speak, having a conversation with 
our peers, stops, then, as Rorty says about the individual unconscious, being ‘just an intriguing 
exercise, and becomes more like ‘a moral obligation’.164 Here, too, ‘alternative narratives and 
alternative vocabularies’ become ‘instruments for change’.165 
As noted, Rorty said that in Freud’s view, our selves appeared as ‘Rube Goldberg 
machines’ that ‘required much tinkering’. Our task became ‘to find new self-descriptions whose 
adoption will enable one to alter one’s behavior’. As I understand him, it is the shift towards 
acknowledging the pragmatic primacy of this task that he takes to constitute the remoralisation of 
the mechanistic self.166 I want to suggest that Rorty offers a view where this process is mirrored 
and replicated on the communal level – he tells a story that ‘remoralises’ our collective self-
making. It matters to make a positive, helpful, communal sense of self, as is his primary argument 
in Achieving Our Country. 
 
Takeover 
In Rorty’s poeticised liberal utopia, literary culture has taken over. This should be seen, Rorty 
suggests in PTG, ‘as the triumph, if not exactly the aesthetic (a Kantian notion for which I have 
little use), of what I call the ‘‘literary.’’167 This idea of the ‘literary’ in Rorty’s work thus evolves a 
great deal from the moment he takes up a largely Snowian conception of it in PPTC until it in CIS 
and beyond comes to characterise the intellectual attitude and practices of the larger human culture 
he wants us to work towards. As an attitude, the ‘literary’ stance here seems to have little to do 
with specific works of literature, although it clearly has everything to do with a sensitivity to 
words, their effects, and uses, and a literary kind of ability to hold descriptions lightly, playfully 
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while still taking their making and their consequences to be of the utmost importance. It considers 
it to be morally important that we, as individuals and as communities, seek to cultivate an 
‘aesthetic life’ of ‘unending curiosity’ that ‘seeks to extend its own bounds’.168  
The deflating, de-divinising, conversational and solidaric attitude that is part of this 
Rortian version of what it means to live an aesthetic life means that although the Rortian attitude 
closely aligns with that of the modernist literary author (cf. Chapter 4), or the novelist (cf. Chapter 
3), it overlaps more significantly with that of the strong literary critic. For while the strong poet in 
the Bloomian sense is intent on autonomy, often at the cost of turning a blind eye to the lives and 
words of others, Bloom-the-critic is stronger yet. Strong due to his ability to ‘beat’ a text into a 
shape that serves his purpose, but even stronger in his capacity to trace the lines that go from poem 
to poem. The literary critic’s true strength, Rorty appears to say, lies in the humanism she must 
cultivate and display to do her job well.  
The case Rorty makes in CIS for a poeticised culture is a profoundly literary case for the 
pragmatist humanism of James and Bloom – it is a call for us to actively cultivate the attitude of 
the character Rorty invents to capture James’s and Bloom’s salient traits in this regard: the ironist 
(pragmatist) who is also a liberal (humanist). At this point, it becomes possible to formulate a 
reason why Rorty does not simply refer to his utopian culture as a pragmatist culture. His use of a 
literary vocabulary is needed to capture elements of the Rortian attitude unique to it, which could 
not be formulated in the familiar metaphors of pragmatist thought. Rorty is using this specific 
vocabulary to transgress the bounds of the familiar, for philosophers but also for pragmatists. He is 
blurring a line that has been taken to have ontological significance since Plato’s republic, and thus 
shows himself a strong poet in his own right. 
Hence, although Rorty did not set it out explicitly, this thesis amounts to a proposal to 
view Rorty’s suggestions that we see his pragmatist stance as comparable to the literary attitude as 
deliberate attempts to convey vital components of Rortian thought: those that set it apart from, and 
goes beyond, traditional pragmatism. I also want to propose that we might take up Rorty’s literary 
redescription of pragmatism – the view I am suggesting of his pragmatism as a literary attitude – 
as a useful pedagogical analogy that can help explain the Rortian attitude. The Rortian attitude is 
like the attitude we adopt towards works of literature but scaled up to encompass all of textual and 
conversational culture, the sciences and religion included: it holds all utterances to be literary, or 
poetic; to be kinds of writing. It holds them in mind as human artefacts, to be evaluated – as the 
literary critic does – for their usefulness and relevance to humans wanting to live their fullest and 
richest lives.  
 





Of course, the bearing these artefacts have might depend on their beauty, on how they are 
made. As indicated at the start, I take Rorty in CIS to not only be sketching an attitude but also a 
poetic practice. For in his open-ended liberal utopia, it is works of literature in a narrower sense 
that are considered most useful to moral progress, and their capability to affect us is key. This is 















The readings presented in the previous chapters amount to an argument for why it might be both 
apt and helpful to think of the Rortian stance as a literary attitude. I take this to apply to the larger 
pragmatist attitude he articulates in his work, rather than simply as an alternative way to talk about 
‘ironism’: as indicated in the previous chapter, ironism does not fully capture the Rortian attitude. 
Moreover, while I suggested there that Rorty deployed his literary vocabulary poetically to push 
even pragmatist thought out of its traditional bounds, I also see Rorty’s constant need to use the 
vocabulary of literature and poetry as manifesting the shortcomings of the irony-idiom. For the 
language of poetry, of poets; of literature or ‘the literary’, adds an aspect to ironism that is of 
integral importance to Rortian pragmatism: an emphasis on practice, on making, poiesis.  
In Rorty’s narrative, we make selves, and make a locus of moral responsibility from which 
to act, we make communities, and we make solidarity. In his work we are – perhaps more than 
anything – makers, of actions, and tools, of noises, conversation, poems, institutions, democracies, 
freedom, human flourishing, and futures. As outlined in the previous chapter, the Rortian 
pragmatist seeks to lead an aesthetic life, and to facilitate the aesthetic life of her community – not 
aesthetic as in beautiful, although that too, and not merely in the sense of aisthēsis, but as in open, 
curious, imaginative, creative, and, vitally, in a sense that means descriptions are held lightly, 
while their potential is nevertheless taken seriously.1 The Rortian pragmatist is, in Rorty’s own 
terms, an artist.  
Artists have practices. It is not sufficient to think like an artist or desire to be an artist to be 
an artist. To adopt an attitude is, however, sufficient to qualify as an ironist, and therein, I am 
suggesting, lies a crucial difference. The previous chapters have explored the Rortian literary 
attitude, its roots, and how it comes to bear on Rorty’s conception of a ‘literary’ or ‘poeticized’ 
culture. This chapter is about the practices Rorty recommends. It aims to show that at the heart of 
Rorty’s thoroughly de-essentialised, institutional, and functional conception of literature, lies an 
acknowledgement of how the key moral function assigned to literature is directly related to the 
literary, writerly skill of arranging words in patterns that are effective at unsettling settled selves. 
Rorty does not fully articulate the main point this chapter aims to get across. Doing so helps 
explain why he places literature in a narrower, traditional sense at the heart of his 
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postmetaphysical, poeticised liberal culture. And this bolsters my claim, which I return to as I 
conclude this thesis, that understanding Rorty’s uses of literature is vital to understanding Rorty, 
and, furthermore, that from a Rortian position, the matter of what literature does, and the question 
of how we might better support its creation, proliferation, and standing in contemporary culture, 
becomes a task of vital importance. 
Hence, in this chapter, I open by examining why Rorty asks us to keep theory private and 
think of literature as pertaining to social hope, before I examine what Rorty means by ‘literature’ 
when it is used in a wide sense, and then turn to the matter of what, to Rorty, characterises 
literature in a more narrow sense and why this is the kind of writing he places at the heart of his 
utopian culture. I find that there are important reasons – reasons that have to do with how literary 
texts are forged even while they are seen as tools – for why works of literature do important work 
for Rorty’s purposes. 
 
Keeping Theory Private 
As previously indicated, Rorty shares an anti-theoretical disposition (although he is not against 
theory in the pragmatic sense of guidelines for action) and distrust of methodology with Felski and 
ordinary language critics like Moi. However, while Rorty eschews setting out a method, he does 
not stop at indicating an attitude in which to work, for he also sketches what might be construed as 
a set of best-practice recommendations for liberal ironist intellectuals. This is one way CIS goes 
further than PMN, for in the later work he is not only concerned with the consequences of 
pragmatism for philosophical thought but wants to consider how we might have a 
postphilosophical intellectual practice. Rorty’s recommendations are, however, not set out as 
universal. They emerge from a Rortian perspective where some aims and thus some doings, for 
practical reasons, appear more useful than others. Writing universalising works of theory appears 
as meaningless (use-less). Engaging in direct, point-by-point argumentation within a language 
game you think needs to be rendered obsolete looks like an activity that counters what you are 
trying to achieve intellectually and politically. Working to find what a text ‘really’ means, or to 
articulate general criteria for truth or knowledge appear as nonsensical aims. These valuations lead 
to a set of suggestions specifically for liberal ironists. 
Furthermore, the pivotal question of how we might cultivate the humanist-pragmatist 
attitude of James and Bloom also shapes Rorty’s practice-recommendations. Hence, as detailed in 
Chapter 5, some activities and resources also begin to appear more useful relative to our shared 
effort to minimise cruelty and maximise solidarity than others. Noticeably, and perhaps 
surprisingly, Rorty sees literature rather than theory as the most useful genre for the liberal cause: 





perfection is, in an ironist liberal culture, reversed.’2 This does seem counterintuitive. But what 
perhaps seems more counterintuitive at this stage, is that Rorty upholds that theory might be useful 
for something. To understand why Rorty performs this reversal of the roles we usually assign to 
literature and theory, it is necessary to look more closely at what kind of project ironist self-
making is. 
To Rorty, self-making is a lifelong activity driven by hope: the hope of making ‘the best 
self for ourselves that we can.’3 As this is a process only constrained by our lifespan and because 
our experiences and circumstances are constantly developing and changing, we need a steady 
supply of intellectual resources, tools to ‘tinker’ with our practical self. 4 As we have seen, in 
Rorty’s narrative, all meaningful awareness requires that we endeavour to put our experiences into 
words, and all individuals ‘carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, 
their beliefs, and their lives’. This he calls our ‘final vocabulary’.5 ‘Final’ only in the sense that the 
individual at this moment in time is thrown back on simply stating it when pushed. We also know 
that ironists are those who will not unhesitatingly defend their current final vocabulary, but 
question it, and thus themselves, in the face of doubt. However, as the ironist recognises no 
authorities external to human conversation (God, Nature, the Moral Law) that might provide the 
standard against which she is to be judged, she can only seek comparative, pragmatic justification. 
Thus 
 
nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save another such vocabulary; there is no 
answer to a redescription save a re-re-redescription. Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies 
which serves as a criterion of choice between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this 
picture and on that, not of comparing both pictures with the original. Nothing can serve as a 
criticism of a person save another person, or of a culture save an alternative culture – for 
persons and cultures are, for us, incarnated vocabularies.6 
 
Rorty rephrases this to stress that ‘our doubts about our own characters or our own culture can be 
resolved or assuaged only by enlarging our acquaintance.’ 7  
However, the ironist not only worries that she has the wrong vocabulary, but that she is in 
the wrong ‘tribe’, has been ‘taught to play the wrong language game’.8 Her search for autonomy 
 
2 Rorty, CIS, p. 94. 
3 Rorty, CIS, pp. 79–80. 
4 Rorty, ‘FMR’, pp. 152–53. 
5 Rorty, CIS, p. 73. 
6 Rorty, CIS, p. 80. Recall that Rorty sees progress as a series of literalisation of metaphors. 
7 Rorty, CIS, p. 80. 





thus requires her to extend her literary critical work (understood here, then, in a sense that 
encompasses philosophical inquiries approached in a ‘literary’ spirit) beyond the language, figures, 
and books of the tribe. Ironists  
 
are afraid that they will get stuck in the vocabulary in which they were brought up if they only 
know the people in their own neighborhood, so they try to get acquainted with strange people 
(Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), strange families (the Karamazovs, the Casaubons), and strange 
communities (the Teutonic Knights, the Nuer, the mandarins of the Sung).9  
 
Rorty thus proposes that the ‘easiest way’ for the ironist intellectual to assuage doubts about our 
own character and culture, is to ‘read books’, and comparatively evaluate what they offer.10 
This activity thus has an expansive direction, a quality Rorty, as we know, associates with 
the ‘aesthetic life’.11 But apart from requiring it to be thus directed, he places no constraints on 
what kind of self private individuals can or should create, offers no guidelines for what human 
beings in pursuit of their private projects should read, or how they might talk or write.12 He cannot 
make such suggestions, because, as detailed in the previous chapter, he rejects the idea that there is 
a human nature and underscores that human needs and desires will be infinitely diverse and 
changeable. It follows that there is no one (re)description that will serve or appeal to all 
individuals. He does, however, take one activity as integral to all ironists’ private pursuits: 
becoming a better ironist. 
That this is a vital part of every ironist intellectual’s perfectionist project makes sense, as 
Rorty defines ironists by the degree to which they understand themselves as ironist, hence ironism 
is not simply a stance towards concepts or language, but towards one’s self. Ironist theory does a 
 
9 Rorty, CIS, p. 80. Rorty does not specify this, but it seems likely that he is referring to Nobel Laureate 
Henryk Sienkiewicz’s The Knights of the Cross, also published as The Teutonic Knights (org. Krzyżacy 
(1900)). – a historical novel, set in the Middle Ages and revolving around the State of the Teutonic Order 
and its eventual destruction. See NobelPrize.org, The Nobel Prize in Literature 1905 (2021) 
<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1905/sienkiewicz/biographical/> [accessed 10 April 2021] and 
Culture.pl, Henryk Sienkiewicz (2021) <https://culture.pl/en/artist/henryk-sienkiewicz> [accessed 10 April 
2021]. It seems plausible that ‘the Nuer’ as a ‘strange community’ would point to E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s 
writings on the Nuer community in Sudan: Evans-Pritchard was central to the development of social 
anthropology as a discipline and wrote several articles on this topic in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the 
book Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer (1951). As for ‘the mandarins of the Sung’, an educated guess 
can be made that it refers to Robert Elegant’s historical novels set in China during the Taiping Rebellion. 
Mandarin was published in 1983 as the third instalment of a trilogy. The timing hence fits well with Rorty 
writing the precursor lectures and essays to CIS in this period. 
10 Rorty, CIS, p. 80. 
11 Rorty, ‘FMR’, p. 154 and Chapter 5, p. 131. 





particular job in this respect: ‘ironist philosophers are private philosophers – philosophers 
concerned to intensify the irony of the nominalist and the historicist.’13 That is: these philosophers 
help ironists intellectuals become better ironist intellectuals by heightening their awareness of 
contingency and the power of redescription. 
To explain why such theorising should be thought of as a private activity, Rorty imagines 
another special case of the general ironist type: the ironist theorist.14 This figure is an ironist who 
specialises in the history of theory. Rorty equates philosophy and theory here, but uses ‘theory’ 
because it gives him the connotations of ‘taking a view of a large stretch of territory from a 
considerable distance’.15 What the ironist theorist is taking a view of, is metaphysical theory.16 
‘The past’, for the ironist theorist, ‘is the books which have suggested that there might be such a 
thing as an unironizable vocabulary, a vocabulary which could not be replaced by being 
redescribed.’17 Rorty furthermore gives the ironist theorist the ambitions of a strong poet: the need 
to demonstrate that they are not a copy.18 By ‘ironist theory’ Rorty then does not mean systems of 
thought put forth for thinking about how things are, or how things, universally, should be 
conceptualised. That would be unironic theorising. Unironic theorists will sincerely believe 
themselves engaged in the work of accurately representing how things truly are for the public and 
common good. Nor does he mean intellectual conversation about how we might talk about our 
ironism as a stance, and cope with the shift in practices this might lead to – that would be ironist 
writing. He means the kind of retrospective narrative about the history of philosophy that allows 
the ironist to undertake the ‘task’ that ‘Coleridge recommended to the great and original poet: to 
create the taste by which he will be judged.’19 It is vital to note that unironic theorising, philosophy 
with universalising ambitions, is simply side-lined in Rorty’s discussion of theory in CIS. It is not 
the subject under debate. What is at stake is whether it is possible for a self-aware and committed 
ironist to write theory, the forms such theory takes, and the purpose it might serve in his utopian 
literary culture. 
But the ironist’s ambition proves difficult to square with a proper commitment to 
contingency. The ironist theorist’s ‘perfect life’, Rorty states, ‘will be one which closes in the 
assurance that the last of his final vocabularies, at least, really was wholly his.’ 20 By achieving 
 
13 Rorty, CIS, pp. 94–95. 
14 Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 133. 
15 Rorty, CIS, p. 96. 
16 Rorty, CIS, p. 96. 
17 Rorty, CIS, p. 98  
18 Rorty, CIS, p. 43, and cf. Chapter 5, pp. 133. 
19 Rorty, CIS, p. 97. 





this, he hopes to overcome the need to theorise: ‘The goal of ironist theory is to understand the 
metaphysical urge, the urge to theorize, so well that one becomes entirely free of it. ...The last 
thing the ironist theorist wants or needs is a theory of ironism.’21 The ironist theorist wants to write 
a strong-poetic account of the history of theory in such a way that it not only frees him from his 
need to theorise, but an account that also demonstrates his own intellectual, poetic autonomy, and, 
moreover, singles him out as the last theorist History ever needed. Conceived like this it is clear 
why Rorty considers the writing of an ironist theory with such aims as a private project, meaning a 
project which has the individual’s own flourishing and validation as its main concern. The ironist 
theorist is not engaged in a project of public service, but one of personal becoming and over-
coming.  
 
That Rorty attributes a desire to pronounce on behalf of humanity to the theorist underscores why, 
on the Rortian picture, maintaining that theorising is a publicly useful activity can be seen as an 
oppressive move. To home in on this, Rorty compares Proust, on the one hand, and Nietzsche and 
Heidegger on the other, to show the inhumanism inherent in taking one’s own imaginative creation 
to signify something more than a piece of writing one has crafted. 
 Proust and Nietzsche both, Rorty notes, are considered to have achieved the kind of 
autonomy and perfection Coleridge described – they not only replaced inherited contingencies 
with their own but understood themselves as doing just this.22 They were profoundly aware of 
their self-creation as a project of making what they could of themselves before the end, rather than 
as a quest to uncover and become who they ‘truly’ were. While both thought there was ‘nothing 
more powerful or important than self-description’, they knew there were ‘only little mortal things 
to be rearranged by being described’.23 Their difference, to Rorty, lies in the way and extent to 
which they took their work to matter to the lives and conducts of other people. Whereas ‘Proust 
took metaphysics as just one more form of life’, Rorty observes, ‘it obsessed Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
was not only a nonmetaphysician, but an antimetaphysical theorist’.24 Nietzsche wrote as though 
he had a ‘social mission’, to change the world, whereas Proust wrote to change individual minds.25 
 This difference is reflected in the form they chose for expressing their thoughts (cf. the 
claims advanced in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis): in the difference between theory and novels. 
 
21 Rorty, CIS, pp. 96–97. 
22 Rorty, CIS, p. 98. Rorty states that his readings of Nietzsche and Proust here are heavily influenced by 
Nehamas. See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1987 (1985)). 
23 Rorty, CIS, p. 99. 
24 Rorty, CIS, p. 98. 





Novelists, Rorty suggests, are content to make concrete matters hang together, theorists aim for an 
overarching view. A ‘crude way of blocking out a difference between Proust and Nietzsche’, he 
says, is to note ‘that Proust became who he was by reacting against and redescribing people – real 
live people whom he had met in the flesh – whereas Nietzsche reacted against and redescribed 
people he had met in books.’26 More importantly, whereas Proust’s array of characters, ‘parents, 
servants, family friends, fellow students, duchesses, editors, lovers’, represent ‘just a collection, 
just the people whom Proust happened to bump into’, Nietzsche’s litany of characters stand for 
vocabularies that are linked in an internally related sequence – in Nietzsche this is not just a 
‘chance collection’, but a ‘dialectical progression’.27 He is not describing his life, but that of a ‘big 
person’ he names ‘Europe’.28 
This ‘invention of a larger-than-self hero, in terms of whose career they define the point of 
their own’ is, to Rorty, what makes Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger theorists, rather than 
novelists. They are ‘people who are looking at something large, rather than constructing something 
small.’ While they are ‘genuine ironists’ they are ‘not yet full-fledged nominalists’ because they 
cannot let themselves be ‘content to arrange little things’. That is ‘what sets their narratives apart 
from Remembrance of Things Past’: 
 
Proust’s novel is a network of small, interanimating contingencies. The narrator might never 
have encountered another madeleine. The newly impoverished Prince de Guermantes did not 
have to marry Madame Verdurin: He might have found some other heiress. Such contingencies 
make sense only in retrospect – and they make a different sense every time redescription 
occurs. But in the narratives of ironist theory, Plato must give way to Saint Paul, and 
Christianity to Enlightenment. A Kant must be followed by a Hegel, and a Hegel by a Marx. 
That is why ironist theory is so treacherous, so liable to self-deception. It is one reason why 
each new theorist accuses his predecessors of having been metaphysicians in disguise.29  
 
As I read Rorty in these pages, he is saying that theorists of this kind are problematic to the extent 
they fail to be novelists.  
Rorty is not saying Proust the author did not have theories about meaning or memory or 
writing – or about the importance of detail. But that he wrote as though what mattered and should 
be foregrounded, were the constituents of life. Rorty’s description moreover implies that novelist 
and novels are defined by their more thoroughgoing acceptance of historicism and nominalism. 
 
26 Rorty, CIS, p. 100. Note again Rorty’s use of ‘blocking out’. 
27 Rorty, CIS, p. 100. 
28 Rorty, CIS, p. 100. 
29 Rorty, CIS, pp. 100–01. Rorty does not say ‘small’ and mean unimportant. ‘Small’ indicates the opposite 





This thus represents yet another instance where Rorty aligns his pragmatist attitude with that of the 
novel and the novelist. 
 Another way of putting Rorty’s point, I think, is to use the line of thought developed in 
chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis and suggest that ironist theorists still see themselves as figures in a 
suprahistorical quest-narrative. Compare Rorty here adding that while ‘ironist theory must be 
narrative in form’, but the kind of relation it sets up is not one to other human beings or his own 
past, but to ‘a larger past, the past of the species, the race, the culture’. It is  
 
a relation not to a miscellaneous collection of contingent actualities but to the realm of 
possibility, a realm through which the larger-than-life hero runs his course, gradually 
exhausting possibilities as he goes. By a happy coincidence, the culture reached the end of this 
gamut of possibilities just about the time the narrator himself was born.30  
 
The ironist theorist writes as though he has succeeded in making – rather than, as the unironic 
theorist would see it, finding – the holy grail. But as he by this act becomes (in his own eyes) the 
one who overcomes theory, he is still casting himself in the role of the hero. That is, while he starts 
from an ironist outlook, he ends up writing an instance of the familiar end-of inquiry narrative, the 
kind of story that permits him to retain this self-image. 
 The novelist’s way of overcoming is, conversely, to foreground and use his fully-fledged 
recognition of contingency to his advantage. Proust’s autonomy was forged by redescribing those 
who had described him. He ‘drew sketches of them from lots of different perspectives [and] from 
lots of different positions in time - and thus made clear that none of these people occupied a 
privileged standpoint.’ He explained ‘to himself why the others were not authorities, but simply 
fellow contingencies. He redescribed them as being as much a product of others’ attitudes toward 
them as Proust himself was a product of their attitudes toward him.’ Thus:  
  
At the end of his life and his novel, by showing what time had done to these other people, 
Proust showed what he had done with the time he had. He had written a book, and thus created 
a self – the author of that book – which these people could not have predicted or even 
envisaged. He had become as much of an authority on the people whom he knew as his 
younger self had feared they might be an authority on him.31  
 
 
30 Rorty, CIS, p. 101. 





Notice once again how Rortian pragmatism aligns well with the attitude and intellectual practice 
Rorty associates with the novelist. There is the same foregrounding of the concerns of human life, 
and the same attention to language and its arrangement, the same understanding of idiosyncratic 
detail, of the relation between vocabulary, narrative and (autonomous) selfhood. 
Rorty’s account of Proust furthermore echoes the moment chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis 
revolve around, and which also, importantly, was the moment of acceptance of contingency and 
finitude that permitted the liberal ironist full, ‘unflinching’ autonomy in the previous chapter. For 
Proust’s ‘feat enabled him to relinquish the very idea of authority, and with it the idea that there is 
a privileged perspective from which he, or anyone else, is to be described.32 Proust was able to 
become autonomous, Rorty suggests,  
 
without claiming to know a truth which was hidden from the authority figures of his earlier 
years. He managed to debunk authority without setting himself up as authority... He mastered 
contingency by recognizing it, and thus freed himself from the fear that the contingencies he 
had encountered were more than just contingencies. He turned other people from his judges 
into his fellow sufferers, and thus succeeded in creating the taste by which he judged himself.33  
 
The lesson Rorty draws from all this is the pragmatic conclusion that ‘novels are a safer medium 
than theory for expressing one's recognition of... relativity and contingency’, for  
 
novels are usually about people – things which are, unlike general ideas and final vocabularies, 
quite evidently time-bound, embedded in a web of contingencies. Since the characters in 
novels age and die – since they obviously share the finitude of the books in which they occur – 
we are not tempted to think that by adopting an attitude toward them we have adopted an 
attitude toward every possible sort of person.34  
 
He notes that ‘[t]here are, of course, novels like Thomas Mann's Doktor Faustus in which the 
characters are simply dressed-up generalities. The novel form cannot by itself insure a perception 
of contingency. It only makes it a bit harder to avoid this perception.’35   
Even ironist theory, however, attempts to evade contingency. Hence, we should make a 
point of seeing ironist theory as merely one more tradition of modern Europe, ‘comparable to the 
modern novel in the greatness of the achievements which exemplify it, though far less relevant to 
 
32 Rorty, CIS, pp. 102–03. 
33 Rorty, CIS, p. 103. 
34 Rorty, CIS, p. 107. 





politics, social hope, or human solidarity.’36 It is crucial to appreciate that Rorty does not think 
there is something to theory in and of itself that makes it an inherently private matter. Theory is 
simply seen as possibly pragmatically useful for heightening the ironist’s ironist awareness, but 
likely to stand in the way of finding useful shared ways to talk about human suffering and how we 
might go about lessening human cruelty. Rorty is tasking us with keeping theory private – asking 
us to stop short of taking theoretical schemes of this kind to have importance for the governance 
and progress of the liberal moral project. ‘The best one can do with the sort of challenges offered 
by Nietzsche and Heidegger’, Rorty suggests, is to 
 
 
ask these men to privatize their projects, their attempts at sublimity – to view them as irrelevant 
to politics and therefore compatible with the sense of human solidarity which the development 
of democratic institutions has facilitated. This request for privatization amounts to the request 
that they resolve an impending dilemma by subordinating sublimity to the desire to avoid 
cruelty and pain.37  
 
Rorty hence does not want us to set aside these theorists altogether. But he asks us to refrain from 
seeing their work as anything more than resources that might help us heighten our ironist 
awareness and understand the history and power of redescription.38  
  
Literature for the Liberal Cause 
This call to keep our theorising drives under control opens a wider public space for other forms of 
expression, other pursuits, and descriptions. Recall from Chapter 5 that Rorty defined the liberal 
ironist as an ironist who was also a liberal. Ironists, Rorty tells us, think ‘that the only 
redescriptions which serve liberal purposes are those which answer the question “What 
humiliates?”’.39 I take Rorty to mean that ironists are liberal ironists to the extent they consider 
coming to understand this as central to their purpose. In my view, Rorty does not ask us to leave 
our ironism behind when we work for the liberal cause, but the emphasis of the ironist’s practice, 
 
36 Rorty, CIS, p. 119. 
37 Rorty, CIS, p. 197. 
38 Not necessarily individually – we might also be part of a community of interpreters. Thinking of theory as 
a private matter is to think of it as an activity on the side of the spectrum of activities that are less directly 
useful to the shared liberal project of lessening cruelty. Heightening individuals’ awareness of the power of 
redescription is, nevertheless, useful to the holistic approach towards sustaining and facilitating a liberal 
postmetaphysical literary culture that Rorty sketches: cf. Chapter 5. 





including her choice of vocabulary, will, for pragmatic reasons, change in response to a shift in 
aims.40 Her striving for personal flourishing falls out of focus – and her attention turns to the 
flourishing of the community and all its individual members.41 She sees herself as participating in 
a shared effort to create our communal moral source and locus, and what is at stake in that moment 
is working out who ‘we’, as a Sellersian moral community, are. 
Rorty, we know, holds that making a better society depends on expanding this sense of 
who ‘we’ are, and suggests that doing so depends on us engaging in a ‘creative’ and ‘imaginative’ 
effort to come to see ‘other human beings as “one of us” rather than as “them”’ – a stance-shift 
most efficiently brought about by a ‘detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of 
redescription of what we ourselves are like.’42 This sense of solidarity is ‘created by increasing our 
sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of 
people’.43 Hence, whereas ironists see it as integral to the solidification of their private selves to 
heighten their ironist sensibilities, the liberal community expands and solidifies its understanding 
of itself through working to increase its awareness of suffering. 
This is ‘a task not for theory, but  
 
for genres such as ethnography, the journalist’s report, the comic book, the docudrama, and, 
especially, the novel. Fiction like that of Dickens, Olive Schreiner, or Richard Wright gives us 
the details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to whom we had previously not 
attended. Fiction like that of Choderlos de Laclos, Henry James, or Nabokov gives us the 
details about what sorts of cruelty we ourselves are capable of, and thereby lets us redescribe 
ourselves.44 
 
‘This is why’, he adds, ‘the novel, the movie, and the TV program have, gradually but steadily, 
replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral change and progress’.45  
Rorty does not unpack this observation. There are, however, resources in his work to say 
something further than that literature provides detailed content. Given the analysis Chapter 5 
presented, I hold the operative part of the passage above to be Rorty’s description of a dynamic 
two-way activity: we read (or expose ourselves to other kinds of detailed accounts of other 
people’s lives), and we allow it to change our self-image, actively work to find out how it might. 
 
40 See Chapter 5, p. 112. 
41 Cf. Rorty, CIS, p. 59. 
42 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 
43 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 
44 Rorty, CIS, p. xvi. 





Rorty, I want to suggest, places literature in a narrower sense at the heart of his literary culture, 
because the literary tradition contains, concentrates, and makes space for texts that are skilfully 
crafted to achieve this kind of effect – to unsettle us, to make it new. To articulate why requires 
starting with Rorty’s levelling of all textual hierarchies.  
 
Whatever the Literary Critics Criticise 
Metaphysicians, Rorty suggests in CIS, ‘see libraries as divided according to disciplines, 
corresponding to different objects of knowledge’ – they  
 
want to start by getting straight about which of these people were poets, which philosophers, 
and which scientists. They think it essential to get the genres right – to order texts by reference 
to a previously determined grid, a grid which, whatever else it does, will at least make a clear 
distinction between knowledge claims and other claims upon our attention. 46  
 
Ironists, however, see libraries as divided ‘according to traditions, each member of which partially 
adopts and partially modifies the vocabulary of the writers whom he has read. Ironists take the 
writings of all the people with poetic gifts, all the original minds who had a talent for 
redescription... as grist to be put through the same dialectical mill.’47  
 The metaphysician’s scheme, Rorty submits, arose in response to the Kantian ‘traditional 
picture of the self as divided into the cognitive quest for true belief, the moral quest for right 
action, and the aesthetic quest for beauty (or for the “adequate expression of feeling”)’.48 However, 
thinking in these terms not only led us to want to separate books that contain knowledge from 
those that do not, but to an oversimplified ‘view of the relation between literature and morality – 
both social morality and individual morality’. For this stance takes literature to be a matter of 
adequacy of the expressions of feeling and literary criticism as a matter of judgment of taste, and 
such views ‘simply do not do justice to the role which novels, in particular, have come to play in 
the reform of social institutions, in the moral education of the young, and in forming the self-image 
 
46 Rorty, CIS, pp. 75–76. 
47 Rorty, CIS, pp. 75–76. On this view of everything as a resource for making further remarks, see also 
Rorty, ‘Philosophy without Principles’, p. 463. Cf. Rorty, ‘PKW’, p. 159.  
Note that these important statements on Rorty’s philosophical program were published in prominent literary 
journals (Critical Inquiry and New Literary History). 
48 Rorty, CIS, p. 142. Rorty again uses the idea of a quest to sweepingly state the narrative his opponents 





of the intellectual.’ 49 If we instead ‘abandon this traditional picture’ we would ‘stop asking 
questions like “Does this book aim at truth or at beauty? At promoting right conduct or at 
pleasure?” and instead ask, “What purposes does this book serve?”.50 In Rorty’s library, all 
‘books’, all texts, are in principle equal. Any distinctions are to be drawn along functional lines. 
In a 1982 essay Rorty puts it as follows: ‘[w]hen the notion of knowledge as representation 
goes, then the notion of inquiry as split into discrete sectors with discrete subject matters goes. The 
lines between novels, newspaper articles, and sociological research get blurred. The lines between 
subject-matters are drawn by reference to current practical concerns, rather than putative 
ontological status.’51 Here the lines between disciplines are recast as a matter of culture, as genres, 
or in terms of solidarity. Science is where we have clear rules for success, for when an inquiry 
terminates, and for how to talk as we negotiate such epistemological equilibria as our discipline 
aims for.52 This is a matter of ‘solidarity’ because the stronger the intersubjective agreement on 
vocabulary, methods and results the ‘harder’ we take the discipline and its results to be. In ‘Texts 
and Lumps’ Rorty notes that:  
 
[The pragmatist] thinks, with Stanley Fish, that “all facts are institutional, are facts only by 
virtue of the prior institution of some such [socially conceived dimensions of assessment].” 
The only way to get a noninstitutional fact would be to find a language for describing an object 
which was as little ours, and as much the object's own, as the object's causal powers. If one 
gives up that fantasy, no object will appear softer than any other. Rather, some institutions will 
appear more internally diverse, more complicated, more quarrelsome about ultimate desiderata 
than others.53  
 
Literary studies, on Rorty’s view, is just the most querulous (critical in one sense of the term) of 
academic disciplines. The rules are less well-defined, and it is more open to change. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Rorty took Hegel’s historicism and irony to have paved the way 
for this kind of reconceptualization of culture as divided into genres.54 In CIS he restates this: 
‘what Hegel actually did, by founding an ironist tradition within philosophy, was help de-
 
49 Rorty, CIS, 142n2. 
50 Rorty, CIS, p. 142. 
51 Richard Rorty, ‘Method, Social Science, and Social Hope’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 11.4 (1981), 
569–88 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231218> (p. 582). 
52 See for instance Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’; Rorty, ‘Solidarity or Objectivity?’; Rorty, ‘Science as 
solidarity’. 
53 Rorty, ‘Texts and Lumps’, p. 7. 
54 See for instance: Rorty, ‘NITT’, pp. 162–63 and p. 164, Rorty, ‘PTG’, p. 9, Rorty, ‘IA’, pp. 22–23, Rorty, 
‘PKW’, p. 142, Rorty, ‘The World Well Lost’, pp. 649–50, Rorty, ‘Heidegger and Dewey’, pp. 294–95, 





cognitivize, de-metaphysize philosophy. He helped turn it into a literary genre.’55 We have also 
already seen that Rorty takes Hegel’s historicism to enable the rise of a new genre: literary 
criticism. The key, I think, to forming a coherent and cohesive view of how Rorty thinks about 
‘genres’ like literary criticism and philosophy and religion, is to realise that these genres qua kinds 
of writing, are the generative products of a foregoing sequence of texts, of exemplars (figures), 
vocabularies, styles, modes of approach. Genres are not essentially something in and of 
themselves. They are here seen as the linguistic-behavioural product of, as Rorty said about his 
own aim in CIS, redescriptions that create a ‘pattern of linguistic behavior’ that tempts ‘the rising 
generation to adopt it’.56 
 Moreover, each sequence of texts or exemplars that generates a distinctive kind of writing 
is as contingent as the next. Rorty – unhelpfully, I would suggest – uses the word ‘canon’ 
repeatedly to denote such a sequence. Unhelpfully, because this word carries connotations that 
then need to be actively suppressed, for ‘canon’ is here not to be understood as a collection of 
works of the highest literary quality (for there is no such thing as literary quality in and of itself in 
Rorty). Nor does, say, the analytic canon contain those books that cast the brightest of lights on 
what knowledge or reason is. It must be understood much more loosely. In ‘The Inspirational 
Value of Great Works of Literature’ (hereafter ‘IV’) Rorty describes ‘canons’ as collections of 
recommendations for where the young might find hope and inspiration.57 Canons, he also says, are 
‘temporary’, consisting of replaceable ‘touchstones’.58 Canonical status is ‘as changeable as the 
historical and personal situations of readers.’59 In Chapter 4 I showed why ‘touchstones’ in Rorty 
should be understood as reminders that help us clarify our vocabulary, coordinate our uses of 
words. Thus when Rorty here invokes the word ‘canon’ it is best read as ‘a temporary list of 
replaceable touchstones that might be useful in this context, for the particular conversation we are 
engaged in’. 
 Genres, Rorty says in ‘Texts and Lumps’, represent a way to use language that is 
developed over time and self-consciously in reference to a set of such touchstones (a canon): ‘Each 
new language creates or modifies a genre – that is, a sequence of texts, the later members of which 
take earlier members into account.’60 Thus Rorty can say things like: ‘Philosophy is best seen as a 
kind of writing. It is delimited, as is any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition – a 
 
55 Rorty, CIS, p. 79. 
56 Rorty, CIS, p. 9. He, as discussed, associated this approach with literature. Rorty, ‘NITT’, p. 157, and 
Chapter 5, pp. 109-110. 
57 Rorty, ‘The Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature’, pp. 136–37. 
58 Rorty, ‘IV’, p. 136. 
59 Rorty, ‘IV’, pp. 136–37. 





family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother 
Derrida.’61 Or, elsewhere, speaking about Heidegger: ‘It is not Athens, Rome, Renaissance 
Florence, the Paris of the Revolution, and the Germany of Hitler which form the history of Being. 
Nor is it Sophocles, Horace, Dante, Goethe, Proust, and Nabokov. It is the sequence from Plato to 
Nietzsche.’62 What makes Heidegger a philosopher is that he places himself in that particular 
sequence of figures – models his self-image on a set of exemplars – and adopts and modifies a set 
of related aims and ways of speaking.   
 In ‘Texts and Lumps’ Rorty also adds to the above that thinking in these terms helps us 
reclassify culture in terms of various experimental practices designed to ‘see if we can get what we 
want at a certain historical moment by using a certain language’. 63 Rorty thus takes genres to 
denote ways of using language, but also to refer to specific rhetorical styles, modes of expression, 
emerging as one writer self-consciously places herself in relation to writers gone before; as the 
next figure in a series of exemplars.64 And this way of using language is then also intimately 
related to one’s philosophical attitude, seen as one’s attitude towards exemplars/vocabularies – 
towards the progression one aims to extend. Thus, Rorty can say things such as ‘English poetry is 
not verse written in English, but what one writes after reading Milton, Wordsworth, Shelley, Yeats’, 
and ‘philosophy of the non-Kantian sort is not a certain “approach to the problems of philosophy,” but 
what one writes after reading Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud’.65 
Rorty also makes it clear that he sees one’s selection of expressive form as intimately 
connected to one’s view of language: to whether it is seen as a transparent medium for conveying 
objective truth about a matter, or as a material part of communicating our subjective experience 
and estimation of the same. This is for instance explicitly set out in ‘Philosophy as a Kind of 
Writing’, where Rorty says that Kantian philosophy on Derrida’s view can be seen as ‘a kind of 
writing which would like not to be a kind of writing’: 
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then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the 
goods which constitute that tradition.’ MacIntyre, p. 222. An extended comparison between Rorty and 
Macintyre on this topic is something I will have to return to on a future occasion, but I take the pivotal 
difference to lie in the extent to which they have a view of ‘tradition’ as an utterly contingent construction. 
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clarify Rorty’s more thoroughgoingly de-essentialised conception of tradition would be helpful.  





It is a genre which would like to be a gesture, a clap of thunder, an epiphany. That is where 
God and man, thought and its object, words and the world meet, we want speechlessly to say; 
let no further words come between the happy pair. Kantian philosophers would like not to 
write, but just to show. They would like the words they use to be so simple as to be 
presuppositionless.66 
 
The analytic tradition, its style, argumentative form, word choices, its entire mode of expression, 
reflects a desire for language to become transparent, or a mirror.  
 Because Rorty wants to do away with the view of language as a medium he takes the 
opposite approach, and understands form and content, attitude and style, as inseparable.67 He pays 
careful attention to textual materiality, to rhetoric – to uses of words, our writerly practice. In this 
way, too, he is literary rather than philosophical. The clear connection Rorty sets up between 
attitude and literary style makes Martha C. Nussbaum a natural point of reference on this topic. 
But while Nussbaum and Rorty overlap to a significant extent, particularly with regards to their 
insistence on the value of literature for moral discernment and development, there are also 
significant differences.  
 ‘Style itself’, Nussbaum holds, ‘makes its claims, expresses its own sense of what 
matters’. ‘Literary form’, she adds, ‘is not separable from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of 
content’. This Rorty would agree with. But Nussbaum adds that it is an integral part of ‘the search for 
and the statement of truth.’ She suggests that there are some truths, or aspects of the human experience, 
that can only be properly and adequately articulated in the language, or narrative modes, of literature.68 
The difference is of course that Nussbaum posits that there are such things as truths. Nussbaum still 
retains a representationalist view of language – and of style.69 She is on a quest for finding properly 
representative language. In Rorty there is certainly continuity, in the form of a dynamic relation, 
between who we see ourselves as, what we pay attention to, what we care about, what we believe 
to be important to find ways to say, and what we do say and do. However, in Rorty, there is no 
right nor final way to do this. Our uses of language, our style, are always experiments in using and 
modifying the language we know. 70 There is no particular way to talk that will uncover Truth. 
 
66 Rorty, ‘PKW’, p. 156. 
67 This was of course also a core component of my argument in Chapter 3. 
68 Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's knowledge: essays on philosophy and literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 3–4. 
69 See also Rorty, ‘Redemption from Egotism’, p. 400 and Schulenberg, 142, 165. See also Tracy Llanera, 
‘Morality by Words: Murdoch, Nussbaum, Rorty’, Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture, 18.1 (2014), 1–17 
<https://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/index.php/budhi/article/view/BU2014.18101> [accessed 18.02.19]. I hope to 
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Rather, particular ways of talking or writing reveal an element of who we perceive our self to be, 
what we (individually or collectively), in Rorty’s phrase, hold to be ‘possible and important’.  
 In keeping with this, literary criticism is also conceived as a genre that relates to and 
extends a tradition, and which has developed a certain mode of rhetorical conduct. Describing this 
genre Rorty once again aligns his own attitude with that of the literary critic. Whereas the analytic 
philosopher wishes argument to be reducible to logical moves and for language to be transparent, 
the ‘ironist's preferred form of argument’, on the other hand, is ‘dialectical in the sense that she 
takes the unit of persuasion to be a vocabulary rather than a proposition. Her method is 
redescription rather than inference. Ironists specialize in redescribing ranges of objects or events in 
partially neologistic jargon, in the hope of inciting people to adopt and extend that jargon.71 I have 
noted several times how Rorty defines this approach as ‘literary’.72  And Rorty also here continues 
by suggesting that Hegel’s dialectic method can be viewed as an ‘attempt to play off vocabularies 
against one another, rather than merely to infer propositions from one another’: Iin Rorty’s view 
‘Hegel's... method is not an argumentative procedure or a way of unifying subject and object, but 
simply a literary skill’. It is a skill at ‘producing surprising gestalt switches by making smooth, 
rapid transitions from one terminology to another. ...In practice, though not in theory, [Hegel] 
dropped the idea of getting at the truth in favor of the idea of making things new’.73  
 By doing this Hegel ‘broke away from the Plato-Kant sequence and began a tradition of 
ironist philosophy which is continued in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. These are the 
philosophers who define their achievement by their relation to their predecessors rather than by 
their relation to the truth.’74 That is, Hegel founded a new genre: a breakaway sequence, that 
generated a new way of writing. ‘A more up-to-date word for what I have been calling “dialectic”’, 
Rorty adds, ‘would be “literary criticism.”75  
Literary criticism, as Rorty conceives it, is an amalgamated genre, a mode of rhetorical 
conduct that traces its roots to Hegel. A genre which, as Rorty put it in PPTC (which I discussed in 
Chapter 4), is ‘neither the evaluation of the relative merits of literary productions, nor intellectual 
history, nor moral philosophy, nor epistemology, nor social prophecy, but all these things mingled 
together into a new genre.’76 In CIS Rorty adds that comparison,  
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playing off of figures against each other, is the principal activity now covered by the term 
“literary criticism.” Influential critics... are not in the business of explaining the real meaning 
of books, nor of evaluating something called their “literary merit.” Rather, they spend their 
time placing books in the context of other books, figures in the context of other figures. This 
placing is done in the same way as we place a new friend or enemy in the context of old friends 
and enemies. In the course of doing so, we revise our opinions of both the old and the new. 
Simultaneously, we revise our own moral identity by revising our own final vocabulary. 
Literary criticism does for ironists what the search for universal moral principles is supposed to 
do for metaphysicians.77  
 
While ‘literary criticism’ originally meant ‘comparison and evaluation of plays, poems, and 
novels’, it got extended ‘to cover past criticism (for example, Dryden's, Shelley's, Arnold's, and 
Eliot's prose, as well as their verse)’, and ‘to the books which had supplied past critics with their 
critical vocabulary and were supplying present critics with theirs.’ The end result was that the 
sequence, the tradition, that generates literary critical writing, had to be extended to include 
‘theology, philosophy, social theory, reformist political programs, and revolutionary manifestos. In 
short, it meant extending it to every book likely to provide candidates for a person’s final 
vocabulary.’78  
 Rorty observes that it is for mere accidental reasons that we have stuck with the name 
‘literary criticism’: instead of changing the name we have ‘stretched the word “literature” to cover 
whatever the literary critics criticize.’ A ‘literary critic in what T. J. Clarke has called the 
“Trotskyite-Eliotic” culture of New York in the '30s and '40s was expected to have read The 
Revolution Betrayed and The Interpretation of Dreams, as well as The Wasteland (sic), Man's 
Hope, and An American Tragedy’. In our ‘Orwellian-Bloomian culture’ she is ‘expected to have 
read The Gulag Archipelago, Philosophical Investigations, and The Order of Things as well as 
Lolita and The Book of Laughter and Forgetting.’ The word ‘literature’, Rorty concludes, ‘now 
covers just about every sort of book which might conceivably have moral relevance – might 
conceivably alter one's sense of what is possible and important.’79 
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The application of this term has nothing to do with the presence of “literary qualities” in a 
book. Rather than detecting and expounding such qualities, the critic is now expected to 
facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon of moral exemplars and 
advisers, and suggesting ways in which the tensions within this canon may be eased – or, 
where necessary, sharpened.80 
 
‘Literature’ on this view, is just the resources people we call literary critics currently make use of 
in their intellectual practice. Literary critics function as moral advisers, because they can guide us 
in our encounters with morally relevant books. But only, Rorty adds, because they ‘have an 
exceptionally large range of acquaintance. They are moral advisers not because they have special 
access to moral truth but because they have been around. They have read more books and are thus 
in a better position not to get trapped in the vocabulary of any single book.’ 81 To Rorty, literary 
critics assemble their reminders for the purpose of helping us work out our attitudes to writers, 
books, vocabularies, and thus towards our own self-image. They help us change our selves.  
 
Required Skills 
This does, however, seem to me to have everything to do with both literary quality and literary 
skill – with how literature in a much narrower and more traditional sense is forged. Rorty fails, I 
think, to properly set out how his two meanings of the word ‘literature’ are interlinked. There is 
the broad idea where it means ‘whatever the literary critics criticize’, a text- and genre-
encompassing meaning where ‘literature’ refers to ‘every sort of book which might conceivably 
have moral relevance – might conceivably alter one's sense of what is possible and important.’82 
And there is ‘literature’ in the sense of the books the liberal ironist thinks public intellectual 
culture centres around, ‘in the older and narrower sense of that term – plays, poems, and, 
especially, novels’.83 Rorty’s view of literature is, as Leypoldt affirms, ‘thoroughly 
contextualist’.84 His idea of literature is fully contingently and functionally reconceived.85 Yet, it 
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appears to me that Rorty nevertheless uses the word ‘literature’ to point to texts where not only a 
certain attitude, but a certain skill is on display – a skill for arranging words in ways that are more 
likely to persuade us to change our selves. To substantiate my case, I must return to how Rorty 
defined literature in opposition to theory. 
As is clear from his definition of literary criticism above, Rorty does not exclude texts we 
would typically talk about as philosophical from the public realm. He does think that a set of 
interrelated ambitions emanating from philosophers starting to see themselves as placed to speak 
on behalf of humanity, as ‘rational’ human beings able to raise their voices above the noise of 
passions, should be exposed as misguided and sometimes dangerous. But philosophy working ‘in 
the service of democratic politics’, is useful as ‘...one of the techniques for reweaving our 
vocabulary of moral deliberation in order to accommodate new beliefs (e.g., that women and 
blacks are capable of more than white males had thought, that property is not sacred, that sexual 
matters are of merely private concern).’86 However, Rorty also insisted above that theory cannot 
fulfil this kind of public role. But ‘theory’ in this line of thought stands for a very specific kind of 
writing emerging from writers who hold on to the kind of ambitions Rorty wants us to leave 
behind.  
Theory aims to take ‘a view of a large stretch of territory from a considerable distance’. 
Theorists, Rorty holds, specialize in ‘standing back from’.87 Rorty uses the word ‘literature’ to 
indicate a kind of writing that stands in opposition to this ambition and approach. Literature moves 
in close. In his discussion of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Proust, literature is about the small rather 
than the large, the concrete rather than the abstract. As a pragmatist, Rorty also wants to move 
away from Theory and abstract ideas and foreground the concerns and details of human life and 
happiness. Rorty’s preference for literature thus relates to his larger philosophical project in subtle 
ways, all of which cannot be explicated here. However, I want to make three observations to 
situate Rorty’s literary-like attention to detail: it is in keeping with the approach of pragmatist 
philosophy, it relates to Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism, and to the conviction that a liberal society 
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must be woven from strands and pieces of who we already are. There is pragmatic value in looking 
closely. 
The pragmatist tradition – the series and genre Rorty seeks to extend and amend – consist 
of figures and works that urge us to think in concrete terms rather than abstract ideas; to be 
pluralistic, perspectival, and to use what works for us as human beings wanting a good life, rather 
than maintain what sustains a specific Theory. Dewey, Rorty notes, wanted to fill the gap opening 
as pragmatism left the metaphysical tradition behind with ‘...concrete attention to beings – to the 
strip-mines, for example.’88 This is of vital importance to Rorty, as for instance his blunt criticism 
of Heidegger shows. Rorty read Heidegger as espousing a variant of pragmatist thought and 
admired his work. Nevertheless, Rorty charges Heidegger with working from a similar 
inhumanism to the one he apprehends in Nietzsche and Foucault: Heidegger held a metaphysics of  
human experience more dearly than actual human beings. ‘Heidegger's hope [of recapturing 
Thought] is just what was worst in the tradition’, Rorty asserts, ‘the quest for the holy which turns 
us away from the relations between beings and beings (the relations, for example, between the 
ghastly apparatus of modern technology and the people whose children will die of hunger unless 
that apparatus spreads over the rest of the planet).’89 The humanist pragmatist tradition Rorty 
wants to insert himself in, attends, in Dewey’s words, to ‘the problems of men’ – it turns, Rorty 
says, towards ‘the ordinary world’90  
While Rorty advocates this as a general characteristic of pragmatist thought, he pays a very 
particular kind of attention not just to material and pragmatic concerns, but to the fact that details 
matter, scale matters, to the construction of democratic cultures, and, also, to the articulation of the 
small; the need to account for it. He considers not just the details of human lives, but the details of 
how we speak and write this culture into existence.91 Coming to see the specific ways in which 
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someone else is suffering or living their lives, to work out who we are and how we are to live ours 
– this small, piecemeal, and constant task of negotiating how we are to feel and talk about 
ourselves and each other – is, in Rorty, a pivotal task for making and sustaining a liberal society. 
‘Solidarity’, he holds, ‘has to be constructed out of little pieces, rather than found already waiting, 
in the form of an ur-language which all of us recognize when we hear it.’92 And moreover, such a 
piecemeal approach must be what we build our efforts around: the liberal ironist, Rorty tells us, 
thinks ‘that recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond that is 
needed.’93 Bond-forming recognition requires detailed descriptions. Thus, social cohesion depends 
on the proliferation of narratives that provide such particulars, that attends to them. 
It is vital to see that Rorty is not making metaphysical claims that pertain to either what 
literature essentially is, what a just or good society is, and so on. What matters is increasing the 
likelihood that our society will move in a direction of lesser and lesser cruelty. ‘The liberal 
metaphysician’, Rorty explains, wants ‘our wish to be kind to be bolstered by an argument, one 
which entails a self-redescription which will highlight a common human essence, an essence 
which is something more than our shared ability to suffer humiliation’. 94 The liberal ironist, 
rejecting the notion of a human essence, ‘just wants our chances of being kind, of avoiding the 
humiliation of others, to be expanded by redescription’.95 
Rorty’s desire for us to reject theory and embrace narrative is thus related to this kind of 
bottom-up, piecemeal approach. Furthermore, his poeticised liberalism requires us to develop the 
kind of literary skill here specifically associated with the novelist: being content to arrange small 
things in helpful ways. Rorty’s up-to-date Hegelian ‘dialectics’, his insistence, with Sellars, that 
what we do is to make ‘things’ ‘hang together’, requires a competence Rorty explicitly defined as 
a literary (critical) skill.96 And this skill depends on cultivating our perception of details, and an 
ability to self-consciously (strongly) – with ironist, poetic awareness – place them in interpretive 
grids. It foregrounds a willingness to, and capability of, connecting our own humanity to that of 
others, like the critic seeks and traces lines from poem to poem. And it judges comparatively, on 
the basis of what is effectuated by our noises and marks as they work in human experience. 
Developing such skills is not to be done for the sake of it, that is, not to aestheticise life or 
our relations to others in Rorty’s unfavoured essentialising sense of the word. We should cultivate 
these skills to come to know what to do. The ironist, Rorty says, thinks we should centre our 
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liberal, public intellectual culture around ‘literature (in the older and narrower sense of that term – 
plays, poems, and, especially, novels)’ because she seeks ‘a certain kind of know-how’. She sees her 
task as increasing her ‘our skill at recognizing and describing the different sorts of little things around 
which individuals or communities center their fantasies and their lives.’ She is equally interested in 
coming to know what it entails to centre one’s life around the vocabulary of metaphysics or religion or 
liberalism. She takes these sets of ‘words’ as ‘just another text, just another set of little human things’. 
Her liberalism ‘does not consist in her devotion to... particular words but in her ability to grasp the 
function of many different sets of words.’97 Rorty later associates this kind of skill and know-how with 
‘sensitivity’ towards others, which he contrasts with egotism, knowing, and being faithful to principles. 
The person who ‘hopes for greater sensitivity just wants to develop the know-how that will let him 
make the best of what is always likely to be a pretty bad job – a situation in which people are likely to 
get hurt, no matter what decision is taken.’98  
The attitude Rorty here describes the ironist adopting, is what I have been calling a literary 
attitude: an attitude that looks at all texts as one amongst many, one way amongst many to use 
words. The ironist will gravitate towards the literary canon as a sequence of touchstones and a kind 
of writing, because she is here more likely to find texts, thinking, where human concerns are 
foregrounded, where other human beings have experimented with what it means to modulate 
attention and writing in response to human experience rather than to ideas. Building and making in 
this piecemeal, parts-to-whole way, and cultivating this kind of sensitivity and this kind of 
responsiveness, is also tied to the fostering of freedom: to Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism, an aspect 
that characterised his post-CIS writings. Paying mindful attention to details rather than subsuming 
details under an overarching abstract theory, is less likely to be oppressive. This was an important 
element of Rorty’s endorsement of the novelistic attitude of Kundera.99  
However, while this provides a general overview of reasons for cultivating a literary 
attitude using literary works, it fails to fully explain ‘why literature in the narrower sense?’. Why 
these specific kinds of text? What is about them – for it cannot be all in the details – that make 
them so central to moral progress? The key to resolving this lies in noticing how Rorty portrays 
the small, incrementally-transformational moments on the individual level, that add up to society’s 
moral and intellectual progress, as a dynamic, two-step and two-way process. It consists of 
exposing oneself to new vocabularies, standpoints and contexts, and actively using what one learns 
to redescribe one’s self. This hinges on us being willing to change, allow change to happen. It 
hinges on the cultivation of the kind of aesthetic mindset described in Chapter 5, where not only 
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holding descriptions lightly but being open, curious, and willing to grow, expand one’s 
understanding and self, was essential. What we need for the liberal cause, is thus not only detailed 
accounts of cruelty and how it is precipitated, but writing capable of stimulating us to change, to 
act, and to want to keep this open attitude alive. 
 While Rorty does recognise this, it is treated as a parenthetical topic in CIS. Bringing it to 
the foreground not only helps us systematise the various categories of ‘books’ and writers Rorty 
sketches, but also attain greater clarity on why the liberal ironist centres her attention on a quite 
specific subset of texts. 
 
Rorty’s focus in CIS is, expressly, on ‘historicist’ writers: those that reject essentialism, including 
the notion of human nature. His specific and limited focus on ironist theorists above was inferable 
from this broader constraint. If Rorty is taken to be working out how one can be an ironist and a 
liberal – how one can be a humanist pragmatist in the spirit of James and Bloom rather than 
Nietzsche and Foucault as he put it in NITT – then it makes sense that his attention will be on 
writings that inform and instruct pragmatist thought (universalising theory, for instance, would be 
of less pragmatic value to his discursive aims in CIS). Such ‘historicist thinkers’, Rorty tells us, 
like Hegel and Nietzsche, have denied that there is a ‘deepest level of the self’: ‘Their strategy has 
been to insist that socialization and, and thus historical circumstance, goes all the way down...’.100 
Moreover: ‘Such writers tell us that the question “What is it to be a human being?” should be 
replaced by questions like “What is it to inhabit a rich twentieth-century democratic society?” and 
“How can an inhabitant of such a society be more than the enactor of a role in a previously written 
script?”’.101 
There are, furthermore, Rorty suggests, two kinds of historicist writers: those who, like 
Heidegger and Foucault, ‘still tend to see socialization as... antithetical to something deep within 
us’ and, on the other hand, those, like Dewey and Habermas, who are ‘inclined to see the desire for 
private perfection as infected with “irrationalism” or “aestheticism”’.102 In CIS, Rorty wants to ‘do 
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I urge that we not try to choose between them but, rather, give them equal weight and then use 
them for different purposes. Authors like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, 
Heidegger, and Nabokov are useful as exemplars, as illustrations of what private perfection – a 
self-created, autonomous, human life – can be like. Authors such as Marx, Mill, Dewey, 
Habermas, and Rawls are fellow citizens rather than exemplars. They are engaged in a shared, 
social effort – the effort to make our institutions and practices more just and less cruel. We 
shall only think of these two kinds of writers as opposed if we think that a more comprehensive 
philosophical outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human 
solidarity, in a single vision.103   
 
They are, he adds, ‘as little in need of synthesis as are paintbrushes and crowbars.’104  
 ‘Citizens’ and ‘exemplars’ overlap with Rorty’s public-private distinction: the former help 
the liberal project more directly, and the latter are less directly helpful for this but can help us 
create a more self-consciously ironist and aestheticised (in the Rortian sense) life.105 The latter 
kind are ‘writers on autonomy’ that lets us ‘realize that the social virtues are not the only virtues, 
that some people have actually succeeded in re-creating themselves. We thereby become aware of 
our own half-articulate need to become a new person, one whom we as yet lack words to 
describe’.106 These writers remind us that that we ‘need not speak only the language of the tribe, 
that we may find our own words, that we may have a responsibility to ourselves to find them’ – to 
(re)create ourselves and become autonomous beings.107 On the other side of the spectrum, ‘writers 
on justice’ remind us of ‘...the failure of our institutions and practices to live up to the convictions 
to which we are already committed by the public, shared vocabulary we use in daily life’.108 They 
tell us that the responsibility to strive for autonomy is not the only one we have.109 
Rorty picks this division up again in Part III of CIS, when he again divides ‘books’ into 
two rough categories: those that have ‘relevance to autonomy’ and those that have ‘relevance to 
cruelty’.110 The latter category of ‘books which help us become less cruel’, are ‘relevant to our 
relations with others, to helping us notice the effects of our actions on other people. These are the 
books which are relevant to liberal hope, and to the question of how to reconcile private irony with 
such hope.’111 Rorty then splits this category in two further sub-categories: ‘(I) books which help 
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us see the effects of social practices and institutions on others and (2) those which help us see the 
effects of our private idiosyncrasies on others.’112 ‘The first sort of book’, Rorty continues,  
 
is typified by books about, for example, slavery, poverty, and prejudice. These include The 
Condition of the Working Class in England and the reports of muckraking journalists and 
government commissions, but also novels like Uncle Tom's Cabin, Les Miserables, Sister 
Carrie, The Well of Loneliness, and Black Boy. Such books help us see how social practices 
which we have taken for granted have made us cruel.113  
 
I want to stress that the second sub-category is Rorty’s focus in CIS.  
Rorty is often taken to be more concerned with the first kind, to be a fairly simplistic 
proponent of providing the public with a sentimental education in the service of moral progress. 
And Rorty does, as the previous chapter discussed, want us to value sensitivity – increase our 
ironist awareness, and heighten our sensitivity to suffering. As noted above he contrasts cultivation 
of sensitivity with devotion to principles.114 This thus has liberalist value in and of itself. 
Nevertheless, Voparil sums it up well when he says Rorty believes that by ‘cultivating our ability 
to imaginatively identify with others, we can extend the reach of our sense of injustice and form 
the kind of democratic moral community where sympathetic fellow feeling renders us more likely 
to act on behalf of less fortunate distant and different others.’115 But seeing Rorty as only, or 
predominantly, thinking of literature as useful for this kind of sympathetic identification, is 
reductive, and leads, as Voparil also notes, for Rorty’s strong valuation of complex, ironic, 
destabilising works of literature, and the kind of novelistic attitude he aligns his outlook with in 
HKD and elsewhere, to seem incongruous.   
We saw above that Rorty relates literary skill with being able to affect ‘gestalt switches’, 
change the vocabulary, persuasively change the subject. Writers who have cultivated such skills 
can ‘exploit the possibilities of massive redescription’.116 I take Rorty here to mean systemwide, 
culture-encompassing redescription, but also to imply the transformation of the masses which 
might ensue. He comments on this in a later interview:  
 
 
112 Rorty, CIS, p. 141, mixing of Roman and Arabic numerals sic. Notice how this echoes Rorty’s discussion 
of metaphors and effect, detailed in Chapter 5. Also, note how whole literary works can be causes.  
113 Rorty, CIS, p. 141. 
114 Rorty, ‘Redemption from Egotism’, p. 395. 
115 Voparil, ‘Jonquils and Wild Orchids’, p. 100. 





ER: One of [your] arguments [is] that we can empathize through the solidarity of imagining 
other people’s pain. Books are supposed to do this. But isn’t that position rather idealistic? 
Wouldn’t a pragmatist happily concede that literary, or any linguistic communication, depends 
upon the intersection of vocabularies, on reaching “intersubjective agreement,” and that, as 
ironists, we can’t be sure whether or not vocabularies will fulfill such useful purposes as being 
able to empathize? After all, the ironist... needs to read as many books as possible to optimize 
the possibility of consensus, but knows that we cannot answer the Nazis by getting them to 
read Anne Frank. 
 
RR: We can’t be sure, but we know that it’s happened in the past. We know of the effect that 
Dickens, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Orwell, and others, have had on the way we think about 
politics and contemporary social issues. I think that the fact you need intersubjective agreement 
is perfectly compatible with the fact that a whole lot of people can suddenly undergo a gestalt 
switch as a result of reading a novel.117  
 
As Leypoldt explains, Rorty  
never argues that novels should be educational case studies of human cruelty, or that the 
production of participant emotion is the most important aspect of the literary as a universal 
concept, or even that the production of sentimental solidarity is what literature does best. His 
claims are much weaker: narrative, while it has no intrinsic moral relevance (any more than an 
intrinsic literariness), has shown itself to be, in a variety of historical accidents, a potentially 
more effective world-making tool than traditional moral philosophy – partly because human 
solidarity has no reasonable basis, partly because empathetic emotion is a more powerful agent 
of solidarity than rational reflection. 118 
 
Thus, Leypoldt adds, ‘when Rorty argues that “the emergence of the human rights culture owes 
nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories,” he 
may overstate the historical importance of, say, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, but he does not “reduce” the 
literary to its moral effects.’119  
As previously noted, simplifying Rorty’s position to one very close to Nussbaum’s will 
lead to issues, as both Voparil and Llanera notice.120 It renders Rorty as suggesting literature’s 
primary function is to provide a ‘sentimental education’ or drive a ‘politics of sentiments’.121 
Against such an interpretation, Voparil struggles to square Rorty’s belief in the public, liberal 
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utility of literature, with his high valuation of complex, ironic works of literature, and the 
Kunderan novelistic attitude. My contention is that such issues result from undervaluing that what 
is perhaps the more important thing about novels and literature to Rorty, is the kind of larger, 
philosophically pertinent literary attitude which it emerges from and sustains. To return to the 
categories above: when it is recognised that Rorty in CIS is primarily interested in the second sub-
category which focuses on the cruelty of individuals and contains the kind of literature that might 
reveal ‘the ways in which particular sorts of people are cruel to other particular sorts of people’, 
Rorty’s views on literature no longer appear as a naïve argument for an uncomplicated cause and 
effect relation between sentimental works of literature and mass gestalt-switches that materialise as 
moral progress.122  
The most useful books for sensitising liberal ironists to the kind of pain they might inflict 
as private individuals, are  
 
works of fiction which exhibit the blindness of a certain kind of person to the pain of another 
kind of person. By identification with Mr. Causaubon in Middlemarch or with Mrs. Jellyby in 
Bleak House, for example, we may come to notice what we ourselves have been doing. In 
particular, such books show how our attempts at autonomy, our private obsessions with the 
achievement of a certain sort of perfection, may make us oblivious to the pain and humiliation 
we are causing. 123 
 
Remember that Rorty wants to work out what a culture of liberal ironist, of pragmatist humanists, 
needs. Individuals thus inclined, are already on-board with the aim of lessening cruelty. They are 
already aware of the contingency of their ideas and sense of self. What they need to further their moral 
deliberation, which, as the previous chapter showed, is also to deliberate on who they are and their own 
poetic self-making, are books like this that emphasise the ongoing work they do to weight their own 
needs against those of others, the constant question of when to prioritise private desires over the 
public good, and the question of how to (pragmatically, in our lives) reconcile private irony with 
liberal hope. These are the books, Rorty adds, ‘which dramatize the conflict between duties to self 
and duties to others.’124 
 In the above, Rorty thus separates books that address the question of whether the system is 
just from those that prompt me to ask whether I am just, in my specific dealings in particular 
moments. This is not to ask if one fails to live up to the edicts of the Moral Law within, be 
authentic or good. The question is whether I succeed, in practical terms, to notice cruelty in the 
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world, to pay attention to suffering, and act on it when I see it. Whereas the first class of books are 
resources for comparatively re-evaluating, redescribing and recontextualising our systemic 
practices, institutions, cultures, and the effects of these on human flourishing (slavery, colonialism, 
systemic causes of poverty and discrimination, and so on), the second class of books help us 
comparatively to evaluate and redescribe how we are performing as liberal individuals. 
 It might still not be immediately clear why Rorty should want to primarily pay attention to 
those books that challenge us as individuals – those that show ‘the ways in which particular sorts 
of people are cruel to other particular sorts of people’. 125 Why not be mostly concerned with those 
that make us more sensitive to systemic injustices? This makes sense in the light of Chapter 5 and 
the discussion of self-making as (akin to) a moral act.126 Moreover, public, intersubjective 
agreement results from individual members of interpretive communities coming to pay attention to 
the same matters and talk in a shared manner about these. As discussed, I see the private and 
public as dynamically linked in Rorty. There is a feedback loop: as we ‘tinker’ with our personal 
senses of selfhood, we also create our moral locus – the stance from which we will act within and 
for our community. And our communities and shared perceptions exert pressures on our own self-
making. It makes more sense still, if CIS is read, as I have been proposing, as a case against the 
presumption that the connection between ironism and antiliberalism is self-evident.127 That is, as a 
demonstration of the possibility of an ironist who is also a liberal through writing a character 
which embodies the humanist pragmatism of James and Bloom rather than that of Nietzsche and 
Foucault. What is at stake in this matter is the possibility of an ironist attentive to not just to the 
more obvious dangers of unjust systems, but to the particular cruelties she, as an aware ironist 
intellectual who is also a sensitised liberal, might inflict on other people. 
When this is accounted for, another distinction Rorty introduces, between books that are 
stimulating and those that are relaxing, begins to not only appear less digressive and idiosyncratic 
than it might at first, but to seem both important and enlightening. The later ‘The Inspirational 
Value of Great Works of Literature’ also casts light on this division. In this essay, Rorty erects a 
dichotomy between ‘inspirational’ and ‘knowing’.128 ‘Knowingness is a state of soul which 
prevents shudders of awe. It makes one immune to romantic enthusiasm.’129 Works that have 
‘inspirational value’, on the other hand, pushes us to let that state of mind go. We ‘attribute 
inspirational value to works of literature’ (note how it is not an intrinsic property of a kind of text), 
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when they succeed in making us ‘think there is more to this life than [we] ever imagined’. This 
kind of effect is 
 
 
typically not produced by the operations of a method, a science, a discipline, or a profession. 
...You cannot, for example, find inspirational value in a text at the same time that you are 
viewing it as the product of a mechanism of cultural production. To view a work in this way 
gives understanding but not hope, knowledge but not self-transformation. For knowledge is a 
matter of putting a work in a familiar context-relating it to things already known. 
If it is to have inspirational value, a work must be allowed to recontexualize much of 
what you previously thought you knew; it cannot, at least at first, be itself recontextualized by 
what you already believe. Just as you cannot be swept off your feet by another human being at 
the same time that you recognize him or her as a good specimen of a certain type, so you 
cannot simultaneously be inspired by a work and be knowing about it.130  
 
We call works ‘inspirational’ when they manage to sweep us off our feet, bring us out of our 
selves. Inspirational works set up a potential that might lead us to reweave our bundle of beliefs, 
change our (final) vocabulary, and thus our self. ‘Great’ works of literature, Rorty suggests, are 
great because they have inspired many readers, not as having inspired many readers because they are 
great.’131   
 I take Rorty’s most important point in this essay to be that it is those who ‘still read for 
inspiration’ who are likely to be most useful to ‘building a cooperative commonwealth.’132 This 
describes an attitude and its outcome: being willing to risk one’s current sense of self, willing to 
risk being changed by someone else, is the spirit that, if adopted, will make us as individuals more 
useful to the work of fostering solidarity and lessening cruelty. Rorty’s essay about ‘great works of 
literature’ is not so much about literature – Rorty describes no traits of such works beyond what 
we might call their capacity to destabilise our settled sense of self, to defamiliarise – as it is about 
the necessity for human beings to be willing to risk their individual self-conception, to put their 
selfhood on the line for the world to change.  
 This later essay thus casts light on the similar split in CIS between ‘books’ that ‘supply 
novel stimuli to action’ and those which ‘simply offer relaxation’: [t]he former suggest (sometimes 
straightforwardly and sometimes by insinuation) that one must change one's life (in some major or 
minor respect). The latter do not raise this question; they take one into a world without 
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challenges.’133 Rorty’s dividing line is between books that put our current practical self on the line 
– and thus have moral relevance because forging a (better) self, engaging in a process of continual 
curiosity-driven change, is as close to a moral obligation we get in Rorty’s view – and books that 
do not succeed in doing this. 
There is, however, no way to provide criteria that lets us identify all such books, for 
‘different people lead different lives, feel challenged by different situations, and require holidays 
from different projects. So any attempt to go through our libraries, reshelving books with this 
distinction in mind, is going to be relative to, our special interests.’ However,  
 
it is clear that this attempt usually will not put Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth and 
Wordsworth's Prelude on different shelves, nor Freud’s Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis and Middlemarch, nor The Education of Henry Adams and King Lear, nor A 
Genealogy of Morals and the New Testament, nor Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism and the 
poems of Baudelaire. So this distinction between the stimulating and the relaxing does not 
parallel the traditional lines between the cognitive and the noncognitive, the moral and the 
aesthetic, or the “literary” and the nonliterary. Nor does it conform to any standard distinctions 
of form or genre. This distinction will nevertheless, for most people, separate all the books just 
mentioned from Beerbohm’s Zuleika Dobson, Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, 
Eliot’s Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats, Runciman’s History of the Crusades, Tennyson’s 
Idylls of the King, Saint-Simon’s Memoirs, Ian Fleming’s Thunderball, Macauley’s Essays, 
Wodehouse’s Carry on, Jeeves!, Harlequin romances, Sir Thomas Browne’s Urn Burial, and 
works of uncomplicated pornography. Such books gear in with their readers’ fantasies without 
suggesting that there might be something wrong with those fantasies, or with the person who 
has them.134  
 
Here, as in ‘IV’, Rorty’s descriptions indicate a blocking out on a spectrum of texts more or less 
likely to destabilise the current beliefs and vocabularies of readers, and thus create a potential for 
changing her perceptions and ways of talking.  
Relaxing books denote those texts that lets us rest easy with who we are. Rorty’s lists of works 
can obviously be contested. To ask whether he here gets these categories right by itemising these 
particular touchstones would be somewhat beside the point. What matters to understanding the 
Rortian narrative is to note that stimulating books put our selves on the line.135 This helps us see 
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why Rorty says this stimulating-relaxing split is the closest he can come to reconstructing the 
moral-aesthetic distinction.136 Stimulating books are more likely to set up a potential for change.   
 
However, Rorty is no more interested in saving the moral-aesthetic distinction, than he is in 
resurrecting the Kantian ‘moral self’. This is further evidenced in his discussion of Nabokov as a 
writer, and there takes the form of the observation that stimuli for both aesthetic pleasure and 
moral deliberation might be contained in the same work. Rorty empathises with Nabokov’s 
suspicion of ‘philosophers' attempts to squeeze our moral sentiments into rules for deciding moral 
dilemmas.’137 But he criticises Nabokov for his insistence on the priority of the aesthetic over the 
moral, and for seeing the aesthetic and the moral as antithetical Rorty does not think we should 
place ‘Housmanian tingles’ in opposition to ‘the kind of participatory emotion that moved liberal 
statesmen’. They are instead noncompetitive goods:  
 
Nabokov is quite right when he says, “That little shiver behind is quite certainly the highest 
form of emotion that humanity has attained when evolving pure art and pure science” (LL, p. 
64). This dictum simply spells out the relevant sense of the term “pure.” But it seems quite 
compatible with saying that the ability to shudder with shame and indignation at the 
unnecessary death of a child – a child with whom we have no connection of family, tribe, or 
class – is the highest form of emotion that humanity has attained while evolving modern social 
and political institutions.138  
 
Even when speaking on Charles Dickens, Rorty notes, Nabokov insisted that ‘all’ that mattered 
was Dickens’ ability to produce such tingles, as an effect of style. ‘Nabokov does not try to defend 
his assumption that social reform does not have the same claim on our attention as “pure art and pure 
science.” He gives no reasons for doubting that people as gifted as Dickens have sometimes been able 
to do quite different things in the same book.’ It would have been much easier, Rorty suggests, for 
Nabokov ‘to admit that Bleak House aroused participative emotions which helped change the laws of 
England, and also made Dickens immortal by having been written so as to keep right on producing 
tingles between the shoulder blades long after the particular horrors of Dickens's century had been 
replaced by new ones.’139 
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 This relates to the discussion on details above. Nabokov thinks that bestowing a particular 
kind of attention onto the details of existence, even to the exclusion of noticing suffering, is a 
transcendent, supreme form of human consciousness. Rorty observes: ‘[t]he theme of Nabokov's 
essay is what he calls the “supremacy of the detail over the general”. He thought a ‘capacity to 
wonder at trifles – no matter the imminent peril – these asides of the spirit, these footnotes in the 
volume of life’ revealed the highest form of human consciousness.140 Rorty takes this up to refute a 
traditional, art for art’s sake kind of aestheticism, and do away with the moral-aesthetic distinction:  
 
Nabokov wanted to absolutize the moral claim by backing it up with the metaphysical claim. 
He wanted to say that idiosyncratic imagery, of the sort he was good at, rather than the kind of 
generalizing ideas which Plato was good at, is what opens the gates of immortality. Art, rather 
than mathematics, breaks through the walls of time into a world beyond contingency.141 
 
Nabokov merely flips the scientistic image. It is an essentialising move, not consistent with the 
characteristic of the novelist as Rorty portrays her when discussing Proust, content to rearrange 
little things in pleasing or helpful ways. Hence, while Rorty urges us to foreground the details of 
life, to poeticise culture, he takes care to stress that he is not an aesthete in Nabokov’s sense. He 
instead underscores that what matters, is the effect literary works cause.  
At this point it might seem like a natural move to turn to established theories of literature 
or poetry that address the question of how texts can produce an unsettling, dislodging, or 
destabilising effect in readers. Russian formalists, the romantics, Nietzsche, and Freud and the 
‘uncanny’ seem like obvious points of reference. But Rorty makes no such connections. Nor does 
he indicate having considered his own thoughts on literature in relation to reader-response theories 
of literature. While such theories of poetry or literature want to put into words what literature is, 
that is, the above withstanding, still not what Rorty is doing. He does not want to delimitate 
literariness or determine the extent to which the meaning of a text is to be found in the reader’s 
interpretation of it. He does, however, appear to tie the extent to which literature succeeds in 
bringing us out of our current selves, to the extent to which it manages to produce physical effects 
in us, emotional responses to external stimuli, and this to how texts are forged. 
Rorty talks about the effects literary works produce as ‘shudders’ and ‘tingles’. As noted 
above, Rorty picks up the words ‘tingles’ from Housman, via Nabokov, and he appears to have 
picked up ‘shudders’ from Goethe and Faust. In CIS Rorty gives no source for his talk of 
‘shudders’, but later indicates one when talking about the importance of keeping open a space in 
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academia for those driven by inspiration rather than knowing: intellectuals like Whitehead (on 
whom Rorty wrote his PhD) who ‘stood for charisma, genius, romance, and Wordsworth. Like 
Bloom, he agreed with Goethe that the ability to shudder with awe is the best feature of human 
beings.’142 It is never specified, but Rorty is likely referring to Faust Part II, where Goethe’s lines, 
generally in older English translations, are rendered as ‘Humanity’s best part in awe doth lie’.143 
This seems like a somewhat inadequate translation. The theme of shuddering – and not just in awe, 
but in fear, in Grauen, is important in the larger context of the work. The original reads:  
 
                            Faust: 
  Doch im Erstarren such’ ich nicht mein Heil, 
  Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil; 
  Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefühl verteure, 
  Ergriffen, fühlt er tief das Ungeheure.144 
 
There is much to say about this passage, and not just in reference to the play itself, but in reference 
to, for instance, Kant and the notion of the sublime, romanticist thought, and how this might again 
connect to the unsettling effect Rorty is after. Here, however, what I want to get across is that what 
is implied by Goethe’s ‘shudder’ is multifaceted, and a physically participative emotion – a point I 
will return to in a moment. 
Rorty’s tingle-talk appears in his discussion of Nabokov and Orwell. Rorty notes that 
‘Nabokov's talk of tingles was certainly influenced by Housman's Name and Nature of Poetry (the 
best-known manifesto in English of what Nelson Goodman calls “the Tingle-Immersion” theory of 
aesthetic experience).’145. In ‘Name and Nature of Poetry’, Housman suggests that poetry is more a 
matter of physical, emotive responses to associative connections triggered by it in the human 
imagination, than about cognitive or interpretive processes. Nabokov echoes this, as Rorty points 
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we read with our minds, the seat of artistic delight is between the shoulder blades. That little 
shiver behind is quite certainly the highest form of emotion that humanity has attained when 
evolving pure art and pure science. Let us worship the spine and its tingle. Let us be proud of 
our being vertebrates, for we are vertebrates tipped at the head with a divine flame. The brain 
only continues the spine: the wick really goes through the whole length of the candle. If we are 
not capable of enjoying that shiver, if we cannot enjoy literature, then let us give up the whole 
thing and concentrate on our comics, our videos, our books-of-the-week.146  
And continues:  
The study of the sociological or political impact of literature has to be devised mainly for those 
who are by temperament or education immune to the aesthetic vibrancy of authentic literature, 
for those who do not experience the telltale tingle between the shoulder blades. (I repeat again 
and again it is no use reading a book at all if you do not read it with your back.)147  
  
Both Housman and Nabokov take such shivers and tingles as a reliable indicator of true aesthetic 
quality. And for both it is a particular and pure feeling only a particular kind of person can 
experience – Rorty also notes this, and objects to the elitism of it.  
When Goodman, in Languages of Art (1968), talks about “the Tingle-Immersion” theory 
of aesthetic experience, he is instead deriding it:  
 
I have not attempted the formidable task of defining “aesthetic” in general, but have simply 
argued that since the exercise, training, and development of our powers of discriminating 
among works of art are plainly aesthetic activities, the aesthetic properties of a picture include 
not only those found by looking at it but also those that determine how it is to be looked at. 
This rather obvious fact would hardly have needed underlining but for the prevalence of the 
time-honored Tingle-Immersion theory, which tells us that the proper behavior on 
encountering a work of art is to strip ourselves of all the vestments of knowledge and 
experience (since they might blunt the immediacy of our enjoyment), then submerge ourselves 
completely and gauge the aesthetic potency of the work by the intensity and duration of the 
resulting tingle. The theory is absurd on the face of it and useless for dealing with any of the 
important problems of aesthetics; but it has become part of the fabric of our common 
nonsense.148    
 
Goodman satirically attributes the Tingle-Immersion theory to ‘Immanuel Tingle and Joseph 
Immersion (ca. 1800)’.149  
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In terms of views on epistemology, language, and art, Rorty overlaps to a much more 
substantial degree with Goodman than either Housman or Nabokov, but Rorty goes even further 
than Goodman in contextualising his perception of art. Rorty is not attempting to formulate a 
theory of art, the aesthetic, or literature at all. He is attempting to work out how we best, most 
pragmatically, might facilitate human growth and change and in this process possibly lessen 
human cruelty. Tingles and shudders and other bodily states and feelings can serve this purpose to 
the extent they unsettle our settled sense of self. The point of ‘novels or plays or poems’, Rorty 
says, ‘is not to represent human emotions or situations “correctly”’. In fact, ‘[l]iterary art, the 
nonstandard, nonpredictable use of words’ should not be measured by its representativeness, for 
‘such accuracy is a matter of conformity to convention, and the point of writing well is precisely to 
break the crust of convention’.150 Rorty wants us to, as part of our moral practice, expose ourselves 
to the possibility of change by engaging with artefacts that have the power to crack open the crusty 
parts of our selves. Those works that succeed in producing an effect on our bodies and minds are, 
Rorty’s discussion implies, most likely to achieve this effect. 
Hence, ‘tingles’ can serve an important function, and so can ‘shudders of awe’ – but also 
shudders of ‘shame and indignation at the unnecessary death of a child’,151 or the arousal of 
‘revulsion’152. To Rorty there is no competition between ‘aesthetic bliss’ and such ‘participative 
emotion’, and thus nor between sentimental novels that have a clear moral message or complex, 
ironic works. What matters is that we expose ourselves to texts (or ethnographies, or journalist’s 
reports, or TV-programmes, or novels or poems) that are capable of effectuating a response in us, a 
reaction that dislodges our sense of self in such a way that it opens us up for connection and makes 
room for growth, for increased and multifaceted awareness and sensitivity. Rorty’s pressing 
message is not that we ought to read a certain kind of literature, high art, or books with a message. 
The moral is to read and seek out the kinds of artefacts that push change and enlargement in us, 
and keep the literary attitude and culture going. 
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We might still want to ask what features are typical of texts that do succeed in unsettling 
our sense of self. Presumably, Rorty would see inquiry into this as a legitimate pursuit if it were 
conceived as a naturalised inquiry looking at cause and effect, patterns and responses. This is 
indeed the connection he indicates when he does mention features of those texts that succeed in 
breaking the crust on our conventional selves. Talking of Nabokov Rorty says Nabokov’s brain 
‘happened to be wired up so as to make him able continually to surprise and delight himself by 
arranging words into iridescent patterns.’153 This helps us see why, despite Rorty’s thoroughgoing 
antiessentialism, even though he rejected the notion of literature or literariness as such, he still put 
literature ‘in the older and narrower sense of that term - plays, poems, and, especially, novels’ at the 
heart of his utopian vision of a postmetaphysical, democratic liberal culture.154 For while Nabokov 
would have been horrified at the suggestion, ‘iridescent patterns’ can be found everywhere, we 
now know that our brains are wired for both pattern-recognition and for feeling some patterns and 
symbols are more luminous than others.155 Parts of the mechanisms outlined above could 
undoubtedly be further naturalised, as is of course being done.156 Nevertheless, we can reconceive 
literature in the narrower sense as a genre, a kind of writing, that through trial and error has 
developed a writerly practice that is particularly good at not just attending to the details of lived 
experience, not just good at describing the pain that unites us, or the specific ways in which we 
hurt and oppress, but that has specialised in causing these kinds of measurable – and bodily-
tangible – effects while doing so, and thus render our minds more open to suggestions for change, 
directly or indirectly, proposed. 
Rorty’s narrow sense of literature has the novel at its heart. While this naturally has to do 
with the reasons he outlines in HKD – the novel’s attitude and mode of operation, elements that 
are, as we have seen, also emphasised in CIS – I want to suggest that Rorty’s focus on the novel 
might also simply emerge from a more pragmatic consideration, one Rorty does not acknowledge. 
In fact, Rorty at one point appears to deny that there is any use-difference:  
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ER: But would you say that poetry is not generally quite as accessible as prose and the 
narratives that novels suggest? Do you find poetry less obviously useful as a medium? 
RR: No, that’s just an idiosyncrasy. I’m not a very good reader of poetry. Bloom has read just 
about every poem published in English and remembers each of them. Poetry is what comes 
first to his mind. It just doesn’t happen to be the first thing that comes to my mind.157  
 
But this response quite evidently goes against everything Rorty elsewhere writes on novels and the 
novel as a genre.  
For – Bloom withstanding – novels are generally speaking, more directly useful to a 
greater number of people than, say, image-rich experimental poetry. There might be a higher 
concentration of those important, effect-inducing ‘iridescent patterns’ in poetry. But because the 
transformation Rorty wants is a two-way process, where recognition of detail and application to 
one’s own lifeworld matters greatly, novels are more readily put to use in the service of such 
transformations. Reading them is often, as Rorty often points out, like getting to know other 
people.158 Novels provide more straightforwardly applicable narratives for us to place our possible 
selves in, and on the Rortian view of selfhood, the narrative we place our selves in as an integral 
part of our sense of who we are. As Rorty holds that we can only critically evaluate our selves 
comparatively: against other options, other vocabularies, other life-stories, novels are simply a 
more easily employed resource for this kind of imaginative, comparative, critical work. 
I can come at this from another angle: I see literature as standing to the rest of our textual 
production as Rorty takes metaphors to stand to literalised language. Metaphors, to Rorty, are no 
different than other parts of language, just more novel, more unfamiliar, strange.159 Thus, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, what they elicited was not immediate adoption and use for known and well-
mapped out purposes, but effects. Only through careful consideration and experimental integration 
might they, if they found a use, literalise into ordinary language. Over time, and with chance and 
luck, they might cause a change in our non-linguistic behaviours. The literary tradition, and the 
history of poetry in particular, similarly contains texts that require more work before they are 
integrated into our everyday use of language, our ordinary understanding of how things ‘hang 
together’ – and thus require a more sustained engagement on our part before we see their 
applicability, their meaning, to and in our lives. Poetry usually, quite literally, has a greater 
metaphorical density. Rorty’s reasons for placing the novel at the heart of his culture, also, then, 
has to do with how language works, how we utilise it, how our brains process it. 
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As Rorty put it when talking about ‘inspirational’ works of literature: we ‘should 
cheerfully admit that canons are temporary, and touchstones replaceable. But this should not lead 
us to discard the idea of greatness. We should see great works of literature as great because they 
have inspired many readers, not as having inspired many readers because they are great.’ We 
should ‘not expect the same key to open every heart’. Nevertheless, we should draw up canons to 
be ‘able to offer suggestions to the young about where they might find excitement and hope’.160 I 
find myself wanting to be more prosaic than even Rorty here, and say we should draw up canons 
to keep a particular conversation going, a particular genre and tradition, that has shown itself 
useful for furthering a more humanistic culture, and to facilitate, or increase the likelihood of, the 
continued production of works that cause ‘tingles’ and ‘shudders’ to keep the process going. We 
might then see the literary (critical) institution as engaged in mindfully creating and curating texts, 
and collections of texts that serve these kinds of purposes. 
The literary institution, on this view, contains resources we might efficiently and usefully 
employ in our work for moral progress. Because it holds, as Rorty uses Kundera to say in the 
epigraph to CIS, the ‘wisdom of the novel’, ‘iridescent patterns’, unsettling metaphors, 
uncompromising self-examination, and means for making ourselves anew. 
 
Poesis Against Inhumanism 
How does Rorty substantiate his case for the humanist pragmatism of James and Bloom over the 
inhumanist pragmatism of Nietzsche and Foucault? By indicating a set of recommendations for 
how liberal ironists might forge a writerly and readerly practice that furthers both their ironism and 
their liberalism, Rorty sketches a practical strategy for countering inhumanism. In 1981 he had ‘no 
way to dispose of’ the moral objection to pragmatism’s claim that even the vocabulary of our 
liberal imagination was a temporary resting place.161 And he does not, in 1989 either – not as a 
theoretical problem. He instead sets it aside as a theoretical problem and comes up with a 
functional strategy. There are no epistemological defences against evil. To counter inhumanism we 
must actively work to oppose it, in ourselves, in our language, and in society; build solidarity 
through acts of recognition and change. We must imaginatively, creatively, aesthetically, make our 
future. And in this work, CIS asserts, literature plays a vital part.  
Rorty’s utopian culture might (to echo Rorty on ironism) be understood as a culture where 
an aesthetic, literary attitude is ‘in the relevant sense’ universal.162 I have been endeavouring to 
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argue that Rorty’s turn to literature, his talk of poets and poems, also is an attempt to capture the 
dimension of making that is so necessary to his case against inhumanism. Rorty suggested we need 
a ‘poeticization’ of liberalism. It might be suggested there is a need to poeticise Rortian 
pragmatism to more clearly set out that in his work literary attitude and poetic practices are two 
sides of the same coin, as closely linked as we are to others. Next, I conclude this thesis by 
expanding on this and suggesting that Rorty perhaps should have stated his alignment with the 
literary attitude and literary institution more clearly and firmly than he did. It helps us understand 






A Necessary Inconclusiveness 
 
Rorty closes CIS with a discussion of Nabokov’s Lolita and Orwell’s 1984 – two novels selected 
because they, on the one hand, warn us ‘against social injustice by warning us against the tendency 
to cruelty inherent in searches for autonomy’ and ‘warn the liberal ironist intellectual against 
temptations to be cruel’, and, on the other, ‘dramatize the tension between private irony and liberal 
hope’.1 Despite Rorty also saying that 1984 can help us see systemic cruelty, he is here reading 
these as books in his second category, as detailed in the previous chapter: the kind of books that 
show how our private pursuits might make us oblivious to the pain we are causing.2 Moreover, he 
is not addressing how literature (or novels) in general, or as such, can help everyone bring their 
own blindness into view. He discusses Nabokov and Orwell as writers whose work can help, 
specifically, ‘ironist intellectuals’, especially those who also consider themselves liberals – who 
include in their ungrounded hopes the hope of a less cruel world – to notice their blindness and 
thus areas where they might act without due compassion. 
 Rorty earlier in CIS explicitly says he aims to defend ‘ironist intellectuals’ against 
accusations of ‘irresponsibility’, a set which here includes both Theodor Adorno and Foucault. 
Rorty is particularly concerned – because he holds Habermas in high regard – to mount a defence 
against Habermas’s dismissal of their critique of Enlightenment rationality.3 That Rorty stresses 
this, dovetails well with my suggestion that Rorty writes CIS as his ‘full-scale’ response to the 
same irresponsibility-worry he himself had taken up in PRI and NITT, and with my suggestion that 
CIS revolves around making a case for the possibility and plausibility of the seemingly paradoxical 
character of the liberal ironist – for the humanist pragmatist. The protagonist in Rorty’s readings of 
Nabokov and Orwell’s novels is, then, not Nabokov, Humbert Humbert, Lolita, or the Barber of 
Kasbeam, nor Orwell, Winston, or O’Brien. It is the Liberal Ironist. Rorty’s readings are 
undertaken to explore what is at stake for the liberal ironist as she, self-aware and fully cognisant 
about ‘the powers of redescription’ – as an intellectual who knows that ‘anything could be made to 
look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being re-described’ – engages in 
the kind of pragmatic deliberation Rorty takes moral reflection to be.4 This is why Rorty is 
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concerned to point out that the kinds of novels here under discussion are helpful because they 
‘dramatize the conflict between duties to self and duties to others’.5  
 Rorty’s reading of Lolita centres on a portrayal of Humbert the aesthete, the seeker of 
aesthetic bliss so self-consumed with his quest for sublimity that he fails to notice the pain and 
suffering, or even the mere perspective, of other people. ‘This particular sort of genius-monster – 
the monster of incuriosity – is’, Rorty suggests, ‘Nabokov’s contribution to our knowledge of 
human possibilities.’6 Humbert’s aestheticism is not to be confused with the Rortian sense of 
aesthetic, which, as previously discussed, includes curiosity as part of the aesthetic (literary) 
attitude.7 In his readings of these novels, Rorty notes that Nabokov, in the Afterword to Lolita, 
identified ‘art with the compresence of “curiosity, tenderness, kindness, and ecstasy.”’. ‘Notice’, 
Rorty adds, ‘that “curiosity” comes first’.8 Nevertheless, he thinks Nabokov knew that ‘ecstasy and 
tenderness not only are separable but tend to preclude each other’, and thus in his novels attempt to 
‘face up to the unpleasant fact that writers can obtain and produce ecstasy while failing to notice 
suffering, while being incurious about the people whose lives provide their material.’ 9 This is, 
Rorty surmises, why Nabokov creates characters ‘who are both ecstatic and cruel, noticing and 
heartless, poets who are only selectively curious, obsessives who are as sensitive as they are 
callous. What he fears most is that one cannot have it both ways — that there is no synthesis of 
ecstasy and kindness.’10 Rorty finds this same dramatisation ‘of the tension between private irony 
and liberal hope’ playing out in Pale Fire and in Bend Sinister.11  
What Rorty does not explicitly articulate, but which this thesis allows me to add, is that in 
his readings of these novels, he presents us with various ironist characters – Humbert, for instance, 
is an ironist, literary intellectual – who, because of their incuriosity, fail to be artists. Not in 
Nabokov’s sense, but decidedly in Rorty’s. Rorty indicates the same when he says that Humbert’s 
‘inattentiveness to anything irrelevant to his own obsession’ means he is unable ‘to attain a state of 
being in which “art,” as Nabokov has defined it, is the norm.’12 Rorty’s deduction echoes my own, 
when I see Rorty as saying that the problem with theorists is that they fail to be novelists.13 Thus 
Rorty’s readings of Nabokov’s works can be seen as yet one more instance of Rorty aligning the 
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attitude he recommends with that of the literary artist or critic. They substantiate my claim that the 
Rortian literary culture is best understood as ‘taking over’ when the cultivation of an aesthetic 
attitude, or life of a culture, as Rorty defined this, would be the norm. 
Rorty’s reading of 1984 elucidates the ethical burden the liberal ironist carries in a 
complimentary way. Winston is forced to surrender his individuality to the collective – a joint self, 
imaginatively created from the crippled remains of private selves. Human bodies stand shoulder to 
shoulder: the ‘we’, the moral community of Big Brother, and thus, in a way, a formidable, all-
encompassing solidarity is achieved. But this comes, of course, at the expense of privacy and 
freedom. Winston’s systemic oppression into solidarity is the opposite of Humbert’s singular quest 
for autonomy – it is the forced, total surrender of self-governance and identity. However, while 
this novel contains an obvious demonstration of how systems can be cruel, that is not Rorty’s main 
concern – his concern is still the ‘liberal ironist intellectual’ and her ‘temptations’ to be cruel.14 
Thus, his reading of 1984 centres on an ironist intellectual on another private, imaginative quest 
for sublimity: O’Brien. 
O’Brien is an ironist intellectual who knows there is no human nature, and thus 
understands that people can be broken and remade in his image.15 And he is an intellectual who is 
a poetic a maker of cruelty. O’Brien, unlike, Humbert notices other people. His forging of sublime 
cruelty depends on being curious about the specific details of other people’s lives and experiences, 
and then skilfully tailoring his responses to invalidate or obliterate their sense of self. His aim is to 
perfect a kind of sadistic manipulation that renders a specific, unique, and idiosyncratic self 
without a final vocabulary, without a narrative about who they are, and thus incapable of 
reconstituting itself after the event.16 The artful perfection of torture for the sake of torture is 
O’Brien’s obsessive private perfectionist project. In writing this character, Rorty takes Orwell – 
like Nabokov – to have written into literature the psychological possibility and plausibility of a 
new kind of person.17 
Here, as in his reading of Lolita, Rorty takes the central cruel-intellectual character to be 
the one the liberal ironist intellectual will find most unsettling. Thus, he takes 1984 to read as a 
stark warning to the liberal ironist against complacency – as a demonstration that humiliation of 
others can in fact be inherent to the purposes around which ironist intellectuals shape their lives. 
This is a much more subtle claim than the prosaic observation that 1984 show us how systems or 
groups of people can be cruel. Rorty wants to warn us, and uses Orwell to do so, against a 
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‘possible future society, one in which the intellectuals had accepted the fact that liberal hopes had 
no chance of realization.’18 Orwell, Rorty says, managed to convince us that ‘all the intellectual 
and poetic gifts which had made Greek philosophy, modern science, and Romantic poetry possible 
might someday find employment in the Ministry of Truth.’19  
Put in the same terms as above, Big Brother-society is O’Brien’s ingenious poetic work. 
He is a creative, imaginative maker. But he fails to lead an aesthetic life in the Rortian sense, not 
for lack of curiosity as was the case with Humbert, but for lack of kindness. The moral in tow for 
Rorty’s readings of Nabokov is pay attention, notice, be broadly curious, and specifically curious 
about the suffering of others, and willing to change in response to what you discover. Rorty’s 
reading of 1984 is part of his case for compelling us to act for solidarity, against cruelty, and 
specifically to take action to cultivate kindness – to cultivate an intellectual culture and practice 
that is not just curious, but also acknowledging and non-oppressive.  
Rorty here tells us Nabokov and Orwell wrote new characters into our collective 
consciousness. Writing the possibility and plausibility of a character is what I have been 
suggesting Rorty aims for when he writes the liberal ironist. In Rorty’s larger philosophical 
narrative, Humbert and O’Brien stands to Rorty’s liberal ironist as Nietzsche and Foucault to 
James and Bloom: as inhumanist pragmatism stands to humanist pragmatism. Rorty is populating 
his Sellersian moral ‘we’ by saying it includes Orwell and Nabokov, but not Humbert or O’Brien. 
He is performing the job he assigns to the literary critic: acting as a moral guide, showing us the 
kinds of attitudes we might adopt towards the characters in play and thus towards our own selves. 
These literary critical readings are not illustrative appendices to a philosophical argument, but 
wholly a part of Rorty’s literary case for how we might facilitate a fully historicist and nominalist 
pragmatism while also cultivating ethical awareness in its intellectual practitioners. 
Rorty’s readings of these two novels are complex and nuanced assessments, although his 
judgments are not unproblematic – in particular, Rorty’s conception of Nabokov the writer, whom 
Rorty endows with a kind of humanism I am not convinced Nabokov possessed, could be 
problematised. However this might be, his readings clearly demonstrate that for Rorty, how texts 
induce change is not resolved by simply pointing to the fact that we can be moved to change 
through sentimental identification with the victims of cruelty. It is the possibility of O’Brien that 
Rorty thinks might stimulate readers to action, not simply our sympathy for Winston. As noted, 
Rorty suggests that novels can induce ‘gestalt switches’ on a population level.20 However, he does 
not say these changes depend on triggering sentimental feelings. He says ‘gestalt switches’ depend 
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on cultivating a ‘literary skill’ and goes on to suggest that we are more likely to change our 
disposition on the basis of a work of literature if the words are arranged in such a way that they 
succeed in triggering (bodily) emotions in us: tingles, shudders, revulsion, shame.21 
That the nuancing of Rorty’s use of the concept of the ‘literary’ and works of literature this 
thesis has offered is itself of use, can be supported by a brief examination of Catherine Toal’s 
assessment of Rorty’s readings of Nabokov and Orwell in her 2016 book The Entrapments of 
Form: Cruelty and Modern Literature. Toal discusses Rorty in a section entitled ‘“Cruelty” and 
American Philosophy’, which comes towards the end of a sequence of readings of writers such as 
Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Melville, and Henry James that discuss how the idea of ‘cruelty’ 
acquires a new meaning in modernity. Toal dismisses Rorty’s philosophical position as 
inconsistent due to his public-private split, which Toal reads as ontologically significant (as a 
theoretical separation that in its unreasonableness undermines his position). He is described as a 
(semi)quietist, and as holding that reform of social institutions and practices will be furthered by 
simple sympathetic identification with people of other beliefs, and, also, as relegating sympathy 
with the victims of cruelty to the private realm, alongside our ambitions for autonomy, thus 
leaving us as passive, observant noticers of cruelty, incapable of and unwilling to articulate an 
ambition to change the world.22 This leads Toal to read Rorty as part of a trend in twentieth-
century philosophy that negates lived experience of cruelty. 
It seems that without a fully comprehensive account of the context, aims, and thus of the 
rhetorical moves in play in Rorty’s readings of these writers (she also touches on Rorty on Proust 
and Derrida), it is difficult to give a just evaluation of both Rorty on cruelty and as a reader of 
literature.23 Toal’s readings fail to re-present what is at stake in Rorty. He is taken to define cruelty 
passively, as a mere by-product of self-absorption, and hence his readings of Nabokov are seen 
simply as relating how cruelty might arise from inattentiveness, and these readings’ role in Rorty’s 
wider philosophical argument is missed. His readings of Orwell are taken to be about the cruelty of 
social practices, even while his emphasis on O’Brien is noted. The analysis Toal provides fails to 
demonstrate a nuanced and well-considered understanding of Rorty’s philosophical position, and 
as a result correspondingly reductive conclusions are drawn about his readings of literature. 
Rorty’s many readings, uses, and mentions of specific works of literature are worthy of a 
study in their own right. What this thesis offers, is an analysis that better enables such a next phase 
of work to proceed: it lays down the foundations that permits a close and valid analysis of Rorty’s 
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readings of literature to be undertaken, and for the results of such an analysis to emerge as 
coherent, and as representative of Rorty’s actual position.  
Nevertheless, Toal’s struggle to pin down exactly where Rorty’s active engagement 
against cruelty in America is located is understandable. The study this thesis has provided might 
help Toal formulate a more effective critique. My aim in this thesis was to provide a 
comprehensive account of the conceptual role the literary, and the notion of a literary culture plays 
in Rortian pragmatism, as well as to substantiate the claim that the literary aspect of his work is not 
a by-product but a defining feature. It seemed to me that accounts of Rortian philosophy that leave 
this strand of thought out were omitting something of vital importance. I am now better placed to 
suggest what this is, and also to relate it to Toal’s worries, and thus say something about how 
centring Rorty’s literariness helps render his philosophical position with greater clarity. 
Through situating the literary aspect in the foreground of a reading of Rorty’s work, this 
thesis has brought out in clear relief a strand of his thinking tangibly present throughout his 
oeuvre, but not yet properly delimited and accounted for in the secondary literature. As it is traced 
in this thesis, Rorty’s literary turn is considered to emerge in response to two needs. The first is a 
need to formulate a vocabulary for expressing his constructive project (his brand of pragmatism, 
thus demonstrating that he is not a copy, but a strong poet in his own right). The second, was a 
need to address his worries about the moral implications of the philosophical stance he advanced. 
His literary vocabulary originally emerged from his redescription of Snow’s idea of a literary 
culture, which Rorty reformulated as a culture that stands in opposition to the scientistic culture of 
professionalised philosophy. The broader result of this turn was a shift towards imagination, 
literature, and an emphasis on making, poesis: on that we must make, through speaking and 
writing and other actions, selves and lives and institutions and cultures that recognises the need for 
countering cruelty and furthering solidarity through the formation of material human habits and 
practices. It seems to me that if a criticism is to be raised against this, it must come from the 
vantage point of questioning whether Rorty’s literary vocabulary provides a helpful way to 
formulate a pragmatist response to the worry Rorty shares with Felski and Toal. 
This thesis has argued that it does, and, moreover, that emphasising Rorty’s literariness 
and bringing out his reasons for aligning himself with the literary institution and the literary critic 
in fact might help pragmatists sympathetic to Rorty better respond to these kinds of critiques. It 
has thus augmented Rorty’s own articulation of his stance by reconstructing his argument as 
saying that the full recognition of contingency he insists on amounts to adopting an aesthetic 





entailed by his suggestion that we can treat physics and poetry ‘evenhandedly’.24 It suggests that 
this aesthetic attitude of openness and curiosity – capable of holding all human artefacts equally 
lightly while nevertheless taking their potential uses, interpretations, consequences seriously – is as 
important in Rortian philosophy as his uses of specific literary works, or his suggestion that 
reading literature might heighten our ethical sensitivity and lead to moral progress. Through its 
literary emphasis, this thesis moreover pulls making into the heart of the matter, a move that 
emerges from and also strengthen Rorty’s own alignment of his pragmatism with the attitude and 
practices of the poet. This shifts the focus beyond the moment of transformation sketched in 
chapters 2 and 3, and places the stress on what is at stake when we have come to see ourselves as 
mere poets. On what kind of practice we adopt, as we self-consciously, aware of the power of 
redescription, partake in making selves and communities and institutions and cultures in the hope 
the artist always has: that what she makes might make a difference. Thus, this thesis also opens up 
a space within Rortian philosophy for asking further questions about how literary critics and poets 
do their work – how texts that succeed in changing us are made. 
It is my contention, then, that Rorty did not fully articulate a satisfying, wholly persuasive 
account of what his attitude incorporates beyond ‘ironism’, beyond the ‘fundamental choice’ to 
take all starting points as contingent – and that this thesis helps formulate such a response. Hence, 
while I disagree with Toal’s assessment that Rorty encourages an ‘imaginary erasure’ of cruelty, I 
can understand why such a reading of Rorty might arise.25 Such assessments of Rorty will arise as 
long as his ironism is taken to be what defines his pragmatism – whenever his deflationary attitude 
towards language and ideas (including the idea of selfhood and community) is taken to be the 
extent and core of his contribution. When this happens, Rorty’s poeticism falls out of focus. And it 
should, on my view and as already noted, be seen as the other side of the Rortian coin: attitude and 
practice, ironism and liberalism, pragmatism and humanism, adopting a literary stance and writing 
poems. ‘Ironism’ should not be used synecdochically to indicate ‘Rortian pragmatism’. It is 
misleading and reductive. I suspect a conflation of Rortian ironism with Rortian pragmatism is at 
least partly to blame for criticism of Rorty that worries about, as Rorty himself put it, ‘whether 
pragmatism is morally dangerous’.26 This appears to be the shared worry of Toal, Felski, and 
Misak: a worry that strong readings might be unethical, about the dangers of ‘making things up’, 
and whether it is possible to cultivate a humanist pragmatism even while stating that there is no 
theoretical, epistemological, or morally foundationalist defence against cruelty.27 
 
24 Richard Rorty, ‘Non-reductive physicalism’, in ORT, pp. 113–25 (p. 113). 
25 Toal, p. 131. 
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Rorty is also often seen through an affect-lens, rather than a work-lens: as suggesting that 
we need to invoke the right feelings rather than doing the right work. As we have seen, it is far 
from that simple. While Rorty does not make policy suggestions, he did see himself as attempting 
to do work, poetic work, that might potentially change how people talk, and in the long run ‘tempt 
the rising generation’ to change their behaviour.28 Asking whether Rorty got it right, got, say 
Peirce right, or Kant right, is to miss the point. Requiring Rorty to construct a rigorous 
metaphysical argument against cruelty is like asking an atheist to provide a theological argument 
for the existence of God. Rorty’s oeuvre is, as already suggested, a strong poem in its own right, 
and is, I am contending, most usefully read as such: for its effects, for its uses in human language 
and conversation and lives. Rorty’s narrative, as he tells it, is the point. And to suggest that this is 
not valid as intellectual or political intervention, is to say that literature has no such capability. 
Another important reason for wanting to advance the idea that Rortian pragmatism can be 
seen as a literary attitude, is the usefulness of this suggestion as a pedagogical tool. Rorty 
associates the literary attitude with quite specific qualities: a heightened appreciation of 
contingency, historicism, and a fully-fledged appreciation for nominalism; with moving in close, 
and with addressing humanly interesting content; with paying attention to the materiality of ‘noises 
and marks’, considering their uses and effects, and with anti-authoritarianism, acknowledgement 
and conversation. The literary stance does not have universalising ambitions; knows that what is 
written will not be the last word – does not want it to be the last word but wants for its words to 
generate more noises and marks. And it sees us all as poets, whatever we are writing – and not as 
collectively engaged in discovering the exact, determinate language that corresponds to how things 
truly are. When Rorty talks about ‘literary, as in ‘literary critic’, and ‘literary culture’, and ‘the 
attitude of the literary artist’, his use of this word carries these connotations. 
Most people would likely recognise that when we read literary works, we adopt a stance 
where the matter of correspondence is set aside: we do not expect a novel to ‘tell the Truth’ in that 
sense. Moreover, that when we read poems, materiality, effect, understanding, helpfulness to 
human lives and in human relations, are concerns that come to the fore. One approach to develop 
this angle further, would be to turn to the work of Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, and 
their definitions of a truth-as-correspondence-suspending, evaluative and appreciative ‘literary 
stance’.29 A Rortian account of ‘the literary stance’ would amount to similar definitions, sans their 
insistence on separating this stance from our regular attitude towards noises and marks; towards 
 
28 Rorty, CIS, p. 9. 
29 See Peter Lamarque and Stein H. Olsen, Truth, fiction, and literature: a philosophical perspective 





texts. Elaborating on this similarity would, I think, have significant explanatory power vis a vis 
Rortian pragmatism. 
One way of explaining the Rortian stance, then, is to say it breaks down the difference 
between theory and fiction. And, having established that, asks: now what? Where do we go from 
here? If everything is poetry, if even quantum mechanics is, as Rorty put it, ‘a notoriously great, 
but quite untranslatable, poem, written in a lamentably obscure language’; if there is no scheme or 
format or language or vocabulary that is the right one for knowledge or morality or physics or 
politics, what do we do? 30  How do we now negotiate knowledge equilibria? Engage in moral 
deliberation? Build institutions that take the processuality and contingency of their own making 
and operation into account? What will work now? What kind of practices do we need; what kind of 
guidelines for action?  
This illustrates why Rorty’s suggestions for how to think about what will work in a fully 
poeticised culture are well-worth evaluating, expanding on, and actively employing in our so-
called post-truth society. On a cultural level, we have come to acknowledge that we no longer have 
foundational and eternal truths to rely on, and we appear to collectively be grappling with the 
‘what will work now?’ question. Many nevertheless still hold the truths of science to be our 
fundamental truths, rather than our most useful truths for prediction and control. The Rortian 
approach offers resources for discussing how we might think and talk if we adopt the latter view. 
Here I think literary studies, as a discipline that produces knowledge, is a key case in point. 
Rorty fails to connect that in our field we have long had to deal with the question of how to 
negotiate knowledge-equilibria without recourse to correspondence-incidents (as is part of 
Lamarque and Olsen’s point). As an academic discipline, we successfully negotiate knowledge 
about literature in the absence of an ambition to find the right, true, representative, mirroring, 
language to talk about, say, John Ashbery. Of course, we operate with facts, but we also do so with 
self-conscious, even ironic, awareness of these facts as constructed, as products of a situated 
practice and a language. Seen from this angle, literary studies because it is the more querulous 
discipline (see p. 159), because it knowingly uses literary skills for persuasion, and because is 
content to treat knowledge claims as temporary and revisionable, might be said to be at the 
forefront of knowledge negotiation in our so-called post-truth culture. Literary studies might be 
where we need to turn to learn more about where to go from here, if, as Rorty implicitly argues, 
this discipline, this culture or interpretive community, works from an attitude towards ideas and 
texts that is useful for sustaining democratic openness and solidaric sensibilities, and cultivates and 
propagates a vital set of analytical, interpretive, and writerly skills. 
 





Moreover, Rorty’s argument for giving literature the central role he does, amounts to an 
argument for giving literature and literary criticism a considerably more central role in 
contemporary society. If literature both emerges from and helps us cultivate an attitude and a kind 
of attention we need– if it helps us cultivate the dispositions and habits we need to sustain and 
advance democratic culture as we know it (and we still do not have any better alternatives by 
comparison, which is the measure here), and helps us better imagine what might be ‘possible and 
important’ – then ensuring its recognition and proliferation, ensuring the cultivation of a necessary 
kind of literary skill, has the same kind of pragmatic primacy as Rorty gave to self-making. It 
implies that ensuring that literature and art and criticism is recognised as integral to our shared 
efforts towards a better future, is a vital matter. Vescio makes very similar points when he insists 
on the necessity of literary studies and criticism as a ‘Ministry of Disturbance’ defined by an 
unsubsumable plurality and constant critical debate about what we say and who we are. This is 
now, he says with Rorty, the place in society where students and intellectuals most ardently and 
imaginatively struggle to work this out, and the literary critical institution thus performs a 
necessary function for liberal democratic societies.31   
Yet, as I noted in the Introduction, Rorty takes care to downplay his own centring of 
literature and the literary. We must not privilege literature. Insight into writing must not be 
permitted to replace philosophy as the master discourse. 32 In an interview he is asked by E. P. 
Ragg: ‘[w]ould it be fair to say, then, that thinking holistically is, to some degree, literary?’ And 
Rorty replies: 
 
No, I don’t think so. It would be more appropriate to say thinking holistically, in the sense of 
not being limited to a given context or disciplinary framework, is a matter of thinking 
imaginatively. Politicians and theologians and engineers think imaginatively just as much as 
literary people do. To call it literary would be unduly to privilege literature.33 
 
In PTG he warns literary culture against giving itself airs.34 In Philosophy as Poetry published in 
2016 but based on Rorty’s 2004 Page-Barbour Lectures (given the year PTG was published), 
Rorty offers a sweeping, driven, at times startling version of the narrative he spent his career 
developing, and, as I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, told again and again: in PTG he called 
it his ‘tediously familiar up-from-representationalism story’, the story about the ‘takeover’ of 
 
31 Vescio, especially Part I.3. 
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‘literary culture’.35 But in these Page-Barbour Lectures, Rorty is concerned to not overstate the 
importance he had placed on literature for three decades. He says it seems ‘misguided’ to have said 
that postphilosophical (as in post-truth-as-correspondence) intellectual culture should place 
‘literature and the arts’ in the place of ‘science and philosophy as sources of wisdom’. ‘I think it 
would be better’, Rorty says, to say it would be a culture where ‘wisdom’ meant ‘something like 
“skill”, something that could be gained only through the accumulation of experience’.36 
The last comment in fact merges well with my discussion of Rorty on ‘literary skill’ above 
(pp. 163-166) and my suggestion that what is at stake is an attitude and a practice – a novelistic 
literary attitude or sensibility, and a readerly and writerly practice, or skill. Nevertheless, it is 
valuable to note and affirm these moments in Rorty’s work where he expresses the fear that we 
might get a culture that is the inversion of the scientistic-philosophical intellectual culture. But like 
Ragg, and like Vescio whose book as a whole affirms this view, I would suggest that Rorty in 
these instances fails to see the aptness of describing his attitude in the manner Ragg suggests. For 
what Ragg sees and expresses in this interview, goes beyond holism, to the kind of self-awareness 
about the made character of all texts, and the literary, novelistic attitude Rorty overtly supports and 
advances. Ragg can see that thinking of his approach as ‘literary’ is a suggestion that emerges 
from Rorty’s work – a line of reasoning I have been working to bring out more clearly. I am not 
saying science and its ways of talking and doing are not as vital as literature. But I am suggesting – 
and I think with Rorty – that cultivating that the kind of literary self-awareness that is the mark of 
the intellectual in Rorty’s utopian culture, will get us farther in the long run than seeing ourselves 
as seekers of Truth, for reasons Rorty extensively articulated. And thus, as suggested above, that 
cultivating it – even and perhaps especially in our scientists and philosophers – has a kind of 
pragmatic primacy of concerns.  
 There is support for this interpretation also in those same Page-Barbour Lectures. Rorty 
notes that Robert Brandom’s ‘paradigm of rational inquiry is the common law’ because it is a 
hermeneutic model of thought. Then he adds that ‘literary criticism’ would serve as well as a 
model for discourse, because its ‘necessary inconclusiveness is made plain by a remark that 
Brandom quotes from T. S. Eliot: “What happens when a work of art is created is something that 
happens simultaneously to all the works of art that preceded it”’.37 Rorty’s remark appears to 
condense a range of features he, in the course of a long career, associated with literary criticism, 
into one: processuality, acceptance and even celebration of redescription, an emphasis on tracing 
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36 Philosophy as Poetry, pp. 58–59. 
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those lines that go from poem to poem, its conversational nature, openness, and its holism – one 
that connects tradition, or a genre, with making it new, and by this alters and expands it. All these 
features combine to characterise literary criticism as a mode of discourse premised on 
‘inconclusiveness’ as its defining condition. 
Here, as on numerous previous occasions, the aptness of Rorty’s literary invocation is, 
moreover, striking. The lines that go from Eliot’s theory of poetry to Bloom’s are easy to trace. 
But there is more to it than what might at first be obvious. As Helen Thaventhiran notes in her 
book on modernist criticism, in which she borrows the phrase ‘radical empiricism’ from William 
James to serve as the lens through which to offer a reinterpretation of key critics of this era, Eliot 
‘openly ridiculed what he called “the lemonsqueezer school of criticism”’.38 It might be said of 
Rorty that he similarly caricatured the lemonsqueezer school of philosophy. This invocation of 
Eliot also brings up Rorty’s explicit alignment with modernism, rather than postmodernism. As 
Thaventhiran puts it, this was the ‘heyday’ of the question of the ‘meaning of meaning’.39 
Although pragmatism construes this question somewhat differently than the literary modernists 
did, it also permeates pragmatist thought: pragmatism, at least as I see it, still seeks a way to talk 
about meaning. There is, I would suggest, considerably more to explore here in relation to the 
question of why Rorty holds on to an identification with literary modernism, and on what it is that 
modernism sought that postmodernism lost interest or faith in, and that perhaps needs to be 
recovered.  
Richard Shusterman has painted Rorty as even more of a magpie-writer than James, 
suggesting he merely looked around, took what he found, and went with it.40 While that, too, 
surely was sometimes part of his process, most of Rorty’s literary invocations seem carefully 
selected. As the project this thesis contains comes to a close, it has already given rise to a new one, 
where I have begun the work of detailing these uses and appeals in a manner undergirded by the 
work undertaken for this thesis. What I have been arguing in it, what Ragg sees and Rorty 
acknowledges in the above, is that literary criticism works as a model for the holistic, humanistic, 
revisionary (and re-visionary) kind of thinking and knowledge-negotiating Rorty advocates. 
Furthermore, the remarks Rorty makes in the above, and this thesis as a whole, substantiate my 
claim in Chapter 1 that the role of literature and literary thinking in Rorty merits considerably 
more attention than it has been getting. It seems mistaken, to me, to construe Rorty’s literariness as 
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an ‘aspect’ of his work. The closer it is examined, the more it appears as an integral, uneliminable 
part of Rortian thought, interwoven into his writings, persistently and over decades. It connects 
ironism and liberalism, pragmatism and humanism, attitude and practice, lightness and 
seriousness. And it emphasises what is most distinctive about Rortian pragmatism: its radical 
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